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 ABSTRACT  
 
Descent into Darkness: The Local Participation of the Wehrmacht in the Holocaust in Belarus, 
1941-2 
(Under the direction of Christopher Browning) 
  
 This study examines how and why the German army become involved in the murder of 
Jews in the Soviet Union in the context of the Holocaust.  Focusing on the involvement of the 
Wehrmacht in genocide in six local areas, this work details a progression of complicity from 
improvised participation to the internalization of anti-Jewish measures.  Moreover, it explains in 
detail the myriad ways in which German soldiers aided in and benefited from the murder of Jews 
in Belarus.   
 This work highlights the critical importance of unit culture and the complex interaction 
between situational factors, values, and social-psychological forces.  It also demonstrates that the 
antipartisan war (or threat thereof) was intentionally and successfully mobilized to increase the 
participation of the German Army in the Holocaust.  Finally, this dissertation examines in detail 
the many different relationships between German soldiers and Jews that occurred in the context 
of the Nazi genocidal project in the East. 
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I. Introduction 
 
On a bitterly cold morning in November 1941,  fourteen-year-old Lisa Derman’s 
mother brought her and her sister to the barbed wire fence surrounding the Slonim ghetto and 
told them to hide with a neighbor.  They escaped the ghetto but were refused refuge in the 
town.  Instead, the two girls hid in the nearby woods.  As they ran into the dark pine forest, 
they stumbled across the site where 10,000 Jews of Slonim were being shot by an SS unit, 
assisted by German soldiers.  They then fled “from the blood and the screams and the shrieks 
to the opposite part of the forest to hide.”  A Polish forest ranger stopped them but the girls 
said they were simply gathering wood for the winter.  After having seen the killing site, 
however, the ranger returned and angrily accused them of being Jews escaping the action.  
He took them back to the road where most of the Jewish population of Slonim was slowly 
marching to the murder pits and told the two girls to get in line with the rest.  Lisa’s sister 
grabbed her hand and screamed to run and the two sisters ran away from the column across 
an open field.  Surprisingly, the German soldiers escorting the Jews did not fire at them.  The 
forest ranger hit Lisa’s sister in the leg with an axe but the two managed to escape.  After 
running from little children in Slonim who had screamed “Jewesses, Jewesses, you took off 
your yellow stars,” Lisa and her sister collapsed in a nearby barn.  The barn belonged to a 
local Christian woman who found them and told the frightened children, “You do not have to 
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tell me where you are coming from.  I know.  God has brought you to the right house.”  She 
fed them, bandaged their wounds, and hid them in her sofa during the killing.1 
The next morning a different journey to the killing site began.  German Army Private 
Anton N. marched out of the town of Slonim with his squad.  The men were tasked with 
covering the grave where between eight and ten thousand Jews had been killed the day 
before.  As they marched through a small wood, the squad came upon several Jews who had 
been wounded during the execution and had escaped.  One of them had been shot through the 
jaw.  All were returned to the mass grave and shot by these German soldiers.  When the 
squad finally arrived at the actual killing site in the Czepilow forest, it was apparent that 
other Jews had also managed to crawl out of the trench.  As a result, Private N.’s squad 
leader, Sergeant Martin Wörndle, led the men on a search of nearby villages for escaped 
Jews.   
Twenty years later, Anton N. found himself sitting in the local police office of the 
village of Sandebeck deep in the ancient German Teutoberger Forest.  He described the 
results of that patrol to the prosecuting attorney.  “We picked up a man, a woman, and a 
twelve year old boy.  We took them all back to the grave.  There, these three were also shot.”  
Of course, he said that no one from his group actually shot; this was taken care of by a 
volunteer firing squad.  As he and his fellow soldiers shoveled dirt on the grave, “it still 
moved because those Jews who were wounded had not received a killing shot.”2  
Similar acts of complicity in the Holocaust were repeated over and over across the 
occupied Soviet Union between 1941 and 1944.  While the SS and SD may have been tasked 
                                                
1 "Derman, Lisa,"  (USC Shoah Foundation Institute: Interview # 23224, Visual History Archive, 2009). 
2 "N., Anton Statement, 7 February 1961,"  (BA-ZS: B162/1550), 145-46. 
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officially with the murder of Jews, the German Army made itself, in many places, deeply 
complicit.  German soldiers rounded up Jews, guarded them, marched them to killing sites, 
and, in some cases, pulled the triggers themselves.  They appropriated Jewish property, 
sometimes sending it home to their own families.  Some soldiers even engaged in sexual 
relationships with Jews.  Yet others evaded participation and, in a very few cases, actively 
sought to aid or rescue Jews.  It is this multiplicity of experiences that form the subject of this 
study. 
Many scholars of the Holocaust have demonstrated that various organizations, 
including the German Army, were complicit in the crimes of the Nazis.  They have unearthed 
agreements and described common aims and mindsets among the leaders.  However, few 
have been able to present the end result of these more general acceptances of Nazi policy.  
What did “Wehrmacht complicity,” really look like at ground level?3  In what ways did units 
and individual soldiers actually take part in Nazi genocidal policies?  How did this 
participation change over time and with increased familiarity with killing? Why did some 
soldiers choose to participate (and not to participate) in the ways that they did?  In addition, 
how and why did the Wehrmacht become so involved in the murder of civilians? These are 
the central questions that I seek to answer in this study.  By focusing in detail on a series of 
cases, all of which occurred  in the territory of present day Belarus in the autumn and winter 
of 1941, I seek to provide a more cohesive narrative and analysis of the Wehrmacht’s 
progressive complicity.   
                                                
3 The term Wehrmacht technically refers to all fighting arms of the German military during World War II. 
When discussing the complicity of the military, especially from a historiographical standpoint, in 
atrocities committed during the war, I will use the term “Wehrmacht” as the discussion of such atrocities 
generally centers on land forces, specifically the Army. 
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How did German soldiers go from uncertain guarding of killing sites to grave robbing 
to sadistic “Jew Games” in less than six months?  This study will present the development of 
Wehrmacht complicity through four stages: 1) Improvisation, 2) Clarification, Exhortation, 
and Execution, 3) Routinization, and 4) Internalization.   This investigation follows the 
evolving participation of the Wehrmacht in the Nazi genocidal project through five roughly 
chronological cases throughout Belarus.  It begins in September 1941, when the 354th 
Infantry Regiment directly aided in the murder of 1,000 Jews in the town of Krupki, near 
Minsk.  The improvised manner in which this unit assisted Einsatzkommando 8 characterizes 
the initial stage of Wehrmacht complicity.4  Next, I examine a little-studied but vital 
antipartisan conference that took place a week later in Mogilev and explicitly connected the 
murder of Jews with day-to-day operations against partisans. Resulting directly from the 
Mogilev conference was the murder of over a hundred Jews in the village of Krucha by the 
3rd Company, 691st Infantry Regiment on October 10. The Army carried out this action 
completely on its own. This chapter explains the explicit idenification of Jews as targets, the 
incitement to kill Jews in the course of operations, and the ensuing execution of these 
policies.  In it, I argue that the Jew-Bolshevik-partisan construct was intentionally used to 
bring the manpower of the Wehrmacht to bear against Jews in smaller areas that posed 
logistical problems for the Einsatzgruppen.  I then move to the towns of Slonim and 
Novogrudok where, in November and December of 1941, two companies of the 727th 
Infantry Regiment assisted civilian authorities with ghettoization, expropriation, and the 
murder of 10,000 and 5,000 Jews, respectively.  These companies exhibit the routinization of 
                                                
4 Einsatzkommando 8 was a subordinate killing squad from Einsatzgruppe B which operated predominantly in 
what is now Belarus.  Specifically, the 354th assisted Teilkommando Schönemann which was subordinated to 
Einsatzkommando 8. 
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complicity within the framework of established relationships with the SS and civil 
authorities.  Finally, the case of the 12th Company in Sczcuczyn demonstrates the last stage in 
this process: internalization of guidance to murder Jews.  While not involved in any large 
massacres, this unit continually murdered Jews in small groups  in the course  of regular 
patrols and specialized “Jew hunts,” in which they reported the dead as “partisans,” thus 
demonstrating the continued influence of the antipartisan war as subterfuge for genocide. 
 Three important arguments explaining the depth and manner of Wehrmacht 
involvement in the Holocaust run throughout this work.  First, leadership was vital in both 
participation and non-participation of German soldiers and units.  Some units, led by 
particularly brutal men such as First Lieutenant Glück, in Slonim became particularly brutal.  
The example of Josef Sibille, who refused to comply with an order to murder Jews also 
highlights the power of leadership at the local level in the commission of mass killing.  
Second, almost from the beginning, the Jew-Bolshevik-Partisan calculus and the greatly 
exaggerated antipartisan threat was used to justify the participation in the Wehrmacht in the 
murder of the Jews.  The modes of this involvement extended far beyond the “logistical” 
support detailed in prewar agreements.  The manpower and increased territorial reach of the 
Army was explicitly leveraged to alleviate difficulties the killing units such as the 
Einsatzgruppen encountered in the East.  German Army units killed Jews independently and 
then reported the victims as dead partisans. Lastly,  it was extended contact with the 
Holocaust that led to increased participation, not some large difference in ideological fervor.  
Not all German Army units were placed in a position to become involved in genocide but a 
great many of them would have been disposed to participate given the opportunity.  By 
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examining the specifics of soldiers’ behavior on the ground, relationships with Jews and with 
German civil authorities, we can see that soldiers typically became more complicit over time. 
Both the temporal and spatial boundaries of this study are important.  With fewer 
local collaborators (due to Belarus’ less well-developed nationalist movement as compared to 
the Baltic States and the Ukraine), German forces were required to take more of a leading 
role in Nazi genocidal policy.  In addition, the large numbers of Jews living in this region 
made the “Final Solution” in this region of particular significance.  Lastly, the German 
perception of a partisan threat (even if of questionable reality) added an additional factor in 
the calculus of Wehrmacht complicity.  The timing of these actions in the autumn  and winter 
of 1941/42 is also helpful in narrowing the scope of this investigation.  The general tenor of 
the opening campaign in the East for the Germans was one of rapid advances and stunning 
victories.  This continued relatively unabated until November when the Germans were 
stopped at the gates of Moscow and the offensive ground to a stalemate.  With the most 
brutal and savage fighting yet to come, explanations based upon a “barbarization” of warfare 
leading to increasing violence by German forces can, for the most part, be discarded.  
Likewise, the partisan movement in Belarus did not become a real military threat until mid-
1942.  Thus, while as an  imagined threat it  played a decisive role in the mentality of the 
Wehrmacht and its willingness to engage in atrocities, arguments suggesting that genocidal 
violence was a reaction to a difficult guerilla war can be set aside for this period. 
Naturally, in an organization whose numbers reached over 17 million, the search for 
the “Holy Grail” of representativeness can be frustrating.   Germans served in many different 
types of units and in many different locations.  Several cases obviously cannot speak for all 
soldiers in all places.  Thus,  I will endeavor to explain  how several units came to be 
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involved in the ways they were as well as how the microhistorical approach to these selected 
case studies illuminates the larger phenomenon of Wehrmacht atrocities in other areas.  In 
many cases, this speaks to the potential for atrocities by the German Army as a whole, given 
certain situations.  Where this study differs from others in this scholarship is its focus on the 
lowest levels.   Taking into account the larger structural environment, I hope to reconstruct 
the daily lives and decisions of  Wehrmacht units complicit in mass killing in a way that has 
so far been neglected by most historians.  In so doing, we venture deeper into a myth of 
honorable and apolitical Wehrmacht behavior already deeply challenged by historians. 
 
The Many Lives of the Wehrmacht: Public Controversy and Academic 
Investigation 
 
“I can’t believe that.  I can’t believe it.  They were shot at, they had to defend 
themselves,…they had to.  I don’t believe these pictures of arbitrary shootings and 
hangings.  I don’t believe my uncles were murderers…I don’t believe my grandfather 
was a murderer either.  I can’t believe it.  Otherwise I would have to hang myself.” 
Visitor to the Wehrmacht Exhibition, Vienna, 19955 
 
“The 'innocent Wehrmacht' was always nonsense….People say 'We didn't know'. But 
there are hundreds of thousands of letters home. There is a lot of self-protection 
among older people.” 
Heinz Denicke, 75, visitor to Wehrmacht Exhibition, Hamburg, 19956 
 
 
 At 4:40 am on the morning of 9 March 1999, a bomb exploded outside an adult 
training center in Saarbrücken, Germany.  While causing extensive damage to the building 
and shattering the windows in a nearby church, the bomb did little damage to its intended 
                                                
5 Gabriel Fawcett, "The Wehrmacht Exhibition," History Today 52, no. 4 (2002): 2. 
6 Steve Crawshaw, "Germans Own up to Horrors Committed on Eastern Front," The Independent, 17 April 
1995, 8. 
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target: an exhibition depicting the complicity of the Wehrmacht in the crimes of the Nazis.7  
Yet, the anger, shock, and public interest in the traveling exhibit funded by German tobacco 
magnate and philanthropist Jan Reemstma and organized by the Hamburg Institute for Social 
Research demonstrated the powerful position that military collaboration in the Holocaust still 
held in the German psyche.   
The eruption of public response manifested itself in protests and violence from all 
sides of the political spectrum.   A demonstrator from the right-wing NPD carried a sign 
reading, “If all soldiers were criminals and murderers, then I am one of the latter. I do not 
feel guilty. It was not a humane war.”8  A conservative historian wrote a volume in response 
called “Crimes against the Wehrmacht” in which he documented the war crimes committed 
against German forces by the Red Army, implying that the exhibition suffered from a 
misplaced emphasis.9  In the four years after it opened, the exhibit traveled to thirty-three 
Austrian and German cities and hosted over 800,000 visitors.10  If it highlighted the highly 
emotionally charged elements of the subject, the exhibition also demonstrated but did not 
master its historical complexity.  In 1999, three historians contested the attribution of several 
photographs, arguing that they depicted victims of the NKVD and not those of the 
Wehrmacht.  This led to a suspension of the exhibition as a panel of historians painstakingly 
examined every photo.  The exhibit reopened in 2001, with far fewer photographs, leading it 
to be accused of  presenting “consensus history” and having “banished the emotions to the 
                                                
7 "Nazi War Crimes Show Bombed - Police Suspect Extremists ", Deutsche Presse-Agentur 9 March 1999. 
8 Jan Phillipp Reemtsma, Ulrike Jureit, and Hans Mommsen, eds., Verbrechen der Wehrmacht : Dimensionen 
des Vernichtungskrieges 1941-1944 : Ausstellungskatalog (Hamburg: Hamburger,2002), 697. 
9 Franz Wilhelm Seidler, Verbrechen an der Wehrmacht : Kriegsgreuel der Roten Armee 1941/42 (Selent: Pour 
le Merite, 1998). 
10 Jan Phillipp Reemtsma, Ulrike Jureit, and Hans Mommsen, eds., Verbrechen der Wehrmacht : Dimensionen 
des Vernichtungskrieges 1941-1944 : Ausstellungskatalog (Hamburg: Hamburger,2002), 687. 
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footnotes.”11  It had raised critical questions which were necessary for German society, but 
had provided no answers. 
While the exhibition was successful in raising public awareness, challenging 
conventional beliefs, and provoking violent emotional responses and debates, its overall 
historical value was debatable.   Questions of representativeness and of internal motivation 
remained unanswered. In many ways, the format of the first exhibition precluded a 
methodologically rigorous approach to such questions for it entailed (by necessity) the 
“cherry-picking” of particularly egregious or emotive examples of Holocaust complicity. The 
exhibit further challenged the academic community through its use of sources. The several 
errors of attribution regarding photographs as well as the inclusion of diaries and letters 
spawned important questions about what documents should or could be relied on and what 
these sources are able to tell historians (as well as what they cannot). In the end, the 
Wehrmacht exhibition brought the crimes of the German army into public view and caused 
strong emotional reactions, but its “sound and fury” left many, if not most, of the questions 
regarding the complicity of the Wehrmacht unanswered.12  Chief among these was the level 
of participation among German soldiers and how this unfolded over time. 
The history of the German Army (and its relationship with the Nazi regime) has 
followed a somewhat torturous path since the end of World War II.   For much of this period, 
this issue evolved in the separate yet connected spheres of public and academic discourse.  
For many if not most Germans, any involvement by the Wehrmacht in the crimes of the 
                                                
11 Hannes Heer, Vom Verschwinden der Täter : der Vernichtungskrieg fand statt, aber Keiner war dabei 
(Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 2004), 36. 
12 For more on the Wehrmacht Exhibition and associated debates, see Helmut  Donat and Arn Strohmeyer, eds., 
Befreiung von der Wehrmacht? : Dokumentation der Auseinandersetzung über die Ausstellung 
"Vernichtungskrieg--Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944" in Bremen 1996/97 (Bremen: Donat,1997). 
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Third Reich remained a taboo subject, individually and collectively.  The large number of 
Germans served in the Wehrmacht at some point between 1939 and 1945 dwarfed the 
numbers who served in the SS, the only military organization to be officially condemned as 
criminal at the Nuremburg Trials.  Because most Germans knew a relative or close friend 
who had served in the military, there was understandably great reluctance to consider their 
participation in atrocities.  Very quickly this personal discomfort, among other things, led to 
what has become known as the “Mythos der sauberen Wehrmacht” or “Myth of the Clean 
Wehrmacht.” In this formulation, the German Army fought a purely conventional war against 
the Red Army, to protect the homeland.  The genocidal crimes and excesses of the Third 
Reich, while regrettable, were committed by the SS and police apparatuses.  The Army, if it 
knew of them, was deeply disturbed but unable to intervene.  The very real violence carried 
out by the Red Army when it conquered Germany, most notably the systematic mass rapes of 
German women, further validated the sacrifice and service of veterans. 
The political exigencies of the immediate postwar era also worked to place any 
discussion, let alone prosecution, of Wehrmacht crimes beyond reach.  As the Cold War 
became hotter, America increasingly focused on Germany as a bulwark against the Soviets 
rather than the land of the Nazis. Donald Bloxham notes that “between 1945 and 1953, 
Allied policy shifted rapidly from enforcing the idea of collective German guilt to 
differentiation between Germans, then, somewhat more gradually, to appeasement of 
German indignation at the earlier punishment of war criminals.”13 None other than General of 
the Army Dwight Eisenhower, distancing himself from earlier more critical comments, 
                                                
13 Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial: The War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and 
Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 11-12. 
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declared in 1951 that "the German soldier fought bravely and honorably for his country."14 
Such exonerating statements served both the larger Cold War need for Bundeswehr 
recruitment and the public need to minimize the possible guilt of a large part of the male 
population. Indeed, in 1953, when asked if they thought “German soldiers could be 
reproached for their actions in the occupied countries”, 55% of Germans said “no”, 21% said 
“in some cases,” and only 6% answered with an unequivocal “yes.”15 
Political engagements in the public sphere merged with a focus on the return of 
POWs in the postwar years and by a tendency by Germans to focus on the effects of Allied 
bombing, the experience of German POWs, and the crimes of the Soviet Army, rather than 
addressing issues of complicity in the Third Reich. Indeed, for many Germans, the debate 
over the return of POWs from the Soviet Union and emphasis on those Germans driven out 
of the East served to highlight the role played by the Wehrmacht in “saving” Germany from 
further Soviet depredations.  This had the secondary effect of both minimizing any 
participation of the Army in the Holocaust while simultaneously allowing the German people 
to view themselves as the real victims of the war (as POWs and refugees fleeing the Red 
Army as well as of the Allied bombing campaigns).16 
The first published works on the German army after the war were similarly myopic. 
These books were often written by the generals themselves. They were sterile, largely self-
serving military histories, full of dates, locations, and tactical decisions, but eschewing any 
                                                
14 David Clay Large, "Reckoning without the Past: The HIAG of the Waffen-SS and the Politics of 
Rehabilitation in the Bonn Republic, 1950-1961," The Journal of Modern History 59, no. 1 (1987): 111. 
15 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Erich Peter Neumann, The Germans: Public Opinion Polls 1947-1966 
(Allensbach: Bonn, Verlag für Demoskopie, 1967), 202. 
16 For an excellent discussion of this postwar construction of collective memory, see Robert G. Moeller, War 
Stories : The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001). 
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mention of the darker side of the Nazi regime and the participation of the Army in it.17  The 
U.S. was particularly interested in these memoirs, given its new interest in defeating the 
Soviet military.  Former generals were brought to the United States to coach American 
military men on tactics used against the Red Army in preparation for a future World War III 
in Europe.  Indeed, American fascination with the Wehrmacht persists to this day, as 
evidenced in popular culture.18  Even renowned historians such as Gordon Craig were not 
immune from seeing little complicity between the German Army and the Nazis.  While he 
was certainly critical of the German Army and its relationship with the Nazis and covered 
very briefly the Nazi genocidal project, he was—like others—more interested in the 
military’s role in the failure of democracy in Germany and in furthering Hitler’s expansionist 
policies.19 
However, beginning in the 1960s, a newer generation of scholars began exploring the 
Holocaust itself more deeply.  Historians such as Raul Hilberg examined the massive Nazi 
machinery of killing, to include the high level cooperation between general officers and the 
regime.  The masterful studies in The Anatomy of the SS State by Hans Buchheim, Martin 
                                                
17 See, for example, Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago,: H. Regnery Co., 1958), Günther Blumentritt, 
My Military Career (Karlsruhe, Germany: Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe 
[Foreign Military Studies Branch], 1946), Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (Washington: Zenger Pub. Co., 
1979), Wilhelm Keitel and Walter Görlitz, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Keitel, Wilhelm, 
1882-1946. Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Verbrecher oder Offizier? English (New York: Cooper Square Press, 
2000). 
18 For a fascinating study of this dynamic, see Ronald M. Smelser and Edward J. Davies, II, The Myth of the 
Eastern Front : The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
19 Craig briefly covers genocidal plans in his seminal work on Germany, 1866-1945.  In his work on the army’s 
political history, he doesn’t treat it at all, choosing instead to focus on historical junctures where the military 
failed to resist Hitler.  These shortcomings aside, Craig still deservedly stands as a giant of German history. 
Gordon Alexander Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 
Gordon Alexander Craig, "Germany, 1866-1945." (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.00821. 
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Broszat,  Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, and Helmut Krausnick figure as some other seminal works 
from this period.20 They first discussed, for example, the role of discipline in following 
orders, the Commissar Order, and the intentional murder of Soviet prisoners of war.  
Important in this regard was also Manfred Messerschmidt’s volume discussing the Nazi 
indoctrination of the Wehrmacht.21 The 1960s  also witnessed  the spectacle of the trial of 
Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem and the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt (among many German 
trials) which again focused attention on the Holocaust and its perpetrators.  However, both 
the Eichmann trial and the larger German trials focused almost entirely on SS perpetrators 
and omitted the complicity of Wehrmacht personnel entirely. 
Later scholars began building upon the foundations laid for them by historians like 
Hilberg, exploring the Holocaust in more detail.  By the 1970s and 1980s, the breadth and 
depth of both Holocaust research and research into the crimes of the Wehrmacht had greatly 
expanded.  Christian Streit’s massive and path breaking book illuminated in detail the 
systematic and intentional murder of Soviet prisoners of war.22  Krausnick and Wilhelm also 
probed deeper into Wehrmacht complicity in genocide with their work on the 
Einsatzgruppen.23  Other historians followed, investigating different areas of Wehrmacht 
complicity and its behavior.  One of the more decisive of these works was the research of 
Israeli historian, Omer Bartov.  Focusing directly on the German Army on the Eastern Front, 
                                                
20 See Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), Hans 
Buchheim, Martin Broszat, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Anatomie des SS-Staates, 2 vols. (München: Deutschen 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1967). 
21 Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat; Zeit der Indoktrination (Hamburg: R. v. Decker, 
1969). 
22 Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden : Die Wehrmacht Und Die Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941-1945 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978). 
23 Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges : die 
Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 1938-1942 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981). 
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Bartov first recognized and then sought to explain its abnormal brutality.24  
Academic study and public awareness of  the Holocaust had briefly merged during 
the famous trials of the early 1960s.  They crossed paths again with the debut of the 
miniseries Holocaust in German in 1979, which brought Germany’s role in the crimes of the 
Nazis into virtually every living room.  While the television event may have pushed the 
Holocaust again to public consciousness, the impetus for trials of Nazi war criminals in 
Germany was waning as perhaps the outcome of the trial of Majdanek concentration camp 
personnel in 1981 indicates.  Out of sixteen defendants, only eight were convicted.  Their 
sentences, apart from one life imprisonment, averaged to six and a half years in prison.  
Overseas, however, other nations began taking a greater interest in denaturalizing and 
prosecuting potential war criminals living within their borders. 
More recently, several trials of German war criminals in the SS and Wehrmacht as 
well as local collaborators such as John Demjanjuk have reminded the public and historians 
alike that complicity in the Holocaust remains an critical and relevant issue today.25  Most 
notable among these is the case of Josef Scheungraber who, as a Wehrmacht lieutenant 
ordered the deaths of at least eleven Italian civilians by locking them in a barn which was 
then blown up.  The killing was in revenge for a partisan attack upon his soldiers.  He was 
                                                
24 Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45 : German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1986). 
25 Apart from John Demjanjuk (accused of being a prison guard at Sobibor), other cases have come to light.  
Former Waffen-SS trooper Adolf Storms has been charged with the execution of Jewish slave-laborers in 1945.  
Another Waffen-SS member, Heinrich Boere, a Dutch volunteer, was convicted of the murder of three Dutch 
civilians in 1944 and sentenced to life in prison.  For Demjanjuk, see  Nicholas Kulish, "Man Tied to Death 
Camp Goes on Trial in Germany," New York Times, 1 December 2009. For Storms, see  Roger Boyes, "Ex-SS 
trooper Adolf Storms charged over mass shooting of Jews,"  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6920433.ece.For Boere, see Roger Boyes, 
"Laughing SS Hitman Finally Faces Court for Murders," The Times, 29 October 2009, Victor Homoloa and 
Alan Cowell, "Ex-Nazi Guilty in Wartime Murders," New York Times, 24 March 2010. 
 15 
sentenced to life in prison at the age of ninety.26  In Germany, the prosecution of these cases 
is a result of renewed interest by a younger generation of prosecutors which is certainly 
partially driven by the reaction to the Wehrmacht exhibition of the 1990s.  Yet even today, 
there is a divide between public and private memory of the Nazi period in German 
households as sociologist Harald Welzer demonstrates.  While most recognize and condemn 
the crimes of the Third Reich and may even admit that the Wehrmacht participated, they do 
not accept that their family members could have been involved.  Often, stories of the war 
within families privilege acts of resistance and disagreement with the regime, not admissions 
of guilt.27   
Scholarly studies are now beginning to focus on the army’s actions from a regional 
perspective, beginning with Walter Manoschek’s path breaking work on Serbia (pre-
Wehrmachtausstellung) and continuing to Poland and the occupied territories.28  Theo 
Schulte has written a study of one rear area administrative unit in the Soviet Union, Korück 
582.29 Mark Mazower treats the German occupation of Greece, while Karel Berkhoff focuses 
on the occupation of Ukraine.30 Two regional studies particularly useful for this project are 
Bernhard Chiari and Christian Gerlach’s studies of the German military occupation of 
                                                
26 See Judy Dempsey, "Former Nazi Officer Convicted of Murdering Italian Civilians " New York Times, 12 
Aug 2009, Nicholas Kulish, "In Germany, Whispers of 'Enough' at a War-Crimes Trial," New York Times, 8 
February 2009. 
27 For an excellent study of this phenomenon in Germany, see Harald  Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline 
Tschuggnall, Opa war kein Nazi : Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2002). 
28 Walter Manoschek, "Serbien Ist Judenfrei": Militärische Besatzungspolitik Und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 
1941/42 (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1993). 
29 Theo J. Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia ( New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1989). 
30 Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair : Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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“White Russia.”31 Local studies of atrocities have also been conducted by several historians. 
Rafael Scheck has researched the treatment of French colonial troops by the Wehrmacht and 
Sarah Farmer has studied the massacre of civilians at Oradour by SS troops.32 Rossino and 
Böhler’s studies of the German invasion of Poland are useful monographs in this vein as they 
prove the Army’s proclivity for atrocities in the spirit of Nazi ideology over two years before 
the invasion of the Soviet Union.33 H.F. Meyer’s study of the 117th Jäger Division and its 
participation in atrocities and Ben Shepherd’s book on the 221st Security Division are 
examples of two valuable unit-level works.34  One of the most recent and useful works is 
Christian Hartmann’s detailed comparison of five different divisions (two infantry, one 
panzer, one security, and one rear area command).35  Hartmann seeks to compare and 
contrast how these different kinds of units experienced the war on the Eastern Front as well 
as their interactions with prisoners of war, commissars, and the Holocaust.  It is an 
enormously informative work but, focusing at the division level, is often unable to explore in 
detail the internal dynamics of  killing units. 
As this growing body of historiography ably demonstrates, the Wehrmacht can hardly 
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claim to have been “clean,” not only in the occupied Soviet Union, but throughout Europe. 
Many of its crimes have been documented, though historians are continuing to bring to light 
new areas of responsibility and modes of complicity.  This excavation has raised important, 
fundamental questions: Why did the German army participate to such an extent in Nazi racial 
policy?  In the end, the German Army’s involvement in murder devolved onto individual 
decisions of soldiers on the ground.  How willingly did these soldiers participate? What roles 
did ideology, the combat environment, leadership, and group dynamics play in the ways and 
extent of complicity?  The debate over these questions appears far from settled.  
Historians and researchers have sought explanations for the behavior of perpetrators 
since the crimes of the Nazi state were uncovered.  Approaches have varied from ideological 
to psychological to experiential, from identification of specific characteristics of German 
culture to connection with universal aspects of human nature.  Some explanations stem from 
an ideological approach.  Historians and researchers have argued that, as a product of Nazi 
society, the Wehrmacht reflected the high level of racial and ideological indoctrination that 
the civilian population experienced as well.  Perhaps the most influential  of these historians 
is Omer Bartov.  His path-breaking work, Hitler’s Army, argued first that the Wehrmacht was 
Hitler’s army, that it was highly indoctrinated and maintained a high level of belief in the 
Nazi system. He further contended that the situation on the front led to the destruction of the 
“primary group” of comrades and that this primary group was replaced with ideology as the 
motivating factor and source of cohesion. Bartov went on to explain that soldiers were 
allowed (and even encouraged) to commit atrocities as a way to release the tension created 
by the Army’s draconian system of discipline.  Finally, he concludes that as the situation on 
the Eastern Front deteriorated, soldiers clung more and more desperately to the ideologies 
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they were being fed, making them view the war in more and more extreme ways.36  In a later 
work, he wrote, 
It is quite possible, of course, to stake out a third position, one which stresses 
a crucial factor neglected both by Browning’s circumstantial interpretation 
and by Goldhagen’s essentialist view, namely the powerful impact of 
ideology and indoctrination on the perpetrators.37 
 
Daniel Goldhagen lies at the most extreme end of this spectrum.  Eschewing any short-term, 
situational factors, he argued that a special German “eliminationist” anti-Semitism was 
present.  Shaped by centuries of German culture rather than years of Nazi indoctrination, 
soldiers, like all Germans, were eager to kill Jews and simply waiting for the opportunity to 
do so.38  
 Other scholars have employed a psychological approach to explain perpetrator 
behavior in general. One of the first to do so was Theodor Adorno, who attempted to explain 
such inhuman behavior with his conception of the “authoritarian personality,” a personality 
type particularly disposed to complicity in an authoritarian state, given the right conditions.39  
In 1944, sociologists Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz began conducting hundreds of 
interviews of captured German soldiers. They focused on the “primary group” as the 
essential factor behind soldier motivation and combat effectiveness.  The “primary group” 
refers to a cohort of soldiers who have known each other often for a long period of time and 
                                                
36 Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army : Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991). 
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38 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners : Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, 1st ed. (New 
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have developed strong bonds of comradeship from both their civilian upbringing and military 
experiences.  Retreating from earlier assertions, the two sociologists argued that  
it appears that a soldier’s ability to resist [to fight] is a function of the 
capacity of his immediate primary group…to avoid social 
disintegration....The capacity of the primary group to resist disintegration 
was dependent on the acceptance of political, ideological, and cultural 
symbols (all secondary symbols) only to the extent that these secondary 
symbols became directly associated with primary gratifications.40 
 
The experiments by Milgram and Zimbardo on deference to authority and role adaptation 
respectively have further informed this topic.41  These studies showed in their subjects a 
remarkable degree of acceptance of authority and susceptibility to peer pressure and that such  
peer pressure can form quickly and have a decisive impact on behavior and the decision to 
stand up to perceived wrongdoing.  Philip Zimbardo’s disturbing “Stanford Prison 
Experiment” demonstrated in shocking form that individuals quickly adapt to assigned roles, 
and seek to exhibit the skills and characteristics they believe define these roles.  His 
experiment was so “successful” that it had to be stopped after six days as it became too 
violent and degrading for the participants.  Zimbardo argues that the social groups in which 
we find ourselves “define what is right, socially appropriate, or ‘in,’ and produce adherence 
to these ideas through such techniques as social rewards, threats of punishment or ostracism, 
and various other pressures toward conformity.”42  In addition, the theory of cognitive 
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dissonance holds that most individuals are distressed by discrepancies between their beliefs 
and action, and often alleviate this distress by altering their beliefs.  Browning’s example of 
the policeman who justifies his murder of children as a mercy killing, because their parents 
had just been murdered is an example of such an explanation in action.43 Harald Welzer, too, 
employs this approach via his discussion of a new Nazi “ morality of killing.”44 In the end, 
all this research in social psychology indicates that human beings are profoundly influenced 
by the social pressures within groups.  
 These findings have also influenced the historiography.  In his book, Ordinary Men, 
Christopher Browning arrived at a much different conclusion than Bartov or Goldhagen as to 
why reserve policemen participated in atrocities. He argues convincingly that social 
psychological factors within the context of group dynamics played a pivotal role in 
motivating middle-aged reserve policemen to commit atrocities and that, at least in these 
cases, ideology was not the primary motivating factor.45  The men of Reserve Police 
Battalion 101 were neither specially indoctrinated troops nor men young enough to have 
been shaped by Nazi schooling and youth groups.  They were middle-aged men, with 
families, who killed more often due to peer pressure and obligation to duty than out of 
malice. 
 In his study of Reserve Police Battalion 45, Harald Welzer, too, argues for a social 
psychological approach.  He writes “even when we examine ourselves, substantial 
                                                
43 Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men : Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland 
(New York: Harper Perennial, 1998), 73. 
44 See Harald Welzer, Täter : wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden (Frankfurt am Main: S. 
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45 See Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men : Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland 
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discrepancies appear between our moral demands and actions; depending on the situation, we 
are capable of extremely different ways of thinking, acting and speaking.”46 Welzer also 
contends that a new Nazi “morality” governed the behavior of these men.  Thomas Kühne 
goes a step further.  In his study of comradeship, he maintains first that “the threat of social 
death, exclusion from the mutual welfare and communication network, was the cement of 
military group culture.”47  Indeed, he describes a “shame culture” which exerted a very real 
and powerful peer pressure, also incorporating elements of a conception of masculinity that 
viewed noncompliance as weakness.48  Kühne then claims that atrocities themselves served 
as an initiation into the group.  Killing, then, became an act of collective act of bonding. 
Thus, while the crimes of the Wehrmacht in their various forms have been laid bare, 
questions of scope, scale, and motivation remain conclusively unanswered. The variety and 
breadth of the crimes of the Wehrmacht demand not only a comprehensive and comparative 
look at policy and institutional decision-making, but also a micro-historical examination of 
how individual soldiers participated in these violent policies.  The latter examination of the 
Wehrmacht in particular has only recently begun to be attempted.  Put plainly, what does 
complicity actually look like on the ground? 
One of the reasons that this line of inquiry remains elusive is that approaches that 
have worked well for other studies are often less useful at this scale.  Studies relying on large 
samples of letters, for example, may be enlightening in telling us about some soldiers’ 
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mentalities.  However, they often tell us little about participation in atrocities.  Even when 
soldiers write about such things, their letters are often vague and avoid any details about their 
participation.  Studies at the regional level looking at policy decisions are valuable, but again 
often cannot reveal much about individual cases.   
This study will focus on five specific, unit-level microhistories of Wehrmacht 
participation in the Holocaust in Belarus.  It will seek to reconstruct the internal unit 
dynamics of these units as well as the details surrounding these killings.  Only by focusing on 
the micro level with regard to Wehrmacht complicity in genocide can one really begin to 
weigh the influences of factors such as antisemitism, social-psychological pressures, 
guidance from above, and situational or positional factors.  This study will also attempt to 
incorporate an understanding of the spatial characteristics of killing, specifically the impact 
of positionality on the killers and their responses to killing.  By positionality, I mean a 
person’s physical location in space and their relation to their surroundings.  For many 
soldiers, their positions during killings can provide insight into their personal attitude toward 
those killings. It is almost impossible to accurately reconstruct this past when relying on only 
one source base.  Thus, this work is based on a variety of different, sometimes contradictory 
sources that serve to correct and to corroborate each other. These are postwar judicial 
interrogations, military archival documents, survivor testimony, and physical site surveys. 
Shards of Stories: Sources 
The reconstruction of worlds is one of the historian’s most important tasks. He 
undertakes it, not from some strange urge to dig up archives and sift through 
old paper, but because he wants to talk with the dead. By putting questions to 
documents and listening to replies, he can sound dead souls and take the 
measure of the societies they inhabited. 
- Robert Darnton, The Literary Underground of the Old Regime49 
                                                
49 Robert Darnton, The Literary Underground of the Old Regime (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1982), v. 
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 Explaining the experience of the Holocaust in the East requires reliance on diverse 
sources, all of which have their own strengths and weaknesses.  For the historian, the first 
step is understanding these benefits and limitations and incorporating this evaluation in the 
employment of these texts.  The sources for this work fall into roughly four categories: 
postwar German testimonies, German wartime military documents,  survivor testimony, and 
site visit fieldwork. 
 Judicial statements given by former soldiers form, in many ways, the foundation of 
this study.  They constitute both one of the richest and also most problematic of the sources 
used.  The Central Office for the Investigation of Nazi Violent Crime was founded in 1958 to 
act as a central agency for the coordination of all investigations of German citizens involved 
in Nazi crimes.  As such, it also became a repository for records relating to these 
investigations and trials.  Housed perhaps fittingly in a former prison in the small, baroque 
town of Ludwigsburg outside Stuttgart, this archive contains a wide variety of documents 
from legal memoranda to court judgments to interrogation statements.  It is the last of these 
that sheds the most light on the development of complicity by German soldiers.  These 
documents are the records of interrogations and interviews conducted by German police and 
prosecutors of former members of the Wehrmacht and SS.  The vast majority of these men 
were called as witnesses rather than as accused.  Therefore, they are at least less likely to 
obfuscate than those who were testifying at the risk of their freedom. 
 The challenges of these sources are apparent.  First, the investigatory environment in 
which these discussions took place was, by its nature, adversarial.  Witnesses were quite 
aware of the legal risks involved and certainly reticent to implicate themselves.  Second, they 
were often concerned with protecting their former comrades.  Investigators did not always 
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ask the questions that historians might be most interested in nor did soldiers always volunteer 
that information. Especially with those accused, but also with witnesses, the nature of the 
questioning could lead to a great deal of obfuscation, evasion, and outright lying.  How does 
one make sense of such documents?  In his discussion of Eichmann, Christopher Browning 
provides us with four useful tests to help determine the relative truth contained in these types 
of testimony.  They are: 
1. The Self Interest Test: When a witness makes statements against his self interest 
or where telling the truth is in his self interest. 
2. The Vividness Test: When the witness describes events with “an unusual 
attention to details of visual memory.” 
3. The Possibility Test: When a witness' claims “are not contradicted or 
proven impossible.” 
4. The Probability Test: When the accounts “coincide with or fit a pattern of 
events suggested or established by other documentation.”50 
It is, therefore, surprising how much valuable information can be gleaned from these often 
seemingly contradictory and self-serving testimonies, especially when reading them against 
other types of sources. 
First, these witnesses provide a great deal of information that is of no legal 
significance but is incredibly useful in understanding both the nature of the unit and the 
nature of their crimes.  As these descriptions carried little judicial risk, they also did not 
receive the same level of careful consideration that other subjects may have.  These men tell 
us much of what these killings looked like to those on the ground and how soldiers 
participated.  Second, the very manner in which witnesses and the accused attempt to explain 
or evade answering can be instructive.  Word choice, even after the fact, can be a valuable 
way of interpreting how these men understood their participation in these atrocities.  Of 
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course, what is not said can often also be a valuable piece of information.  Finally, despite all 
these possible reasons for dissembling, many witnesses do provide detailed accounts, even of 
potentially incriminating activities.  Like any source, when one has read a critical mass of the 
same kinds of documents, patterns emerge and it becomes easier to discern “truth” from 
obfuscation. 
 Alone, however, these documents still can present a skewed view of the Holocaust, 
reflecting both a perpetrator perspective and a judicial environment.  For this reason, the 
second source base, military documents, provides a necessary corrective.  Military maps, 
orders, and memoranda are not tainted by postwar reflection or judicial concern.  They 
represent to a degree contemporary policy and actions.  They can show us where units were 
and, in some cases, who was being killed.  Military documents also can elucidate what 
policies and guidance were being disseminated to the troops.  These elements add an 
important contextual and organizational background that tempers the often apologetic nature 
of judicial statements. 
 Military documents, of course, come with their own bias.  While specific about some 
things, they can often be infuriatingly vague about others, particularly the nature of killings 
and Jewish policy.  As a result of the fortunes of war, the mass of documents surviving in 
archives often comes from the higher levels of the military and, thus, does not always tell us 
what the lower level units were doing.  Finally, military documents function under their own 
logic and contain specific language that can misinterpreted unless carefully read. 
 Survivor testimony gives us the very important survivor perspective and offers a 
further corrective.  Obviously, these sources go a long way toward filling in the very physical 
void left in the sources by the absence of the victims.  These testimonies also correct the 
 26 
tendency of judicial statements to minimize mention of cruelty and antisemitism.  They also 
add details and contexts that were beyond the scope of legal investigation. These survivor 
testimonies come in several forms such as legal witness statements, written memoirs, taped 
oral histories, and Yizhkor or memory books.   
Each is a different kind of source created under circumstances that influence how 
they are best used.  Legal statements given to German prosecutors by survivors are, like the 
interrogations of the accused, narrowly focused on points of law and the facts of the case and, 
thus, often lack a larger human context.  However, as the witnesses are often interviewed 
relatively more recently after the war, their testimony is less likely to be affected by the 
effects of memory and collective storytelling.  Written survivor memoirs have all the benefits 
and limitations of any form of memoir writing and are also affected by things like author 
self-censorship, backward-looking analysis, and faulty remembering.  Taped oral histories 
such as those found in the Fortunoff or Shoah Archive collections are very valuable in their 
great length and the ability of the interviewer to interact with the witness.  Of course, the 
historian cannot himself interact with the subject and is thus limited to relying on the skills of 
the interviewer who may or may not be asking the questions most useful to that research.  
Lastly,  survivors of many Jewish communities compiled Yizhkor or memory books to 
memorialize both the life and the death of their hometowns.  While these documents are 
certainly of an amateur nature, to overlook them as a valuable source would be shortsighted.  
They often provide details about the people in these communities which are absent from legal 
investigations and at times even corroborate statements made in these investigations.  
Lastly, visits to the sites of murder and conversations with those mainly non-Jewish 
inhabitants still alive who witnessed killings add perspectives that cannot be gained from an 
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archive.  Walking the ground and visiting the villages where the Wehrmacht killed adds a 
sense of space and place that textual sources cannot provide. Taken together and read against 
one another, these four  types of sources offer us the opportunity to explore for the first time 
the participation of German soldiers in the Holocaust on the ground in Belarus. 
 
Nations, Partitions, and Shtetls: Belarus and the Jews 
 
On the earth, this is the last part of the Jewish people that has created 
and kept alive its own songs and dances, customs, and myths, 
languages and forms of community, and at once preserved the old 
heritage with a vital validity. 
 - Arnold Zweig, Ober Ost cultural administration51 
 
By starving Soviet prisoners of war, shooting and gassing Jews, and 
shooting civilians in antipartisan actions, German forces made 
Belarus the deadliest place in the world between 1941 and 1944. 
 -Timothy Snyder52 
 
Belarus is truly—as sociologist Andrew Savchenko noted—a “perpetual 
borderland.”53 No Belarussian state as such even existed before the 20th century.  It is a 
generally flat country, heavily forested with large marshy areas to the south.  The rivers 
Dnieper and Beresina were highways through the region from Roman times as was the 
Pripyat River to the south, connecting the Dnieper to the Vistula and Poland.  With major 
population centers in Minsk, Gomel, Mogilev, Vitebsk, Brest, and Grodno, Belarus is now 
home to around 10 million people.  
 Yet for over a thousand years, the region was a part of several different nations and 
empires, beginning with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that expanded to include all of 
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modern day Belarus in the mid-thirteenth century.  Belarus  remained a part of the Grand 
Duchy for 500 years before becoming part of the Russian empire in the 18th century. The 
important Magdeburg Statutes, which granted self-rule to certain Belarussian cities, were 
important in establishing them  as centers of commerce, beginning in the 14th century.  This 
fostered contact with Western Europe that in turn “ensured a fertile reception in Belarus of 
Renaissance and humanist ideas and values” and led to a “historical exposure to diverse 
intellectual currents…and traditional religious tolerance [which are] a major source of 
cultural difference between Belarus and its eastern neighbor, Russia.”54 The multiethnic and 
multilinguistic nature of the area is indicated by the 1897 census that lists nine separate 
nationalities (Belarussians, Jews, Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, 
Germans, and Tatars.)55  
Jews began arriving in large numbers from western Europe in the 14th century, many 
as a result of the expulsions there.  Their skills in trades and finance were valued by the 
rulers of the region and they enjoyed considerable freedoms.  However, Jews were limited in 
their economic opportunities, being forbidden to own land and join certain guilds. Here, as 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, much of Jewish life was centered around the shtetl.  Jews lived 
together in towns and villages where they traded with and provided services to non-Jewish 
peasants.  In towns and cities, where they often formed a large percentage or even a majority 
of the urban population, Jews lived in a Jewish street or quarter.  This concentration 
geographically and by occupation persisted until World War  
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By 1795, Belarus had become part of the Russian empire in the wake of three Great 
Power partitions of Poland. In the context of a struggle between Russia and its subject 
peoples  in the region, several nationalist uprisings were put down by the empire in the 19th 
century.  Particularly in western Belarus, the tsars attempted to repress Belarussian national 
consciousness and to “russianize” these areas.   For Jews, annexation into the Russian Empire 
meant forced concentration in the Pale of Settlement, an area that stretched from Lithuania to 
the Crimean and included Belarus.  According to the 1897 census, over 97 percent of Russian 
Jews lived inside the Pale.56  The Jewish settlements in Belarus, while much different, more 
isolated, and more traditional than those in the West, were nonetheless vibrant and diverse 
communities.  They were marked, for example, by a commitment to education (Jews in 
Belarus had a literacy rate of 94% in 1939.)57  This was due in large part to the large number 
and high quality of Yiddish schools.  As elsewhere, the shtetl contained a variety of 
charitable organizations from loan organizations to aid for the elderly that supported the 
members of the Jewish community in a nation that had marginalized them.  Belarus was also 
an important center of Jewish religious life, with famous yeshivas for Torah study in many 
towns such as Minsk, Bobruisk, Slonim, Lida, Novogrudok, and Baranovichi.58  Under the 
Tsars, Jews suffered periodically from both governmental oppression in the form of anti-
Jewish laws and informal pogroms such as those following the assassination of Alexander II 
in 1881. 
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During the First World War, the Germans occupied practically all of Belarus until 
1918. They were confronted there with a complex ethnic, religious, and linguistic landscape. 
As historian Vejas Liulevicius writes, “the terms of national identity seemed unfamiliar and 
dangerously unstable to the newcomers.”59 The German military administration sought to 
bring Kultur to the region in the form of education, economic improvements, and cultural 
events. Though certainly paternalistic and sometimes heavy-handed, the World War I 
experience was at most an ambivalent one, which resulted in some very real improvements. 
For example, in Borisov near Minsk, electric lighting arrived for the first time with the 
German occupation troops.60  While latent German anti-Semitism occasionally presented 
itself, the occupation was not on the whole hostile to Jews: cultural authorities in Ober Ost 
took pains to protect Jewish “sacred objects” and artifacts, such as seventeenth and 
eighteenth century wooden synagogues.61 The character of this occupation would color the 
expectations and reactions of Jews and non-Jews alike to the arrival of the Nazis often 
leading them to expect experiences of occupation similar to those they remembered from the 
First World War. 
The Bolshevik revolution and the post-World War I battles with Poland resulted in 
the division of Belarus between the Soviet Union and Poland at the Treaty of Riga in 1921.  
This left a small, largely powerless Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic, which had been 
formed in 1919, while the remainder of Belarussian territory was incorporated completely 
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into Poland without any recognition of its own particular demographic composition and 
historical background.  This partition had significant impacts for both Jews and non-Jews.  
Indeed, this was a tale of two lands.  By 1926, the Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(BSSR) had more than doubled in size to 48,500 mi2 and quintupled in population to almost 
5 million.  This territory came from the inclusion of Belarussian “ethnographic areas” that 
had remained within the Russian republic. However, 82 percent of Belarussians lived in rural 
areas and 91 percent were peasants.62  The Bolshevik New Economic Policy began to slowly 
change this, increasing industrialization, commerce, and urbanization.  Education also 
improved.  In addition, in the 1920s and 1930s, emigration of younger Jews from the more 
traditional shtetls to the cities increased.  However, to a large extent, these shtetls “preserved 
[their] unique character right up to the outbreak of the war with Nazi Germany.”63A 1924 
decree established equal language rights for Russian, Belarussian, Yiddish and Polish.64 
Hebrew was outlawed and Hebrew schools and language education were repressed.  Still, 
Yiddish enjoyed a resurgence as the Soviets viewed it as a proletarian language. 
The Bolshevik Revolution was a mixed blessing.  It officially outlawed antisemitism, 
and while Lenin opposed any concept of Jewish nationality, Jews rose to high positions in 
Soviet leadership, though in doing so they would not have identified themselves as Jews. The 
attraction of Jews to socialist and communist ideology is not surprising, given that they were 
often excluded from nationalist and conservative parties and  socialism and communism at 
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least purported to offer equality and freedom from antisemitism.  However, Jews also 
suffered along with their neighbors from the purges and terror of the Stalinist era. Soviet 
authorities under the NKVD continuously shot Belarussians, both Jews and non-Jews, in the 
Kurapaty Forest near Minsk from 1937-1941.  An estimated 250,000 were killed.65 In that 
Stalinist purges particularly focused on older followers with residual memory of and loyalty 
to Lenin and Trotsky, the first generation of Jewish communists were severely decimated and 
replaced by new recruits and supporters of Stalin, who were much less often Jewish.  Jews 
were thus both less conspicuous and less numerous among the Stalinist leadership than 
earlier.   
For the area of Belarus incorporated into Poland, the next eighteen years were 
markedly different.  The conservative Polish government under Jozef Pilsudksi was not 
interested in any real Belarussian political consciousness.  As he wrote in 1920, “I am in 
favor of some significant concessions to the Belarussians in the field of their cultural 
development but I do not wish to make any political concessions favoring a Belarussian 
fiction.”66  In the end, not even these concessions were made and for the former Belarussian 
areas in Poland,  the reality was increased oppression and further attempts at Polonization.  In 
1935, Poland refused to recognize protections for minorities.  Jews here suffered relatively 
greater oppression and official antisemitism. 
On 17 September 1939, Stalin invaded eastern Poland, fulfilling his agreement with 
Hitler.  For many Belarussians familiar with Poland’s repressive nationalist policies, Soviet 
occupation promised relief.  The two years of Soviet rule proved to be repressive as well, 
                                                
65 David R. Marples, "Kuropaty: The Investigation of a Stalinist Historical Controversy," Slavic Review 53, no. 
2 (1994): 516 ff. 
66 Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus : At a Crossroads in History (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 82. 
 33 
though less so than previous Polish rule. For Jews in these regions, the arrival of Soviet 
power brought with it the hope that conditions would improve, compared to earlier 
discrimination they had experienced under Polish oppression.  Above all, they preferred 
occupation by the Red Army rather than the German army.  Many refugees fleeing the Nazis 
also arrived in western Belarus. This, too, explains the often warm welcome that the Red 
Army received.  About 300,000 people were deported by Soviet authorities before the 
German invasion in 1941.67   
For Jews in both eastern Poland and Belarus, the experience of Soviet rule was, on 
the whole, a painful one.  The nationalization of businesses, redistribution of land,  and 
imposition of purges is reflected in much survivor testimony and many survivors speak of an 
almost constant state of fear that they would be deported to Siberia.  A 1944 study cautiously 
estimated 1.25 Polish citizens (in what would become western Belarus) were moved into the 
Russian interior; while those drafted into the Red Army, seeking jobs, or voluntarily leaving 
were included, 900,000 were deported as prisoners or “special settlers.”68 
While the eastern Poles and Belarussians were not gently handled by the Soviets, 
their treatment was both objectively and subjectively less violent than that endured by the 
Ukraine and the Baltic states.  These areas suffered far harsher Soviet repression due mainly 
to both their well-developed national consciousness and the accompanying nationalist 
organizations which the Soviets saw as clear threats to their rule.69  Past experiences under 
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the Soviets (and the perceived role of Jews in them) would play a decisive role in the form 
that Nazi occupation took in those areas.  Because they had a far less developed sense of 
national identity, the Belarussians were much less traumatized than their neighbors to the 
north and south.  Moreover, it was in the hopes of a realization of nationhood through their 
German occupiers that many locals in the Baltic States and the Ukraine came to collaborate.  
This relative lack of a national sentiment meant that the scale of this collaboration in Belarus 
was smaller. Nonetheless, as Henry Abramson adroitly indicates, “history…is better 
understood as the unfolding of events based on perceptions rather than as the linear 
progression of facts.”70  The perception that Jews were behind the comparatively greater 
suffering in the Baltic and the Ukraine had a powerful impact on later treatment of Jews in 
those areas, an impact lessened in Belarus. 
 The massive army that crossed the Soviet border on 22 June 1941 was, in many ways, 
an instrument specially forged for the war of annihilation that would follow.  It was a volatile 
mixture of a longterm organizational culture and memory with a new infusion of Nazi racial 
ideology.  Before we turn to how this weapon was wielded, particularly against the Jews of 
Belarus, it is informative to take a look at how this institution developed and how it became 
more and more a tool of Nazi policy. 
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II. A Weapon of Mass Destruction- The German Army 
 
The German Army had a history of harsh treatment of civilians, extending at least 
back to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, its colonial experience, and certainly through 
the First World War.  Isabel Hull, in her study of the institutional and doctrinal development 
of the Imperial German Army, describes an organizational history of violence that is helpful 
in explaining the behavior of the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union.71  First, in the period of 
Kaiserreich, the Kaiser firmly held the reigns of military control, limiting interference by the 
civilian government to intermittent reviews of budgetary matters.  The constitution itself 
“thwarted policy coordination” not least by removing the “political, legal, economic, 
diplomatic, and social considerations a civilian chancellor and a cabinet ought to have 
brought to military thinking.”72  Earlier in its history, German civilian thinking tended to be 
relatively more moderate than the military, and this became the cultural norm to which the 
Army became accustomed.  In the Nazi period, this dynamic would be reversed.  While the 
German army had earlier been used to defending itself  from civilian interference in its 
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exercise of excessive violence, it was not prepared to deal with a situation where it was the 
civilian government itself that was driving the military into ever more violent actions.  
Combined with the increasing deprofessionalization of the Army, this impulse would 
contribute to a much more brutal force.    
  
The actions of the Wehrmacht in Belarus are reminiscent of atrocities committed by 
German soldiers in World War I.  John Horne and Alan Kramer note three dimensions that 
led to the myth of the franc-tireur or partisan in this war and thus to the violence inflicted 
upon the local French and Belgian civilian populations that resulted in 6,500 civilian 
deaths.73 They argue that “first, a set of fictional representations of the enemy crystallized in 
the first few days of the war…portraying the enemy as the exact opposite of the German 
soldier and the qualities he embodied.”  The “circumstances of the invasion” imposed by the 
Schlieffen plan and the “exhaustion and nervousness of troops in a hostile land” were the 
second dimension.  Lastly, “the defining feature of the franc-tireur fear of 1914 was its 
capacity to convince large numbers of people that something which was an illusion was 
actually happening.”74 The evidence of German behavior toward civilians in general and 
Jews in particular demonstrates that a very similar dynamic was in operation in the Soviet 
Union in the fall of 1941, ultimately on a far larger scale over a far longer period of time.  
Finally, as Omer Bartov points out, one must take into account the tradition of draconian 
discipline in the German Army.  He notes, “the strict obedience demanded from the troops, 
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and the draconian punishments meted to offenders, doubtlessly played a major role in 
maintaining unit cohesion under the most adverse combat conditions.”75  This discipline and 
cohesion combined with a mythic association of Jews, Bolsheviks, and Partisans as 
contributing factors to participation in atrocities.   
One must, however, be careful not to draw too straight a line from colonial or 
imperial German military practices to Operation Barbarossa.  Certainly, the Wehrmacht was 
different from these earlier organizations.  It was larger, increasingly less professional, and 
more highly ideologically influenced.  It also fought under the banner of an openly racist 
regime and in arguably more desperate conditions.  Yet, one cannot also discount the 
important influence of institutional memory and culture on the decision-making of the Army, 
at both high and low levels.  Militaries, like other large bureaucratic organizations, tend to be 
conservative, resistant to change, and likely to retain practices from previous eras.  They are 
even more likely to do this as, given their specialized tasks, they are less susceptible to 
intervention by civilian authorities.  However, as we have seen, the German Army actually 
became more susceptible to interference by the Nazi civilian government, at least when this 
interference exhorted even more violent and heavy-handed actions by the military. Thus, it 
seems fair to argue that the Wehrmacht entered the Soviet Union with a set of baseline 
practices and default responses to dealing with civilians which already tended toward the 
extreme. 
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Faustian Bargain: The Army and the Nazis 
Every army is but a part of its own people. 
 - General Gunther von Blumentritt76 
 
 The military collapse in 1918 was a crushing defeat, both physically and emotionally, 
for the German Army.  It was catastrophic not only in its material effects but also in its 
lingering impacts on German military culture and organization.  Principally, the loss of 
World War I created three loci of discomfort in the German military leadership.  The first 
was the loss of prestige suffered by military decision-makers.  Throughout German history, 
military leaders had directly advised the Kaiser on foreign affairs as well as military.  After 
the abdication of Wilhelm II and the bankrupt advice that had gotten Germany into the war,  
the military felt keenly its loss of sovereignty in this area during the immediate postwar era.  
One of the most obvious symbols of this loss was the Versailles Treaty which clearly sought 
to make the German Armed forces a deliberately neutered one.  Connected to this loss of 
influence, was the very real loss of a military German empire in the East.  While the war on 
the Western Front was predominantly a conventional military endeavor, in the East, the 
Imperial Army under the command of Erich Ludendorff had created what was very nearly an 
autonomous military empire in which the Army controlled all aspects of life for the occupied 
population.77  For a staunchly anti-communist and conservative officer corps especially, the 
loss of this Eastern empire was particularly painful.   
Lastly, the “Stab in the back” myth (Dolchtoßlegende)  served as a unifying 
explanation for the German defeat in the war and the accompanying losses mentioned above.  
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Under this formulation, advanced by Ludendorff himself as well other right-wing groups, the 
German Army had been brought down, not by force of arms, but instead had been betrayed at 
its moment of victory by a combination of Jews, Socialists, democrats, and liberals who had 
sabotaged the war effort.  The manner of the war’s end did not help.  While the military (and 
the Kaiser) had been responsible for directing all aspects of the war, a civilian government 
was only brought in to supervise the surrender, though it had had little to do with the defeat.  
Thus, the end of the First World War left Germany with millions of military men who were 
conservative, staunchly anti-Communist, anti-Jewish, anti-democratic, rabidly nationalistic, 
and angry.  This generalization does not apply to all the men, particularly the rank and file, 
but it holds for the officer corps and leadership. 
Perhaps a liberalization and reformed German military could have occurred in a 
relatively stable postwar state.  However, postwar Germany was anything but.  It was very 
quickly thrown into a chaotic battle between paramilitary groups of the left and the right.  
The massive numbers of men in uniform, under military control, stood as a powerful force 
for whomever they chose to support.  To this end, the Quartermaster General of the Army, 
Wilhelm Groener, approached the new chancellor of the fledgling republic, Friedrich Ebert, 
on 9 November 1918 offering military support of the government in return for guarantees 
that the government would continue to support the military and essentially preserve it from 
revolutionary reforms.  However, when the German Congress deliberated a series of radical 
reforms to the military, General Groener threatened to withdraw military support from the 
government in the face of increasing violence from the communist Spartacists and the right-
wing Freikorps.  The civilian government was forced to abandon these reforms and continue 
to rely on the old military institutions for support and legitimacy. 
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This uneasy partnership was also an unequal one.  Given its strong nationalist and 
anti-communist leanings, the Army was more than willing to crush socialist and communist 
groups, even actively enlisting the technically extra-legal Freikorps in this endeavor.  This 
zeal did not often extend to uprisings from the right as evidenced by the Kapp-Lüttwitz 
Putsch of 1920.  In this uprising, military units resisted demobilization and were joined by 
Freikorps units in an attempt to take over the government.  However, when the civilians 
turned to the Army to suppress the revolt, they were denied. Perhaps the ultimate expression 
of this betrayal was famously summed up in Hans von Seeckt’s statement that “Troops do 
not fire on troops….When Reichswehr fires on Reichswehr, then all comradeship within the 
officer corps has vanished.”78  Only a general strike called by socialist leaders eventually 
brought the coup to an end.  It therefore became clear that the civilian leadership could not 
rely on the military to support a constitutional government. Instead of honoring the Ebert-
Groener agreement to support the government, the military—steadfast in its commitment to 
the stab-in-the-back legend, having at least partially recovered its nerve from the recent 
military debacle, and then capitalizing on widespread resentment against the Versailles 
Treaty—refused any true loyalty to the Weimar Republic.79   
In 1921, the new Reichwehr was created.  This smaller force was to be a new, 
reformed military only suitable for national defense. However, in keeping with the Ebert-
Groener Pact, the law that created a provisional Reichswehr, though putatively requiring it be 
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“built on a democratic basis,” in fact dictated that its leadership be drawn from the ranks of 
the Imperial officer corps and Freikorps veterans.80 Throughout the Weimar period, the 
military remained a deeply suspicious and anti-democratic organization, but also one that 
was interested in honor and stability.  Thus, when Hitler attempted his Putsch in 1923, the 
military stood behind the government and supported the rightwing but less radical Gustav 
von Kahr. 
In the internecine bureaucratic maneuvering that characterized the end of the Weimar 
Republic, military leaders were an ever-present force.  They were concerned with supporting 
civilians they believed they could control or who would at least not step into the realm of 
military decision-making.  When Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, the Army remained 
neutral and probably agreed with Papen’s contention that he could be controlled. 
Even so, Hitler had to actively work to win the Army’s support for his party, though 
he had certainly gained a following, particularly among the younger demographic.  General 
Beck, chief of the General Staff from 1933-38, wrote a friend in 1933 welcoming the Nazi 
“political transformation.”81  However, Ernst Röhm, the leader of the paramilitary arm of the 
party, the SA, increasingly sought to erode the military’s unique role in the German 
government.  The leadership of the Reichswehr was not at all happy about the possibility of a 
rival military organization.  In order to solidify future military support, Hitler purged the SA 
in June 1934 during the “Night of the Long Knives,” thereby ensuring that there would be no 
threat to military supremacy…except from Hitler himself.  A month after the “Night of the 
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Long Knives,” all servicemen swore an oath of allegiance to Hitler himself, rather than to the 
government. 
In March 1935, military conscription was reintroduced and the military enlarged.  
Hitler also undertook a project of rearmament that was certainly viewed favorably by many.  
Yet, as his aggressive foreign policy aims became more and more clear, there were military 
leaders who disagreed and wished to limit Hitler’s power.  Despite the protests of his military 
advisors, Hitler carried out the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 and the annexation 
of Austria in 1938 while repudiating the Versailles Treaty.  As he turned to Czechoslovakia, 
his senior advisors balked.  Hitler, benefiting from Himmler and Goering’s own quest for 
more power, was presented with an opportunity to remove them.  Key generals Blomberg 
and Fritsch found themselves discredited and driven from public life as Hitler gradually 
sought to recenter military control in his hands alone.  General Ludwig Beck, the Chief of the 
General Staff, resigned in protest.  However, at Hitler’s request he did so in secret which 
largely eliminated any value Beck’s protest might have had.  With the appointment of the 
compliant Wilhelm Keitel as the highest Army commander, Hitler had effectively made 
himself the both the titular and actual head of the German Armed forces, a move that would 
have serious implications as war loomed in 1939. 
If German military leadership eagerly embraced rearmament and had mixed emotions 
about Hitler’s foreign policy, what of his racial ideologies?  The evidence indicates that the 
military was at least passively supportive.  The old German military establishment was no 
stranger to antisemitism.  Perhaps one of the clearest examples of this was the infamous “Jew 
Census.”  In 1916, the Imperial High Command commissioned a census ostensibly to 
“prove” that Jews were underrepresented in the war effort.  In order to further support the 
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“stab-in-the-back theory,” a version of the results was released to antisemitic publications 
after the war.  A more systematic study in the 1920s demonstrated that it was “the greatest 
statistical monstrosity of which an administration had ever been responsible.”82  After Hitler 
took power, the Army applied the Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service to its ranks as 
well, removing Jewish service members and requiring proof of Aryan heredity for its 
members.83 
 
Dress Rehearsals for Genocide? The Polish and French Campaigns 
It can be assumed that only weak police forces will be available in enemy 
territory [therefore] Sipo Einsatzgruppen will be employed in rear areas 
fighting all anti-German elements.  The Quartermaster of the Eighth Army 
will oversee the deployment of Einsatzgruppe III. 
 - Special Order for Army Logistics, 8th Army Corps, 16 August 
193984 
 
 The first real combat test for the Wehrmacht was the campaign against Poland 
beginning on September 1, 1939.  While it was not so much a test of the Wehrmacht’s 
combat prowess, the Polish campaign was a test of how deeply the military would become 
involved in the Nazi genocidal project.  Poland would be the first nation to fully experience 
the first iteration of the traveling execution squads called the Einsatzgruppen.  While the 
scale of violence may not have been immediately apparent, the leadership could have had 
“no illusions about the general criminal character of the coming actions of the 
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Einsatzgruppen.”85 As early as July, Generalquartermaster Eduard Wagner had coordinated 
with Heydrich for liaisons between the Ic (intelligence) sections of Wehrmacht units and the 
Einsatzgruppen. The five Einsatzgruppen would be responsible for “combating all enemy 
elements in enemy territory behind the fighting troops.”86  The higher leadership of the 
Wehrmacht was also aware of what this meant.  Keitel, chief of the OKW, informed his head 
of military intelligence Adm. Canaris on September 12 that “the matter [of the execution of 
polish elites] had already been decided by the Führer; the commander of the Army had been 
informed that if the Wehrmacht refused to be involved, it had to accept the pressure of the SS 
and the Gestapo.  Therefore, in each military district, civilian commanders would be 
appointed who would carry the responsibility for ethnic extermination [added in pencil: 
political cleansing.]”87  After the annexation of western Poland in October 1939, Hitler told 
the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht (OKW) Field Marshal Keitel in October 1939 
that the occupation of Poland would allow them to “purify the Reich territory also of Jews 
and Polacks.”88 Knowledge of the intent of the Einsatzgruppen did not initially translate to a 
good understanding of how this was to play out between the Army and SS on the ground. 
The military, particularly at the lower levels, was (at least initially) shocked at the 
scale of violence.  The discomfort felt by both leaders and soldiers is evident in several 
written complaints. In February 1940, General Ulex in command of the southern sector wrote 
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to his commander that “the acts of violence by the police forces, which have increased 
recently, demonstrate a quite incredible lack of human and moral feeling, so that it can be 
called sheer brutalization.”89  An indication of perhaps some of the attitudes among the men 
can be gleaned from an order issued in July 1940 by an Army commander in which he wrote: 
“I wish to emphasize the necessity of ensuring that all soldiers of the Army and, in particular, 
the officers refrain from any criticism of the struggle being waged with the population in the 
General Government, for example, the treatment of the Polish minorities, the Jews, and 
Church matters.” It is, however, telling that General Ulex above also observed in his 
memorandum that “it seems as if the superiors privately approve of this activity and do not 
wish to intervene.”90 
In fact, a policy of non-intervention accurately describes the evolution of the Army’s 
collaboration with these first Einsatzgruppen.  As Dieter Pohl rightly states, “among the 
generals themselves the repudiation of mass killing was not very widespread.  At the most, 
they were directed against crimes that were not remotely justified by “ ‘military necessity’ 
[even by the military’s own expansive understanding of that concept]...or were accompanied 
by excessive cruelty.”91  In his pathbreaking work, Jochen Böhler calls the Army’s actions in 
Poland a “prelude” to the war of annihilation.  He demonstrates both participation in the 
extensive killing of civilians and especially in the massive violence against suspected 
Freischärlers or partisans that was already occurring in 1939.92  In Poland, with the coming 
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of civilian government, the Army was relieved to wash its hands of Nazi racial policy, which 
was the clear purview of the SS and Gestapo, in preparation for the war against France. 
 The campaign in France beginning in May 1940, fought against a less denigrated 
racial opponent on territory not targeted as future German Lebensraum, was not generally 
characterized by  mass violence against civilians, either from a security or racial standpoint.  
It was a more conventional, far less racialized, war than the one fought in Poland. There 
certainly were atrocities, such as the Vinkt massacre in Belgium. Crucially, however, there 
were no Einsatzgruppen sent into France seeking to conduct mass executions as in Poland.  
This is not to say that no racially motivated killing took place. In contrast to Poland, when it 
occurred, racially motivated killing was conducted almost solely by the Wehrmacht.   Rafael 
Scheck’s innovative research on the fates of French colonial troops captured by the Army 
demonstrates a disturbing continuity of racism.  He shows that between 1,500 and 3,000 
black African soldiers fighting for the French were summarily executed by the Wehrmacht, 
because they were black.93  Though some generals had initially disagreed with the 
recklessness of the Führer’s invasion plan, one of the most important repercussions of the 
French campaign was an almost universal “recognition” of Hitler’s strategic brilliance in the 
face of military misgivings; indeed, many generals “no longer wished to remember their 
previous skeptical criticisms.”94 
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Continuity and Break: Operation Barbarossa and Wehrmacht Complicity 
Weighted down with heavy cares, condemned to months of silence, I can at 
last speak freely—German People!  At this moment a march is taking place 
that, for its extent, compares with the greatest the world has ever seen.  I 
have decided again today to place the fate and future of the Reich and our 
people in the hands of our soldiers.  May God aid us, especially in this fight. 
-Adolf Hitler’s Proclamation to the German People, 22 June 194195 
 
[Your] sense of justice has to take second place behind the necessity of 
war….One of the two enemies must perish; bearers of the enemy view are 
not to be conserved, but liquidated. 
- Lieutenant General Müller to General Staff officers and Military 
Judges, 11 June 194196 
 
It was apparent from the beginning that the war with the Soviet Union would be 
fundamentally different (and even more violent) than the Third Reich’s previous campaigns.  
The war with the USSR was to be a “war of annihilation,” a clash  in which only one 
ideology, Nazi or Bolshevik, and one race, German or Slav, could triumph.  As Hitler himself 
had written eighteen years earlier in Mein Kampf, “Germany will either be a world power or 
will not be at all.”97 Nothing more epitomized this all or nothing mentality than the invasion 
of the Soviet Union. 
The roots of the yearning for land in the East extended far back into the German 
past.98  The desire for an Eastern empire had several components.  One was nostalgia for a 
return to a romantic era when Teutonic knights ruled fiefdoms in the East.  Another was a 
desire for additional territory (Lebensraum) which, for Germans, naturally lay in the 
                                                
95 Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45 (New York: W. Morrow, 1965). 
96 John N. Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914 : A History of Denial (Yale University Press, 
2001), 406-7. 
97 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1939), 950. 
98 For a discussion of the earlier roots of the desire for eastern discussion, see Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns 
Eastwards : A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), Vejas G. Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front : Culture, National Identity and 
German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 48 
underdeveloped and racially inferior lands to the East as they had no chance at overseas 
colonies.  Finally, in more modern times, an intense, intertwined fear and hatred of the 
Bolshevik menace in the Soviet Union led to a desire for both buffer territory and the total 
destruction of this enemy.  For the Nazis, Bolshevism was more than a political ideology; it 
was a disease that merged with Jewish domination of the Slavic race and could not be easily 
cured except by total destruction. 
Hitler expressed these themes clearly in Mein Kampf.  Harkening back to prior 
Germanic glory, he proclaimed “We take up at the halting place of six hundred years ago.”99 
On the necessity of space, he wrote “Only a sufficiently extensive area on this globe 
guarantees a nation freedom of existence.”100  Regarding the racial component and 
Bolshevik, Hitler stated, “The struggle against Jewish bolshevization of the world requires a 
clear attitude toward Soviet Russia.  You cannot drive out the Devil with Beelzebub.”101  
Even  if Hitler’s more rabid antisemitic beliefs were not always shared by the military, these 
concepts held great sway.   
This conceptual framework for Operation Barbarossa was operationalized into very 
real plans for a decimation of the occupied East.  In the first place, Hitler was committed to 
avoiding any significant negative impact of the war on the home front through economic 
deprivation or severe rationing as had happened in World War I.  To that end, the military 
was expected to feed and supply itself generally from the land it conquered.  This was but 
one element of what became known as the “Hunger Plan” that quite openly recognized that 
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“without a doubt umpteen millions of people will starve when we extract all our necessities 
from the land.”102  Accompanying the Hunger Plan was the brutal Grünen Mappe (Green 
File) economic plan.  Together, these documents outlined the systematic starvation, 
deportation, expropriation, and depopulation of the occupied East in preparation for 
Himmler’s Germanic settlers who would occupy the region.  Some Nazi administrators 
circulated the number of 30 million as the likely death toll.103 As the numbers of Jews under 
German control increased almost exponentially with the occupation of the Soviet Union, the 
Final Solution was also part of this destructive dynamic in the East.  The military, which 
would be wielding a great deal of power, at least initially, was also expected to play its part 
in all these policies. 
To highlight this fact, the Army High Command disseminated three important 
documents before the invasion.  These had been written at the instigation of Hitler himself 
beginning in the spring of 1941. The first was a 13 May 1941 Führer Decree, which 
suspended prosecution of German soldiers for most actions in the East.  It clearly states, 
“punishable offenses committed against enemy civilians do not, until further notice, come 
any more under the jurisdiction of the courts-martial and the summary courts-martial.” This 
decree removed enemy civilians from protection of military law, giving German soldiers 
legal impunity in their treatment of civilians. A later clause authorized “punitive measures” 
against villages on the authority of battalion commanders. 104 Any prosecution of crimes was 
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to be considered only if “necessary for the maintenance of discipline or the security of the 
troops.”105 Thus, German soldiers were not only given the freedom to do as they pleased, but 
they were also encouraged to be violent.  This decree even provided a justification for this 
violence, blaming “the break-down in 1918, the time of suffering of the German people after 
that, and the numerous blood sacrifices of the movement in the battle against national 
socialism” on “Bolshevist influence”  and instructs the troops to defend themselves 
“ruthlessly against any threat by the enemy civil population.”106 The effect of these orders 
was to release German soldiers from the constraints of “civilized” warfare and to both 
rationalize and promote brutal behavior toward civilians and “enemies.” 
 In the second document, the “Guidelines for the Behavior of the Troops,” issued to 
company level prior to 21 June, soldiers were informed that “Bolshevism is the mortal enemy 
of the German people” and that “this war demands ruthless and aggressive action against 
Bolshevik agitators, snipers, saboteurs, and Jews and tireless elimination of any active or 
passive resistance.”107  Jews were thus explicitly targeted as enemies to be eliminated by the 
military. The order went on to note that the “Asiatic soldiers of the Red Army are obtuse, 
unpredictable, underhanded, and unfeeling.”108   
A third directive, the so-called Commissar Order or Kommissarbefehl, instructed the 
troops that the political commissars who accompanied the Red Army were to be shot out of 
hand by frontline troops and if encountered in the rear areas were to be turned directly over 
to the Einsatzgruppen for similar treatment.  Hitler’s pronouncement that the Communist is 
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“kein Kamerad” was immediately accepted by those crafting the order.  The order in one 
stroke both explicitly authorized an abandonment of the laws of war and encouraged closer 
cooperation with the SD.  The Commissar Order stated that “political representatives and 
commissars are to be eliminated” and that “the decision rests with an officer of disciplinary 
power whether that person is to be eliminated. Identification as political functionary is 
sufficient proof.”109  This blanket execution order directly violated all previous laws of armed 
conflict and sent a powerful message to all in the military that they would not be bound by 
such codes. 
A personal message from Hitler to the troops on the eve of the invasion reinforced the 
antisemitic message from the “Guidelines.” “Alone for over two decades,” the Führer 
claimed, “the Jewish-Bolshevik rulers from Moscow have sought to set fire to not only 
Germany but all of Europe.  It was not Germany but the Jewish-Bolshevik rulers in Moscow 
that have steadfastly sought to force their domination not only spiritually but above all 
physically upon ours and other European peoples.”110  These, then, were the explicit 
messages and justifications that German soldiers carried with them into the Soviet Union. 
In addition, groundwork had already been laid for cooperation between the 
Einsatzgruppen of the SD and the Wehrmacht. This relationship was to be far better defined 
than it had been in Poland.  On 13 March 1941, OKW Keitel informed the military in the 
often quoted Richtlinien auf Sondergebieten zur Weisung Nr. 21 “Fall Barbarossa” that the 
Reichsführer SS had received from Hitler the “authorization to carry out special tasks” in the 
                                                
109 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. Supplement A (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1947), 352.Document 884-
PS 
110 "Soldaten der Ostfront,"  (BA-MA: RH 26-102-7), Anl. 67. 
 52 
Army rear areas.111 The Generalquartermaster of the Army Eduard Wagner was the Army’s 
representative to the SS and SD in ironing out the details of this relationship.  Discussions 
over the proposed use of the Einsatzgruppen began in the spring of 1941.  After a month of 
talks between Wagner and Heydrich, an agreement was reached in the form of a draft 
memorandum circulated  on 26 March 1941.112 Wagner met with Daluege, Wolff, Heydrich 
and Himmler himself on 16 April to further iron out relationships between the police and 
Army.113  The final version of the agreement was disseminated to the Army on 28 April 
under the signature of General Brauchitsch, Army commander.  In it Wehrmacht units were 
tasked with “march, quartering, and supply” support of the Einsatzgruppen and that the 
“combating of enemies of the state and Reich” was the general responsibility of Army Group 
Rear area commanders.114 
This agreement was reflected at lower levels as in a directive of  15 June 1941 in 
which the 28th Infantry Division (assigned to Army Group Center (Rear) or Rückwärtige 
Heeresgebeit Mitte (rHGM)) informed its units that “the Reichsführer SS is carrying out 
special tasks in the rear areas with his own organs and under his own responsibility. In the 
rear army areas, only a small group of Security Police and the SD (Sonderkommandos) is to 
be used to carry out certain tasks specified at the outset of operations…Sonderkommandos of 
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the Security Police and SD work together with the Army Ic.”115 rHGM itself stated clearly in 
an order dated 24 June 1941 that the Einsatzkommandos were “subordinate to the 
commander [of Army Group Center (Rear)] concerning march, supply, and 
accommodation.”116  Though Wagner said in a meeting in May 1941 that OKH had refused 
“real support of all these units [presumably meaning in actual operations] and the execution 
of political tasks,” the true nature of this relationship between the Army and the 
Einsatzgruppen would quickly encompass far more than logistical support.117  
The mass death of Soviet POWs was also foreshadowed by the absence of any 
preparations for their care.   Though the Army envisioned a series of giant encirclements that 
would by necessity result in massive numbers of prisoners, the man responsible for planning 
for the welfare of prisoners of war, Generalquartermaster Wagner, made no adequate plans 
for POW camps to accommodate them.118  Prisoners were to be held with minimal supplies 
in open air prisons.  While postwar apologists would claim that the Army was overwhelmed 
by the sheer numbers of captured Russians and was unable to properly care for them, the 
truth is that they were intentionally neglected. A telling indicator of this is a directive from 
the 4th Army Corps on 9 June 1941 before the invasion that clearly stated that “prisoners of 
war are to be fed with the most primitive rations (for example horse flesh.)  High quality and 
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scarce food and luxury foods may not be given out to them.”119  Streit’s survey also found 
that from the beginning the daily caloric intake of Soviet POWs was not enough to sustain 
life.120 The military also fully collaborated with the “selection” of its prisoners for execution 
by the SS and Einsatzgruppen.121  As Streit points out, “the military leadership of the OKW 
through its willing cooperation in the creation of a hierarchy of POWs placed itself in a 
situation in which active collaboration with Nazi extermination policy [Ausrottungspolitik] 
was a logical result.”122 
In the predawn hours of 22 June 1941,  from the Baltic to the Black Sea, over 4 
million German soldiers invaded the Soviet Union.  As the less numerous armored 
formations advanced rapidly, the slower moving infantry formations followed behind, 
mopping up immense pockets of thousands of encircled soldiers.  Accompanying the faster 
moving formations were the approximately 3,000 men of the Einsatzgruppen, Himmler’s 
mobile killing squads.  Each group operated in an Army Group rear area, with A behind 
Army Group North, B behind Center, and C and D behind South.  Tasked with the 
elimination of “enemies” including Jews and communist functionaries, these men and 
especially their leaders had been highly indoctrinated and specially trained at SS training 
centers prior to the invasion.  To support their tasks, they were also well equipped with 
wheeled vehicles to facilitate their rapid deployment.  They were followed by units of Order 
                                                
119 Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden : Die Wehrmacht Und Die Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941-1945 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978), 79. 
120 See table Ibid., 138-9. 
121 See Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im "Fall Barbarossa" (Karlsruhe: C.F. 
Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1981). 
122 Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden : Die Wehrmacht Und Die Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941-1945 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978), 72. 
 55 
Police, Waffen-SS, and Einsatzgruppen zbV (“for special assignment”)  to assist them in 
killing. Higher SS and Police Leaders (HSSPF), such as Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski in 
rHGM, were responsible for coordinating operations between the SD/SS and Wehrmacht 
and, later, for carrying out antipartisan operations.   
Operation Barbarossa would eclipse any suffering Belarus had previously endured.  
German troops, part of the over 100 Wehrmacht divisions committed, crossed the 1939 
Polish frontier and advanced deep into Belarus, covering over 200 miles and reaching Minsk 
in two weeks.   By 22 August, most of the region had been occupied and with it 30 percent of 
the Soviet Union’s Jews.123  Huge pockets of Red Army soldiers were surrounded and 
captured, numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Even so, thousands of bypassed Soviet 
soldiers escaped Nazi encirclements, some attempting to return to Soviet lines, some to 
continue the fight in the German rear, and some merely to return to civilian life.  The much-
lauded partisan bands of 1943 did not exist in 1941, as Stalinist planners had steadfastly 
refused to consider the possibility of Soviet land under foreign occupation and, thus, had 
made no preparations for guerilla warfare.   
Evidence of the cooperation between the Einsatzgruppen of the SD and the 
Wehrmacht in Belarus appears early on. In a directive from 15 June 1941, the 28th Infantry 
Division (also assigned to rHGM), informed its units that “the Reichsführer SS is carrying 
out special tasks in the rear areas with his own organs and under his own responsibility. In 
the rear army areas, only a small group of Security Police and the SD (Sonderkommandos) is 
to be used to carry out specific tasks specified at the outset of 
                                                
123 Mordechai Altshuler, Soviet Jewry on the Eve of the Holocaust : A Social and Demographic Profile 
(Jerusalem: Centre for Research of East European Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1998), 17. 
 56 
operations…Sonderkommandos of the Security Police and SD work together with the Army 
Ic.”124  In late August, the Einsatzgruppen could already speak of “pleasant cooperation with 
the Army authorities.”125 The true nature of this relationship between the Army and the 
Einsatzgruppen would quickly encompass far more than logistical support. This combination 
of sanctioned brutality toward civilians, official antisemitism, and organizational cooperation 
with the SD, along with the Jew-Bolshevik-Partisan calculus, permeated the environment in 
which the campaign would progress. 
Wehrmacht units in Belarus also had already established that Jews were a different 
category of civilians, an inferior one.  Jews, for example, were the first to be identified and 
used for forced labor.  In July 1941, the 350th Infantry Regiment (which would be 
represented at the important Mogilev antipartisan conference) “evacuated” the male Jewish 
populations of the Bialowiezer Forest, which was to be Goering’s private hunting preserve.126  
The division order specified that “all Jewish men [were] to be placed in a camp and to be 
concentrated into work details.”127 An Army Group Center Rear order concerning pay of 
road repair crews specified that Jews “may only be compensated in the form of food.”128  The 
221st Security Division (also stationed in Army Group Center Rear) ordered that Jews be 
rounded up and forced to gather straw and clean houses in preparation for a Wehrmacht 
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unit’s arrival.129  The 403rd Security Division’s intelligence section observed that “not all 
soldiers have the proper attitude towards the Jews.  They do not approach the Jewish laborers 
with the desirable ruthlessness and the distance that should be self-evident for national 
socialist soldiers.  Emphasis must be given to intervene against this thoughtlessness.”130 Such 
a statement demonstrates both that some military authorities conceived of a “proper” attitude 
of brutality to be taken with Jews and, at least in this division, were intent on imposing it. In 
the first months of the war in Belarus, Wehrmacht units were already killing Jews; 20 were 
killed in Lida, 73 in Baranovichi, and 30 in Slonim.131 
Participation in genocide developed over time.  However, the Wehrmacht was 
immediately and, for the most part, in agreement with the execution of the Kommissarbefehl 
and POW policy.  In his thorough study of the Kommissarbefehl, Felix Römer painstakingly 
recreates both the creation of the order and its execution.132 He shows that some units took it 
more seriously than others.  Yet the numbers are damning.  More than 100,000 serving 
political officers in the Red Army were lost during the war, according to Soviet statistics; 
57,608 were killed as a result of military action and an amazing 47,126 were “missing.”133 
The vast majority of these missing were likely executed in accordance with the 
Kommissarbefehl.  The victimization of POWs did not end with commissars.  Anti-Jewish 
policy was carried out in the POW camps as well.  An operations order issued to the SD 
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operating in POW camps on 17 July instructed that “all Jews” found among the captured 
soldiers were to be executed.134   
There is evidence that some leaders objected to the order and that its enforcement 
across units was not uniform; however, on the whole, commissars had a short life expectancy 
in German captivity (if they even made it there.)  As Jörn Hasenclever notes, even those 
refusing to execute the order did not always do it out of moral reasons but were often more 
concerned with the pragmatic effect it would have on the combat ahead of them.135   
The POW policy was met by some with shock and concern, particularly those who as 
professionals took seriously their task of providing for them as well as those who simply saw 
the policy as inhumane.136  Christian Streit’s work on German POW policy exposed the 
dreadful conditions under which captured Red Army soldiers suffered.137 Most POWS found 
themselves in Dulags (Durchganglagers or transit camps) which consisted of little more than 
open fields surrounded by barbed wire and sentry posts.  The men were underfed, exposed to 
the elements, and in need of medical attention.  Indeed, the army itself radicalized its own 
policy, ordering that “mainly” Russian medical personnel and “only” Russian medical 
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supplies were to be used to treat wounded prisoners.138  The mortality rates were enormous. 
Of the 5.7 million Red Army soldiers, almost 57.9% did not survive the war.139  Two thirds 
of the three million prisoners captured in 1941 did not live out the year.  More Soviet soldiers 
died daily in the hands of the Wehrmacht than American or British prisoners did in the entire 
war.   Only toward the end of 1941, when the disastrous POW policy had already had 
devastating effects, did the Nazis realize the growing labor shortage and the potential utility 
of Red Army POWs as slave labor.  Non-Russian ethnicities, however, were often released to 
join German auxiliary forces and the Army itself soon realized that it would need to release 
some soldiers to help bring in the harvest.  A few officers even suggested that mistreating 
POWs made defeating the Soviets more difficult.  While issues of military utility led to a 
change in POW policy, such factors had no effect on anti-Jewish policy.  
As the Wehrmacht became more stationary in Soviet towns, it also became more 
directly involved in promulgating Nazi antisemitic policy.  Because military administration 
was the first form of German government across the occupied East, they were also the first to 
initiate restrictions against Jews. Local military commanders instituted the wearing of the 
Star of David, curfews for Jews, and various other regulations.  They also created ghettos, 
sometimes on their own initiatives.  On 19 August 1941 an order from Army High 
Command, for example, specifically ordered the creation of ghettos in towns with large 
Jewish populations provided it was “necessary and possible given the local situation and 
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assistance at hand.”140  The Army also became quickly involved in the expropriation of 
property and forced labor of Jews in its jurisdiction.141 
Belarus was partitioned again as the front stabilized east of Mogilev, this time 
between military and civilian authority.  An area of some 225,000 km2 with over 9,850,000 
inhabitants roughly west of Borisov to the border of the General Government became the 
“White Russian” region (Weissruthenien) of Reichskommissariat Ostland under the control 
of Heinrich Lohse.142  The area east of Borisov to the beginnings of Army rear areas was 
under the control of Army Group Center (Rear), a corps level unit commanded by General of 
Infantry Max von Schenckendorff. 
As these rear-area units began settling into their jurisdictions, the issue of the 
“partisan threat” became more and more pressing, even if the threat itself did not. On 3 July, 
Stalin addressed the Soviet people via radio.  “The enemy,” he said, “must be hunted down 
and exterminated, and all his plans foiled.”143  This angered Hitler and perhaps prompted his 
statement made on 16 July that “the Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our 
front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it enables us to eradicate everyone 
who opposes us.”  Regarding the security situation in the East, Hitler went on to advise that 
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“the best solution was to shoot anyone who looked sideways.”144  This exhortation to more 
brutal behavior was then echoed and refined by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, head of the 
Armed Forces.  On 12 September, he published a memorandum whose subject was “Jews in 
the newly Occupied Soviet Territories.”  He informed the troops that “the fight against 
Bolshevism necessitates indiscriminate and energetic accomplishment of this task, especially 
also against the Jews, the main carriers of Bolshevism” again reinforcing a drive toward 
increasing violence.145  
  High-level exhortations and directives found their expression in low-level orders and 
policies prior to September 1941 as well.  In July, units were instructed that captured 
partisans (in civilian clothes) were to be treated as Freischärlers, that is, summarily 
executed; in addition, civilians who in any way supported these partisans were also to be 
treated in this way.146 rHGM ordered that all former Soviet soldiers found west of the 
Berezina River were to be summarily executed if they had not turned themselves in by 15 
August.147 Female Soviet soldiers were to be shot out of hand. In the early days of the war, 
however, the German army’s contact with “partisans” consisted mainly of identifying and 
capturing bypassed Soviet troops.  Though not presenting a general military threat, these 
bands could be locally dangerous and may have helped to fuel rumor and over-reaction.  
These partisans were certainly not the partisans of 1943-44.  The inflated fear of partisan 
activity, eerily reminiscent of the summer of 1914 in Belgium, would have disastrous 
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consequences for the Jews of the Soviet Union. 
 
The Wehrmacht and the Final Solution 
 Developing along a parallel path that soon intersected with the Wehrmacht’s area of 
responsibility was the escalation of Nazi genocidal policy.  As mentioned earlier, the 
Einsatzgruppen were designed to follow along behind frontline Army units and to execute 
“enemies of the state.”   This broad category included Commissars, communist functionaries, 
and intelligentsia. At least initially, there was no order to exterminate all Jews in the Soviet 
Union.148  Heydrich’s 2 July order specified only “Jews in the service of the party or the 
government.”149  Soon Jewish POWs were also included, and in some places virtually all 
male Jews of military age were targeted. 
 In the summer of 1941, however, the targeting of Jews  continued to expand until it 
encompassed the systematic killing of all Jews regardless of age or sex (or actual government 
or communist affiliation).  As a specific order from Himmler to this effect has yet to have 
been discovered, historians can only track this shift through the actions of various killing 
units on the ground.  It is most likely that this change in policy was passed through a verbal 
order from Himmler and his top subordinates.150  Christopher Browning was one of the first 
to look at this issue also from a manpower issue, showing that the reassignment of Police 
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Battalions to “frontline” duty against Jews in late July also signaled this change to killing all 
Jews.151  The SS Cavalry and Infantry Brigades as well began conducting this expansive 
form of killing in late July.  The SS Cavalry Brigade under Hermann Feglein reached 
Baranovichi on 27 July 1941.  After a meeting there with Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, the 
Higher SS and Police Leader for Army Group Center and Himmler’s representative, Kurt 
Knoblauch, Fegelein ordered his men to “handle all Jews [with the exception of skilled 
workers, doctors, etc] as plunderers,” that is to kill them.152 Soon, this killing extended to 
woman and children as well. Himmler had ordered on 31 July that “all Jews must be shot.  
Drive the female Jews into the swamps.”153  Gustav Lombard, commander of the 1st 
Regiment, had then informed his troops that “in future not one male Jew is to remain alive, 
not one family in the villages.”154  The 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment reported in the same period, 
“We drove women and children into the marshes, but this did not yield the desired result, as 
the marshes were not deep enough to drown them.  In most places, the water was not more 
than three feet deep.”155 One of the features of this targeting shift was that it appeared at 
different places in different times, culminating in the massive killing of 33,000 Jews at Babi 
Yar at the end of September 1941. 
At the same time, important decisions regarding the Final Solution were also being 
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made.  Reinhard Heydrich had already been authorized by Göring on 31 July 1941 to begin 
preparing plans for a comprehensive mass murder of European Jews beyond that taking place 
in the Soviet Union.  Yet this plan had not yet crystallized.  Regarding European Jews, Hitler, 
in a meeting on 19 August would only promise Goebbels to begin deportations of German 
(and, thus, European Jews) “immediately after the end of the campaign.”156  However, Hitler 
had been personally receiving the reports of the Einsatzgruppen beginning on August 1.157  
By mid-September, he had changed his mind regarding the onset of deportations.  On the 
18th, Himmler recorded that “The Führer wishes that the Old Reich and Protectorate be 
emptied and freed of Jews from west to east as quickly as possible.”158  The first deportations 
to the East began on October 15th.159  Thus we can see a parallel radicalization of both overall 
genocidal planning and its execution in the Soviet Union. 
The reactions of both Belarussian Jews and non-Jews to the initial stages of German 
occupation were of a wait and see variety.  The prospect of liberation from the repressive 
Stalinist regime was appealing to many non-Jews. Some Jews managed to flee further east, 
but most were quickly trapped by the speed of the German advance.   While some news of 
German antisemitic actions in Poland had reached Belarus, most Jews knew very little of past 
German behavior much less plans for the future and were unwilling to abandon property and 
family on what they considered unfounded rumors.  When the war struck, many Jews fled to 
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the countryside to escape the immediate effects of combat upon their cities.  Many of them, 
finding themselves quickly far behind the lines, then returned to what was left of their homes.  
The summer and fall of 1941, then, found large populations of Jews trapped by the German 
advance, many of whom resided in smaller towns, still waiting for their first encounter with 
the conqueror.  The Jews of Krupki were one such population. 
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III. Improvisation- the 354th Infantry Regiment and the 
Jews Of Krupki 
 
 
On an overcast Thursday afternoon in September 1941, the Jews of Krupki in central 
Belarus wound their way out of town, across the highway.160  Somewhere in this group was a 
female opera singer from Minsk. Military trucks followed slowly behind carrying the elderly 
and the infirm.  SS men from Einsatzkommando 8 awaited their arrival about two and a half 
kilometers away, as storm clouds gathered overhead.  German Army soldiers guarded this 
column as it marched.  Here and there, they beat the Jews with rifle butts when they did not 
move fast enough.161 Among the soldiers guarding this column was twenty-year-old private 
Walter K..  As he walked, he noticed a small child whose pants had fallen down around his 
ankles. Though his mother tried to help him keep up, the child was in danger of being 
trampled by those behind.  Walter K. pulled the mother and child out of line and allowed her 
to pull up his pants.  They then rejoined the column and are soon shot in an open pit.  K. 
remembered twenty-five years later that this incident caused him “great distress” as he was 
already married and had two children of his own.162  In this way, the entire Jewish 
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community of Krupki (1,000 people and over half the town) disappeared, on a Thursday 
afternoon. 
In Krupki, we see an example emblematic of the Army’s first encounter with mass 
murder.  The 354th Infantry Regiment’s participation in this “action” was an improvised 
affair, with the leadership operating without a set procedure.  Beyond the vague guidelines 
mandating logistical support, there were no agreed upon tactical instructions for supporting 
an Einsatzgruppen killing. Yet, even in this early stage, there was a great deal of involvement 
in all aspects of killing and a surprising number of close interactions with the Jewish 
population itself.  Moreover, the Krupki killing gives us the opportunity to detail the actual 
complicity of one Wehrmacht unit on the ground.  Specifically, how did this become so 
deeply involved in executing racial policies? 
 
September 18, 1941: Death of a Community 
As we were just about ready to leave, a Russian came running after 
us. He apparently had the task of covering the grave.  He said 
something in Russian that was translated and one of us was sent 
back.  I myself had a look around and saw a three-year-old child 
sitting on the pile of bodies crying.  The child was shot by the man 
who had been sent back. 
 -Willi Kr., member of SS-Teilkommando Schönemann163 
 
 Krupki remains a small town today. The name means “grist” in Russian, which likely 
alludes to its early history as a mill town. Located sixty-nine miles northeast of Minsk on the 
main highway to the regional capital of Mogilev, the town is situated on a gentle rise, 
surrounded by fields on three sides and forests to the north.  Small, brightly colored houses 
line the streets leading from the formerly Jewish quarter to the nondescript main square.  
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Behind a red and white fence made of scraps from a metalworking factory, lies an open lot 
where Krupki’s synagogue once stood. A few hundred yards north is a bright red school 
building as well as the house of a nineteenth-century nobleman situated in a shady park.  
Krupki’s Jewish community was first recorded in the 1700s.  In 1939, approximately 870 
Jews lived there, representing 25 percent of the total population of 3,455.164 According to 
Yad Vashem, approximately 40 percent of the Jewish population consisted of craftsmen and 
laborers.165 The majority lived on Lenin and Sovetskaya streets.166  Beyond some moderate 
growth, the town seems little changed from the mid-summer of 1941 when the 3rd Battalion 
of the 354th Infantry Regiment entered the town. 
 The 354th was formed in August 1939 as part of the 213th Infantry Division with the 
1st and 2nd Battalions coming from reservists in Upper Alsace and the 3rd from Bunzlau in 
modern-day Poland (though this part of Silesia remained part of Germany after World War 
I).  The unit is interesting in that it was drawn from two border regions, one east and one 
west.  It is likely that the geographic distribution (and the ages) of the soldiers meant that 
they were less exposed to Nazi ideology; certainly, the regions from which they hailed were 
not hotbeds of Nazi activity in the interwar years.  The soldiers were mainly blue collar 
laborers while the officers were a mixture of lower middle class officials, professionals, and 
reserve officers.  The average age of the regiment’s soldiers, which was 32 in 1941,  reflected 
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its second-rate quality as the better quality units received younger and more fit men.  Officers 
and NCOs averaged 36 and 34 respectively.  In short, there was nothing exceptional about 
these men from a training or demographic perspective.  However, their coming from two 
different border regions of Germany is.  Coming from Silesia and Alsace, these men would 
not have been exposed to as strong Nazi ideology perhaps.  However, the Silesians may have 
also brought certain negative feelings toward Slavs with them to the unit. 
From September 1939 to May 1940, the 213th Division provided occupation troops in 
Poland. In December, the 354th Regiment was reorganized into battalions of four companies 
each. The 4th, 8th, and 12th were machine gun units, each with one heavy mortar platoon.  The 
infantrymen were then placed on leave from July 1940 to February 1941.167  In March 1941, 
the regiment was remobilized and transferred to the 286th Security Division, which would be 
tasked with rear area security in Army Group Center (Rear).  The 354th would form the 
Division’s main combat power, its “Response Force.” Training guidelines for security 
divisions published in March 1941 stated that “the Response Troops are the strong combat 
reserves of the commander.  They will be held available for the commander at key points on 
supply routes and will be employed offensively against enemy forces that threaten the supply 
routes.”168  Along with the rest of the 286th Security Division, the 354th Infantry Regiment 
left its staging areas in Parczew, Poland, north of Lublin and moved along Highway 1 toward 
Brest, Kobryn, and Sluzk.169  
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 After helping secure the Bialystok pocket against breakout attempts, Major Johannes 
Waldow’s 3rd Battalion arrived in Minsk at the beginning of July.  Waldow was a forty-eight 
year old veteran of World War I, who in that war had seen action in Poland, Romania, and 
France.  In the interwar period, he had worked as a school teacher until his activation in 
August 1939.170  There is no evidence that he was either particularly brutal or particularly 
antisemitic.  He was remembered by his soldiers as “correct,” “decent,” “conscientious,” 
“respected,” and “beloved.”171 
From 6-17 July, the battalion guarded the immense POW “camp” just outside of 
Minsk, likely the massive Drozdy camp.172  Drozdy was an important precursor to events in 
Krupki as it may have been the site of the first exposure of the battalion to the harsh realities 
of Nazi policy  and the “war of destruction” in the Soviet Union.  It was also the site of the 
unit’s first participation in those crimes.  Over 100,000 Soviet POWs were confined in an 
open area, surrounded by barbed-wire and bounded on one side by a stream, which lay 
outside the wire. A quartermaster officer in 4th Panzer Army wrote that the conditions in the 
camp were “untenable” and the prisoners were “completely exposed to the searing heat.”  
Moreover, as transports of prisoners to the rear (which had only been allowed in open 
railway cars) had been discontinued by the 4th Panzer Army due to “hygienic reasons” (the 
cleanliness of the cars), the numbers of prisoners continued to rise on a daily basis.173  A 
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lieutenant in the 354th Infantry Regiment remembered that “the conditions in the camp were 
indescribable” and that “there were rumors that the prisoners had eaten each other.”174 As 
part of their guard duty, soldiers often killed prisoners, either when the starved men rushed 
the field kitchens or when they crossed into off-limits areas.  A soldier on Waldow’s staff 
recalled that a prisoner was found in possession of a nail or a straight razor and brought to 
Waldow, who remarked that there were already enough POWs and ordered his execution.  
When the prisoner broke down crying and could no longer finish digging his own grave, 
soldiers shot him in the vicinity of the battalion headquarters.175 
 The men of the 3rd Battalion witnessed more than these abuses.  Drozdy was, in many 
ways, their introduction to the genocidal policy in which they would become more and more 
complicit. This camp was also divided into sections for commissars and Jews containing both 
Jewish Red Army soldiers and civilian Jews from Minsk. 176   A survivor from Minsk 
remembered that all military-aged men from the city were briefly interned there until the 
Jews were separated out and the rest released.177  The Jews remaining were permitted water 
only twice a day.178  The soldiers witnessed the SS conduct frequent selections among these 
prisoners.  In one of these, all professional Jews were asked to step forward in order to 
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register for jobs.  Instead, they were taken out and shot.179 Men from the 3rd Battalion also 
witnessed these killings and visited the open graves.  Knowledge of these shootings was 
widespread as was the participation of the Einsatzgruppen in these killings.180 An 
Ereignismeldung from 4 September reported, for example, that 733 “inferior elements” had 
been culled from POW camps and liquidated.181  A diary from a 3rd Battalion soldier, 
Richard Heidenreich, states that the unit itself shot Jews in the camp.  This diary entry 
appears in a Soviet book published after the war, but despite its problematic origin, is likely 
accurate.182 The brutalizing impact of the Drozdy camp may be best seen in a report from a 
Nazi official on 10 July 1941 which noted “the limited guard force, which bears the burden 
of guarding, without being replaced for days on end, turns to the prisoners in the only 
possible language, and that is the language of weapons, and they do this mercilessly.”183  
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Thus we can see that the men of the 3rd Battalion were already becoming progressively more 
violent and experienced with the execution of Nazi racial policy. 
 Around 28 July, the 3rd Battalion arrived in the vicinity of Krupki.184  Its mission 
there was the security of Highway 2 and the railroads between the towns of Borisov and 
Bobr, a distance of some thirty miles.185 The 11th Company appears to have been stationed 
outside of town and not involved in the subsequent killing, but the 10th and 12th companies 
were quartered in and around Krupki.  The battalion used the town as its operating base for 
patrols in the surrounding countryside, combating sporadic partisan attacks on the road and 
railways and rounding up any bypassed Red Army troops.  At least one soldier, however, 
testified that these patrols often had as their target Jews as well.186 On 19 September, the 3rd 
Battalion reported on an operation in which it had worked alongside Police Battalion 317. 
Major Waldow’s men captured 164 people of whom 16 were “shot as snipers [Freischärler] 
or while attempting to escape after capture.”187  The unit was clearly carrying out the harsh 
“antipartisan” policy to the letter. 
 
Particularly active in patrolling was Oberfeldwebel Schrade, platoon leader of 2nd 
Platoon, 12th Company.  Schrade submitted an experience report on antipartisan patrolling on 
13 October that was so well received at the highest levels that it was forwarded to all units in 
Army Group Center (Rear).  Among the recommendations was that “women and children be 
ruthlessly prohibited from leaving the village” and also that “because the Russian fears the 
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club more than the gun, beatings are the most effective method.”  He added, “recently, 
women have been found in [partisan] camps.  In almost every case, these were Jewish 
women whose task was to determine whether villages were free of the enemy.  It is also 
women who do not appear Jewish.”188  Schrade also recommended that these patrols be 
conducted by soldiers disguised as civilians.  A member of his platoon recalled that they 
outfitted themselves from clothing belonging to the murdered Jews of the nearby village of 
Kholoponichi; the soldiers picked their clothing from piles stored in the local synagogue that 
the mayor referred to as “Jewish rags.”189 There is, therefore, substantial evidence that the 3rd 
Battalion was already involved in anti-Jewish measures on its  own initiative before the visit 
of Werner Schönemann’s Einsatzkommando 8 in September 1941.   
 Werner Schönemann, commander of Teilkommando Schönemann of 
Einsatzkommando 8 was a thirty-year-old Berliner and Gestapo officer.190  During his second 
semester of law school at the University of Berlin, he was ordered to Pretzsch where the 
Einsatzgruppen were assembling.191  Here, he joined Einsatzkommando 8, whose task was 
the murder of the Jews of central Belarus. Schönemann was an intelligent, yet crude man 
who bragged of his sexual relationships and who sent an eleven-year-old “Aryan-looking” 
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Belarussian girl home to live with his parents in Berlin.192  Yet in his work, he was cold, 
single-minded, and without compromise.  He often began the shootings himself, jumping into 
the pits and firing the first shot “to set an example and to show that he did not shirk his 
duty.”193  He was not a sadist.  Uncomfortable with his task of mass murder, he required that 
the killings take place very quickly and efficiently.194  Schönemann appeared glad when 
killings were over, and  was “on edge” and “hardly approachable” afterward.195  Upon his 
return to Berlin in October 1941, he attempted suicide twice by slitting his wrists.196  These 
suicide attempts might indicate his emotional state after prolonged participation in murder. 
 It was this enigmatic, yet effective killer who arrived at Major Johannes Waldow’s 
headquarters in Krupki a few days before the massacre to make arrangements for support 
from the Wehrmacht.  Understanding the nature of the negotiations and Schönemann’s 
reception at battalion headquarters is the first step in both recreating and explaining the unit’s 
participation in the Krupki massacre. The evidence seems to indicate that this was not the 
first time Waldow had worked with Schönemann.  A memorandum from the 
Einsatzkommando leader reported on 5 August that due to reports of  partisan attacks, he was 
making contact with the 286th Security Division…represented by a Major Waldow of the III 
Battalion.197  The nature of their earlier meeting and collaboration is unclear but multiple 
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testimonies by soldiers in the battalion headquarters help recreate the scene when the two met 
again in Krupki. Schönemann and another SS officer were met in the orderly room by 
Waldow and his adjutant, Lieutenant Werner Speth.   
They then went into Waldow’s office. Schönemann apparently informed the major of 
the planned killing of the Jews of Krupki and requested two companies for support.198 
Waldow himself testified that Schönemann revealed that he was there to kill the Jews but his 
group of only about twenty men  was far too small to carry out the operation on its own.  
Waldow said he would not participate in any shootings, to which Schönemann replied that he 
would not have to supply shooters but merely provide security for the operation.199  
Schönemann also requested additional ammunition, which Waldow claimed to have refused.  
On his way out, Schönemann allegedly turned to Lieutenant Speth and said, “We have to 
carry out this unhappy task, shooting all the way to the Urals.  As you can imagine, it’s not 
pretty and one can bear it only with alcohol.”200 It is, perhaps, important to note here that the 
tendency of many accounts of first encounters with mass killing is to be apologetic and to 
allege reluctance and regret.  The dilemma for the historian, of course, is to attempt to 
determine which cases of these responses are legitimate and which are fabricated.  That the 
interviewee is testifying about a third party lends this account more credence as does the fact 
that Schönemann here is still not professing much moral resistance to his job, only that it is 
disagreeable. 
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 Major Waldow, apparently still uncomfortable with this looming task, called 
regimental headquarters for clarification and perhaps to avoid participation.  The regimental 
commander of the 354th, Colonel von Rekowski, was not available, but Waldow spoke to the 
regimental adjutant, Captain Meyer-Schöller.201  Waldow asked whether he should 
participate, to which Meyer-Schöller replied, “Jawohl!” [definitely].202  Lieutenant Speth 
provides a possible explanation for this decision, noting that “there was an order that Army 
units should support the SS.”203 
 After the departure of the SS, preparations in the 3rd Battalion began in earnest.  
Waldow stated that he held a meeting with the company commanders where he informed 
them of the coming shooting and allegedly added that the individual soldier “was not to come 
into contact with Jewish civilians” or to “enter the wood where the killings would occur.”204  
Sometime later that day the commanders of the 10th and 12th companies, First Lieutenants 
Braun and Liehr, met with their platoon leaders and passed on the order.   
Likely the next day, Lieutenant Nick, a platoon leader in 12th company, ordered 
Corporal Franz M. to saddle two horses, and the two rode wordlessly out of town.  After 
about half an hour, they arrived in a swampy open area near the Starozhevitsa River and the 
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village of Lebedevo.  After inspecting an existing trench two meters deep, where peat had 
been harvested earlier by the locals, the lieutenant remounted and the two rode back.  He then 
turned to Franz and asked him to estimate the distance to the site, which he guessed was 
about 800m.205  Lieutenant Nick had just selected the Krupki execution site.   Clearly, 
Schönemann had left his new Wehrmacht partners with far more responsibility in preparing 
for the massacre than they cared to admit after the war. Certainly choosing a murder site far 
exceeded any planned cooperation between the Army and SD. 
 Early on the morning of 18 September 1941, the soldiers of the 10th and 12th 
companies assembled.  They were told of the task ahead of them or had already been told the 
night before (as in the case of Lieutenant Kerker’s 4th Platoon, 12th Company).  “Men,” 
Kerker had allegedly announced, “we have a serious task ahead of us tomorrow.  Whoever 
doesn’t trust himself to handle a sensitive and serious assignment does not need to be 
ashamed and can back out.”206 According to a soldier in headquarters, the Jews of Krupki 
had also been notified by the mayor the night before that they were going to be resettled in 
the morning.207 
 At first light, soldiers tasked with conducting the outer Absperrung or cordon took 
position outside of Krupki.  They were told that no Jew was to be allowed to leave the village 
and that any who tried were to be shot.208 Though no one admitted personally shooting, 
several soldiers remembered hearing isolated shots all morning.  Paul W. recalled a fellow 
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soldier telling a Jewish man driving his cattle out of town to turn around.209  The First 
Sergeant of 12th company, Hans H., heard from his men that night that “young Jewish 
women ran to the sentries begging for their lives and pleading that they were too young to be 
simply shot.”210 
 After the cordon had been established around 7 that morning, Schönemann’s 
Teilkommando of killers arrived in the small market square.  One of his men remembered 
that Schönemann spoke briefly with a Wehrmacht officer and then said, “Let’s get 
started.”211 As the mayor of Krupki rang a bell, the round up of the Jewish inhabitants of the 
town began.212  Lieutenant Nick and a group of 15-20 volunteers reported to the SD men and 
began pulling Jews from their houses.213 Slowly, the market square filled with people.  They 
arrived in family groups with their belongings.  They had been told to take only money and 
valuables, to leave their houses unlocked and surrender their keys to the mayor.214  German 
soldiers guarded them in the square.  Once the approximately 1,000 Jews of Krupki were 
assembled, an SS-man or possibly the mayor stood on a platform and read out a list of 
names.215  This registration lasted around two hours, after which the Jews were formed into 
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columns to be marched out of town.  The elderly and infirm were roughly thrown onto 
waiting trucks and wagons supplied by the Wehrmacht. 
 In the late morning, the Jews began marching out of town along Sovetskaya Street, 
escorted by German Army soldiers.  During the 45-minute walk, SS men and soldiers drove 
them on with rifle butts when they did not move fast enough.  As they neared the execution 
site selected by Lieutenant Nick, soldier Bruno H. recalled that “someone told them they 
could throw away their things as they were going to be shot anyway.  Some did this and the 
people became very agitated.  Someone else then said that they had to take their things with 
them anyway.”216  The execution trenches were located in a field, bordered on the east by a 
swampy area and a forest.  As the Jews arrived here, they understood what was to happen.  
As one soldier remembered, “many started to scream and cry.  The SS-men beat them until 
order was restored.”217 Margarita Kosenkova was five years old and lived in the village of 
Lebedevo.  She remembered that the “procession was peaceful but once they reached the pit 
they started to scream.  There was an awful scream that they could hear in Lebedevo.”218 
Walter K. who had escorted the toddler and its mother to the killing site observed a 
“panicked state among them, but the guards kept the Jews together.”219 
 However, the 3rd Battalion’s work was not yet complete.  Wehrmacht soldiers were 
also responsible for guarding the execution site along with local Belorussian police while the 
SS shot.  The Einsatzgruppen men selected groups of ten from the mass of Jews forced to sit 
or kneel in a meadow a short distance away.  Erich S., in the Absperrung, watched as the 
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Jews approached the grave.  He saw an SS man shouting, “Undress and give up your 
jewelry.”220 The Jews then removed their shoes and outer coats, throwing them onto a pile 
near the trench, and were forced to deposit their jewelry and watches in a nearby box.221 S. 
continued, “finally, most of them were pushed into the pit because they were afraid to go on 
their own.”222  The brutality of the scene was so great that even the German court noted that 
the Jews “spent the time which separated them from death in agonizing fear and despair 
without any opportunity to escape their fate.”223 
Soldiers surrounding the graves watched as men, women, and children were forced to 
enter the pit, lay down on the bodies of those already shot, and then were themselves shot by 
a squad of SS men standing above.224 The SS men, who were drinking as they worked, would 
hold babies up by their legs and then shoot them.225  A local Belarussian bystander, Petr 
Bulakh, observed the killings.  He was twelve at the time and was so shocked by what he saw 
that he spoke with a stutter for the rest of his life.226 Schönemann explained the process in a 
bizarre attempt at appearing more humane.  “I ordered,” he said, “that each time, the next 
group would lay their heads on the backs of the previously shot people so that they wouldn’t 
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touch the gunshot wounds [of the dead].  I must say frankly that I tried, under the 
circumstances, to find the relatively best method of shooting.”227  The soldiers had set up 
machine guns around the site to secure it.  One witnessed several Jews stand up and attempt 
to run away, but they were beaten with clubs.228 One who did escape was Maria Shpunt.  She 
first attempted to convince the Germans that she and her baby were not Jewish.  Apparently, 
she fell into the pit alive after the rest of her group was shot.  When the shooters went to get 
the next group of victims, she crawled out and ran into the brush.  Though the Germans 
(likely from the 3rd Battalion) shot at her, she managed to escape.229 Watching all of this from 
a small rise were a collection of officers from the battalion, including the commander 
Waldow, adjutant Speth, and 10th company commander Lieutenant Braun. 
 While the participation of soldiers in most of the operation is well-documented, one 
area remains only dimly illuminated: participation in actual killing.  It is likely that the 
battalion killed Jews attempting to escape both the town and the shooting site; moreover, it 
also appears that some of its soldiers participated in the pit shooting alongside Schönemann’s 
SS men.  Determining this kind of participation in the actual killing is difficult, as very few 
former soldiers are willing to discuss such participation. What is clear from the documents is 
that some men did shoot.   
Testimony points to two ways in which Waldow’s soldiers ended up shooting. The 
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first comes from Heidenreich’s diary.  In it, he claimed that he volunteered for a special task.  
The lieutenant asked for “fifteen men with strong nerves.” He accurately described the 
execution site and the rainy weather.  Finally, he wrote  that this group also shot Jews in the 
execution ditch.230  Some soldier testimony supports this possibility.  Herbert C. of 12th 
company testified that he was certain that “shootings were carried out by the 2nd Platoon led 
by Master Sergeant Schrade.”  Moreover, he continued, he had seen photographs taken by a 
sergeant in the company in which Schrade was seen pointing a pistol at a group of ten Jews 
kneeling before a ditch.231  One soldier testified during his initial questioning that Schrade 
had indeed sought “fifteen men with strong nerves” the night before (though in later 
questioning, he said only that Schrade had sought volunteers; in any case, he did not admit 
participating in any shooting).232 Perhaps, while not intending to provide the bulk of killers, 
Waldow had agreed to provide a “reserve” squad of men.  This would explain the fifteen-
man squad mentioned by Heidenreich and others which was identified the night before.  
Then, when time or ammunition dictated, this group was added to the pool of available 
shooters.  There is no conclusive evidence in the postwar testimonies to support this; 
however, it is also the last thing to which most men would have admitted.  It remains unclear 
whether this premeditated participation took place.  The statement of one soldier leaves us 
wondering: he testified that a fellow company member “freely told me after the shootings 
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that he himself had shot several Jews at the grave. I did not have the impression that he did 
this unwillingly.”233 
 Another possible scenario and one strongly supported by the evidence is that those 
soldiers tasked with the Absperrung (cordon) of the execution site were then included in the 
shooting in the course of the action.  It appears that, perhaps as a result of Waldow’s refusal 
to supply the Teilkommando with ammunition, Schönemann’s men were running short of 
bullets, and Wehrmacht soldiers were then asked or ordered to assist with their rifles.234  
Another reason that the men of the 3rd battalion were included may have been to speed up the 
operation.  Schönemann stated “it went incredibly fast, in order to avoid any delay, in the 
interest of both sides, the victims as well as those participating in the execution.”235  
Certainly he did not have the victims’ interests in mind, but he was, as noted previously, 
uncomfortable during these operations and wanted them to go as quickly as possible.  In 
addition, the weather was deteriorating.236  Storm clouds approached, and it had begun to 
rain.  A member of the SS Teilkommando testified that “clouds appeared and a thunderstorm 
approached.  Schönemann therefore had things proceed very quickly.”237 The battalion 
surgeon, Dr. Konrad G., reported that he and a platoon leader in 12th company, informed the 
adjutant, Lieutenant Speth, that 3rd Battalion soldiers were shooting Jews, in response to 
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which Speth allegedly became angry and replied that “the participation of Wehrmacht 
soldiers in the shooting had not been ordered.”238 In the final analysis, Wehrmacht soldiers in 
Krupki took a direct hand in the work of the Einsatzgruppen, either according to plan, in an 
improvised, ad hoc sort of way, or in a combination of both. 
 Around five in the afternoon, after the last Jew had been shot, Schönemann collected 
the victims’ confiscated valuables and along with his men drove away.  The grave was likely 
then strewn with lime and covered by local Soviet citizens.239  Both here and in the town, the 
non-Jewish inhabitants took the possessions left behind by the Jews.240 The soldiers who had 
been tasked with guarding the execution site marched back to the town, where the Jewish 
community of Krupki was no more.  As the local men were covering the grave, they 
discovered twenty-one year old Sofia Shalaumova still alive.  She had fallen into the trench 
unhurt and survived.  She asked the laborer, whom she knew as an acquaintance, not to bury 
her alive, and he allowed her to escape.241 Local civilians remembered that individual Jews 
caught in the area after the shooting were also shot.242 Margarita Kosenkova visited the site 
soon after the killings with a group of other children from her village. “The ground was 
moving,” she said, “and blood was coming out of the ground.  For two years after, there was 
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blood there.”243 
Schönemann reported the killing to Einsatzkommando 8 and a month later the 
following summary appeared in the operational report of Einsatzgruppe B to Heinrich 
Himmler: “Two larger actions were carried out by the unit [Einsatzkommando 8] in Krupka 
and Sholopenitsche [sic].  In the first town 912 Jews were liquidated and in the second 822.  
With this, the Krupka region can be seen as Judenfrei.”244  The killings in Kholoponichi, 
which resulted in an additional 822 victims, had been supported by two platoons from the 
10th Company.245   A report from the 354th Regiment on the next day did not mention Krupki, 
nor did any other report from either the 3rd Battalion or the regiment.246 The whole incident 
either had passed apparently without notice or was intentionally not reported in writing. 
 
Explaining Wehrmacht Complicity: From Berlin to the Forest 
 
 The events in Krupki were the end result of both Nazi genocidal policy at the highest 
level and its negotiation and implementation at the lowest.  Representing the bulk of the 
division’s combat power, the 354th Infantry Regiment was assigned the most important task 
of protecting the vital logistical rail and road links behind Army Group Center.  How, then, 
did the 3rd Battalion become so deeply involved in executing the racial policies of the Third 
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Reich on the ground? 
 The answer lies at many levels.  One must begin with the Army High Command, 
which had agreed before the invasion to support the killing units.  A November 1941 order 
from another division under Army Group Center (Rear) laid out the areas of responsibility of 
the various security organizations, including the SD (Einsatzgruppen).  It identified as 
keywords for the SD: “Politically suspect civilians, Bolsheviks, Jews, and Gypsies” and 
under SD missions listed “Solution to the Jewish Question” and “the Gypsy Question.”247  In 
addition, the well-known “Guidelines for the Behavior of the Troops” demanded “ruthless 
and aggressive action against Bolshevik agitators, snipers, saboteurs, and Jews and tireless 
elimination of any active or passive resistance.”248   
The Jew-Bolshevik-Partisan calculus played a vital role in spurring Wehrmacht 
participation in genocide.  Coupled with the Führerbefehl of 14 May 1941, which suspended 
prosecution  of Wehrmacht soldiers for any crimes committed against civilians in the Soviet 
Union, these high-level orders not only condoned, but encouraged brutal action against 
civilians in general and Jews in particular.  In this calculus, all Jews were pro-Bolshevik, all 
Bolsheviks were partisans, and hence all Jews were partisans. (i.e. not all partisans and 
Bolsheviks were Jews but all Jews were Bolsheviks and partisans or sympathizers). Army 
Group Center (Rear) informed its units that “cooperation with the SD and GFP is to be made 
even closer in all actions by the divisions and their subordinate staffs….Requests for local 
operation of individual squads of SD Einsatzkommandos are to be submitted to the 
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commander.”249  The support provided to the Einsatzgruppen can also be seen at the division 
level.  In its summary for the period from September to December 1941, the intelligence 
section of the 286th Security Division (the 354th’s parent unit) appeared happy to report that 
“constant contact was maintained with the Security Service, specifically the Einsatzgruppe of 
Gruppenführer Neumann, the Einsatzkommando 8 of Sturmbannführer Dr. Bratfisch [sic], 
and in particular with Untersturmführer Reschke’s Orscha-based squad.”250 This statement 
hints at much more than merely a logistical relationship.  
 In addition to supporting the mobile killing squads, Wehrmacht organizational culture 
and that of Army Group Center Rear also propagated the message that Jews were a group 
distinct from the general civilian population, inferior and expendable.  Jews were already 
targeted this way in the “Guidelines for the Behavior of the Troops.” On 18 July, the same 
Division ordered “hostages (particularly Jews)” to be rounded up in reprisal for an attack on 
a German sentry and a messenger.251  The 354th Infantry Regiment itself reported on 7 
September that, in conjunction with a signal battalion, the entire Jewish population of 
Tschereja was killed in reprisal for an attack on German troops.252  
 Finally, all these factors combined under the aegis of the antipartisan war.  In this 
calculus, all Jews were Bolsheviks and partisan supporters.  Thus, the Jewish population was 
“militarized.” That is, they were transformed into combatants (as partisans or partisan 
supporters) and thereby speciously deemed legitimate targets for military action.  This type 
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of broad targeting occurred in the 3rd Battalion.  In the 354th Regiment’s area of operations, 
little real antipartisan war was occurring. Personnel records indicate that, in the period from 
22 June to 30 September, only 17 men were killed and 32 wounded in the entire division of 
7,500.253 It is likely, therefore, that the unit was involved in the far less dangerous task of 
rounding up bypassed Red Army soldiers, communists and, perhaps, Jews. One soldier 
remembered, “We often carried out so-called raids, mostly at night.  The resident Jews would 
be rounded up and assembled in the town.  After they were assembled, a site would be 
chosen in the surrounding woods and they would be shot.  Sometimes non-Jews would be 
taken along to dig the graves and they took the Jews’ possessions with them.”254 Major 
Waldow’s selection as a speaker and trainer at a corps-level antipartisan conference in 
Mogilev a week after the Krupki massacre  is evidence that the actions of his battalion in 
supporting the action there were in no way condemned by his superiors, but on the contrary 
were viewed as an accomplishment that qualified him for special assignment. 
 In addition to the overall policies ordained from above, the local geography and 
conditions on the ground as well as the military situation led to the battalion’s participation in 
this massacre. Because Krupki was located on the main artery between Minsk and Mogilev, 
it likely served as a small center for trading and commerce and this would explain the large 
Jewish population.  For the same reasons, it was an excellent base of operations for securing 
3rd Battalion’s stretch of road, given its access to the highway and the buildings available to 
house soldiers.  Finally, Krupki’s location likely ensured that it was  a target of the 
Einsatzgruppen before more distant, out of the way places.  Thus, while later Jewish 
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“actions” would be coordinated with civilian authorities, Ortskommandanturen, and local 
militias, the Krupki action was  a relatively early action carried out with only the first units to 
arrive. 
 Why did Major Waldow agree to allow his battalion to participate to such a degree?  
It is possible that he was reluctant  to provide his soldiers as firing squads, at least in the 
initial meeting.  He did call his regimental headquarters for clarification on whether he 
should assist Schönemann.  It is unclear whether this was a result of his objection to any 
participation or merely his desire to have the action approved by his superiors.  It is probably 
the former, as little evidence exists to suggest that Waldow was an extreme antisemite or 
pushed for the action on his own initiative.  One cannot necessarily, however, assume that his 
objections were based on any moral grounds.  No evidence exists explaining his reluctance 
except that he found the whole thing distasteful.  He stated during his questioning that “my 
concern was to avoid members of the battalion coming into immediate contact with the 
Jewish inhabitants of Krupki or the SD.”255 Such concerns that the killing of women and 
children was a dirty job and not the mission of the regular Army were common but did not 
necessarily represent disagreement with the policy itself.  In any case, these reservations did 
not prevent him from fully assisting Teilkommando Schönemann, down to choosing the 
execution site for them.  Finally, there is evidence that Krupki was not the first time he had 
worked with Einsatzkommando 8.  A report from Schönemann to Army Group Center (Rear) 
noted that he had made contact with Major Waldow regarding antipartisan operations on 8 
August.256  In any case, his support was vital, for the 10-20 men of the Teilkommando could 
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never have carried out such a large action without the manpower of the Army. 
Among the Living and the Dead: Local Experiences of the Krupki Killing 
I want to mention here that those in the Absperrung were so depressed that 
evening that they wouldn’t eat anything.  I had to really persuade them that 
they had to eat.  I added, “Eat, men.  Don’t worry about it because there are 
many atrocities in war.  We are not responsible for it.” 
  - Lieutenant Hermann Nick, platoon leader, 12th Company257 
 
I didn’t want to witness this.  I was married then and had four children. I 
remember clearly that I thought of my family and felt that the imminent 
events were wrong.  I simply couldn’t witness the shooting of these people.  I 
went then to Lieutenant Mangelsdorf and told him he should release me from 
any further escorting of Jews to the shooting site.  I know I told him I 
couldn’t watch it because I had four children at home.  Mangelsdorf told me I 
could go and do guard duty. 
   - Martin S., soldier, 10th Company258 
 
 As we have seen, the majority of Wehrmacht soldiers participating in the Krupki 
“action” were not volunteers.  How then did they approach this experience and what does 
their experience and that of the victims tell us about such killings?  We may start with their 
knowledge of the intent of the operation.  Did these men realize that their actions were 
directly responsible for the murder of a thousand human beings? 
Naturally, most soldiers claimed to have had no idea that they were participating in 
the killing of the Jews, that they thought the Jews were to be deported to labor camps.  This 
must be, for the most part, a postwar construction.  Waldow and the company commanders 
certainly knew that the Jews were to be shot.  It is almost certain that they passed this 
information on to their soldiers.  In any case, a sufficient number of soldiers confessed 
knowledge of the real goal to cast serious doubt on any claims of ignorance.  For example, 
Erich J. described a conversation with a fellow soldier on the day of the shooting. “The stated 
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reason for the registration was only a pretext,” he admitted, “from the way the conversation 
went it was clear to me that the Jews would be shot.”259  Another soldier, recalling executions 
of Jews the unit had already witnessed in Minsk, said it was obvious these Jews were to be 
“liquidated” too.260  Finally, Sergeant Paul D. related: “Supposedly we knew that these Jews 
were to be resettled.  However, all Wehrmacht members, including me, would have known 
that these people were going to their deaths.”261 
Why, then, out of 130 former officers and soldiers questioned after the war, did only 
Private First Class Martin S. testify later to refusing to participate and requesting a different 
assignment?262  There are several explanations.  First, many soldiers saw no way out or 
perhaps did not realize the full meaning of their participation until they were committed.  
Corporal Paul L.’s statement is typical: “In this moment, it was clear to me that the Jews I 
was escorting would be shot and I had no further task.  I would have not been able to change 
anything.”263 Another said, “I didn’t dare do or say anything because I was only a simple 
soldier and couldn’t have changed anything.”264 Many refer to their station as “simple 
soldiers.”  Others refer to military discipline and orders.  For example, Bruno H. stated, 
“when I am told that at the latest I must have known at the execution site that the civilians 
                                                
259 "J., Erich Statement, 26 May 1966,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3876), 475. 
260 "S. Martin Statement, 9 January 1965,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3876), 364. 
261 "D., Paul Statement, 23 October 1964,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3875), 274-5. 
262 The 10th Company commander also reported calling Major Waldow and requesting to be released from the 
order to support the execution.  It is possible that this occurred. However, as a commander, First Lieutenant 
Braun, was much more vulnerable to a charge himself and, therefore, more likely to invent some form of 
reluctance or resistance. In addition, Waldow does not corroborate this phone call.  Finally, Lieutenant Braun ‘s 
presence at the execution site does not support his discomfort with the mission. "B., Paul Statement, 17 
September 1968,"  (LA-NRW: Münster: Q124/3548), 37. 
263 "L., Paul Statement, 18 April 1967,"  (LA-NRW: Münster: Q124/3548), 146-7. 
264 "S., Erich Statement, 3 November 1966,"  (LA-NRW: Münster: Q124/3547), 106. 
93 
were to be shot and that it had nothing to do with war, this is true.  I didn’t have the courage 
at the time to do anything against it or to refuse the order because I certainly had to count on 
being shot myself.”265  Such  statements are certainly in part a result of the postwar situation 
of the witness and the ubiquitous “obedience to orders” excuse, but there is also likely an 
element of truth in them. The men of the 3rd Battalion were not experienced in these sorts of 
mass killings and perhaps had not discovered the methods of evasion and refusal that other 
soldiers would later use.   
Secondly, as Omer Bartov notes, “the strict obedience demanded from the troops, and 
the draconian punishments meted to offenders, doubtlessly played a major role in 
maintaining unit cohesion under the most adverse combat conditions.”266  Though this was 
not a combat environment, the argument likely holds.  While it was probably clear to most 
that soldiers would not be shot on the spot, the specter of other types of punishment was 
undoubtedly present.  Some men describe a fear that the SS men would shoot them for 
refusing to participate.  This, too, was highly unlikely.  German units (of any ilk) simply did 
not shoot each other out of hand, especially when the offender was not even a member of the 
unit.  However, military culture functions by necessity under increased disciplinary pressure 
and, for some, this pressure may have been enough to mute any evasion, especially as, unlike 
in later situations, those opposed  to such participation had not yet discovered successful 
ways to evade. 
Lastly, the division of labor provided some psychological protection for these men.  
First, the tactics involved were almost identical to those employed against partisans in terms 
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of surrounding towns and identifying suspicious persons.  This “tactical muscle memory” 
may have allowed some soldiers to tell themselves that this operation was no different than 
previous operations of which they had been a part. Except for those who may have actually 
been shooting, soldiers could claim (both to themselves at the time and after the war) that 
they had not actually participated in the shooting.  As one man stated after the war, “We 
merely had to carry out the Absperrung.  At this time, we didn’t know what was actually 
going on.”267  As we have seen, it is highly unlikely that many soldiers would not have 
known what they were enabling.  However, such separation of tasks likely allowed some of 
them to believe or convince themselves that they were not assisting murder.  The dichotomy 
is particularly clear in the following statement: “We soldiers were merely employed in the 
Absperrung….We had nothing to do with the killings.”268  Soldiers attempted to consciously 
divorce their actions from the whole, to intentionally avoid acknowledging that their 
participation was directly connected with the final killing step.  Former corporal L. told 
police, “I could not have changed anything.  In answer to your question, I must say that as a 
result I found myself in no moral conflict…I am therefore not aware of being guilty of 
anything.”269  One is forced to wonder here whether L. is protesting too much and whether he 
is telling this more to himself than to his interrogators. 
However, if some soldiers were reluctant participants swept up in the operation, 
others were very willing.  We have already seen that volunteers were sought and found for 
the more distasteful duty of rounding up the Jews from their houses and possibly for 
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shooting. There were soldiers in the unit whose antisemitism made these killings welcome.  
Private Reinhold Le. recalls that one soldier aimed his rifle at a Jewish girl “for fun” a few 
days before the execution.270  Certainly men such as this were not uncommon, but the 
testimonies do not contain many references to them.  However, witnesses do describe two 
junior officers who stood out as Draufgänger or go-getters of two different varieties and who 
likely had their counterparts among the non-commissioned officers and men. 
The first was Master Sergeant Schrade, who led the 2nd platoon in 12th company.  He 
was described by one soldier as “an arrogant person (Windhund)” who “didn’t have any time 
for his people.”271 He often led “partisan hunts” and “always had ‘his’ people who went with 
him.”272  Schrade used volunteers for these missions, which he conducted often in civilian 
clothes.  As mentioned, he published a treatise on small-unit antipartisan tactics that was 
disseminated throughout Army Group Center (Rear).  Clearly, he was an active and avid 
fighter.  But what of his participation in anti-Jewish actions?  Heidenreich was apparently in 
Schrade’s platoon, and another 2nd Platoon soldier supported his contention that it was 
Schrade who sought the fifteen men with “strong nerves.”   He was also placed at the 
execution site by several witnesses.  It appears that Schrade was certainly a dedicated soldier 
and an ambitious leader.  He may have been involved in anti-Jewish shootings during his 
partisan patrols and during the execution.  In any case, he ranks high as a likely suspect in the 
commission of Wehrmacht atrocities against Jews.273 
Another platoon leader in 12th company was noted for his extremity as well.  While 
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Master Sergeant Schrade appears as a diehard and zealous soldier, Lieutenant Hermann Nick 
is remembered more as a brutal and fanatical man.  He was “unpopular with all the soldiers 
because of his ruthless behavior.  He tormented those who gave him any opportunity.”274 One 
of his soldiers recalled that during one antipartisan operation, Nick had approximately 
twenty-thirty men pulled from their houses and shot on the spot, allegedly because shots had 
been fired from the village the day prior.275  Sometime after the Krupki shooting, he tortured 
a local mayor for information regarding partisans by first repeatedly hanging him from a 
balcony and then forcing him into a freezing lake until he talked.276  On a different operation, 
the lieutenant allegedly burned down a house with a woman in it who was suspected of 
sheltering partisans.  He and his men watched as the house burned to the ground with the 
woman inside, at the window.277  Finally, one soldier reported that he had personally seen 
Nick shoot five or six children who peeled potatoes in the kitchen for extra food.278  It is 
probably no coincidence that it was Lieutenant Nick who found the execution site and who 
was one of those responsible for the Absperrung there; he likely participated in attacks on 
Jews as well. 
Unlike the Einsatzgruppen unit that swooped into a town, conducted its killings, and 
left, the 3rd Battalion had been present in Krupki for over a month before the killings.  This 
unit had, regardless of Major Waldow’s intentions, some contact with the civilian population 
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including the Jews. The speed of the German advance, arriving only six days after the 
invasion, ensured that most of the town’s Jews were trapped under German occupation. A 
ghetto had already been established in July for approximately 1,000 Jews, but likely was not 
closed or guarded.279   
Like Wehrmacht units elsewhere, the 3rd Battalion used Jews as forced labor for 
various tasks.  One lieutenant recalled that they were used for repair work.280 However, most 
soldiers particularly remembered the Jewish girls who were “employed” as maids or janitors 
in the headquarters or barracks.  Daily contact with these Jewish women likely bred 
familiarity, for it is almost exclusively these women who represented the victims in the 
minds of the perpetrators.281  
A clerk in the 10th Company related the following encounter.  On the morning of the 
execution, he looked on as a twenty-year-old Jewish girl stepped outside to empty the trash.  
A Soviet civilian appeared and gruffly spoke to the girl.  He concluded, “the girl was very 
frightened and returned to Krupka.  I thought to myself that this girl would now certainly be 
shot.”282  Yet, the clerk apparently did nothing to prevent this. A private on battalion staff 
recalled watching two twenty-year-old girls who cleaned for them leaving the village to be 
shot.283  He, too, did nothing.   
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The battalion ordnance officer, Lieutenant Werner Koschwitz, told investigators that 
Major Waldow lived in the house of a Jewish pharmacist.284  Waldow’s orderly testified that 
the major had tried to convince the pharmacist to escape because he would be shot the next 
day.  However, the man apparently refused and was likely killed along with the rest.285  This 
incident adds more to our understanding of Waldow himself.  He appears to have been a man 
with reservations about killing Jews, willing to warn those with whom he had personal 
contact, but, as an officer, prepared to fully cooperate with the killing when it was asked of 
him. 
Familiarity did not always breed empathy, however.  It also bred contempt.  As 
mentioned earlier, one soldier pointed his rifle at a Jewish girl apparently in an attempt to 
frighten her.  According to the witness, the girl told this soldier, “Go ahead and shoot! 
Whether today or tomorrow, doesn’t matter to me.”286  The witness concluded from this that 
she knew of the impending execution. Two weeks after the killing, a soldier in 9th company 
wrote in his diary: “The local Russian police brought us bacon which the Jews had set aside. 
These Jews were shot.  There the mayor had them annihilated.”287 
Perhaps the most intriguing and most puzzling of the interactions these men had with 
their victims concerns a Jewish opera singer from Minsk.  This woman was shot along with 
the others.  She appears to have been well known amongst the 3rd Battalion soldiers.  When 
speaking with an eyewitness of the executions, Sergeant Erwin K. asked whether all the Jews 
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had been shot, even the pretty women.  The other soldier replied, “Yes, all shot.  Also, the 
singer from Minsk.”288  Another soldier, asking about the fate of the cleaning women, was 
told that a girl from the theater, who was “pretty as a picture” was also shot.289  It is even 
more unexpected that two SS members of the Teilkommando also remembered that this opera 
singer had been among those murdered.290 
What is the significance of this woman in the memory of the perpetrators?  Who was 
she?  Why was she so well known (and so well remembered)?  Unfortunately, the story of 
this opera singer from Minsk raises more questions than answers.  It is likely that she fled 
Minsk, perhaps because she had relatives in Krupki.  It is possible that she even performed 
for the soldiers in Krupki.  It is doubtful that the Germans became aware of her only on the 
day of the shooting.  Moreover, how did the SS find out about her?  Did the soldiers tell 
them?  If so, under what circumstances?  It could be that women in general figure so highly 
in soldiers’ memories because they highlighted most clearly the extreme nature of this action. 
In any case, the opera singer from Minsk reminds us both of the individual lives and stories 
that came to an end in Krupki and that to these men, their victims were not necessarily 
faceless or nameless but were killed all the same. 
Endgame 
Trying to conceal the vestiges of their crimes, German thugs burned the bodies of 
killed Jews before retreating. Burnings were carried out with the involvement of 
arrested Soviet citizens who were brought from prison in Borisov. They were also 
burnt afterwards. I can’t give you the exact number of bodies burnt, but the number 
of Jews was about 2,000. 
- Vladimir Antonovich Baranchik, Belorussian inhabitant of Krupki, 28 
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December 1945291 
 
I am hearing today for the first time that, in the fall of 1941, the Jewish population of 
Krupki was rounded up and escorted, with the assistance of the 3rd Battalion, to an 
execution site where they were then shot. 
- Colonel Siegfried von Rekowski, commander of the 354th Infantry 
Regiment, 30 March 1967292 
 
In the fall of 1943, an SS-Lieutenant Müller in Minsk began preparing cards listing 
locations of mass killings in occupied Belarus.293 These lists were then handed over to 
Sonderkommando 1005, a unit whose task was eradicating the evidence of Nazi crimes 
before the Red Army re-captured the territory.  In Krupki, as elsewhere, Soviet prisoners 
were forced to dig up corpses and burn them.  Margarita Kosenkova remembered that the 
“smell was terrible and the villagers saw [the burning operation] from the roofs of their 
houses.”294 The Red Army entered the town on 28 June 1944.295 As elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union, the crimes of the “fascist occupiers” including the murder of the Jews of Krupki was 
uncovered. 
Major Waldow had taken command of the 354th Infantry Regiment by November 
1941 and on 11 December the entire Regiment was transferred along with all the other 
infantry regiments in Army Group Center (Rear) to the 221st Security Division and thereby 
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became part of the reserves for the 2nd Panzer Army.296 Shortly thereafter, it found itself in 
bitter winter combat against a major Soviet counter-offensive which began on 6 December 
1941. Between then and the end of March 1942, Army Group Center had sustained over 
700,000 casualties.297  By January 25th, for example, 2nd Battalion, made up of the 5th and 7th 
companies, had to be consolidated into one company (between 100 and 200 men) led by a 
lieutenant and with one lieutenant transferred from another unit. The two companies had lost 
99 men killed, wounded, or missing.  A further 26 were too sick or frostbitten to continue.  
Among the casualties were five officers.  The battalion supply trains had been largely “shot 
to pieces” on 24 December 1941.298  Comparing these losses in less than a month to a total of 
18 killed and 50 wounded (of whom 22 were not evacuated) between June and December of 
1941 starkly demonstrates the difference between killing innocent civilians and actual 
combat.299   
 
The Krupki killing site is little changed today, a large meadow on the edge of an 
evergreen forest sloping gently down to a marsh alongside the Starozhevitsa River.  It lies off 
a gravel road running north of the town and across the highway, likely the same road that the 
Jews were forced down in 1941.  Still visible are the remnants of the peat pits and 
excavations. In 1969, a memorial was constructed at the site, funded by relatives of the 
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murdered.300  However, because the Soviet authorities would not allow any mention of Jews 
in order to minimize any specially Jewish suffering, the inscription reads only “buried here 
are 1,975 peaceful Soviet citizens, brutally murdered by the German Fascist occupants, 
September 18, 1941.”  A few trees have been planted around the monument.  It is a humble 
memorial, but the grass is kept trimmed as is the meadow where the Jews were assembled.  
The Belarussians throughout the region seem to quietly remember their Jewish neighbors by 
maintaining execution sites and even Jewish cemeteries. 
The investigation of the Krupki killing gives us a window into another Holocaust.  
The sterile numbers in the Einsatzgruppen Reports return to real places and re-form into real 
lives destroyed.  It also corrects a prevalent depiction of these killings as routine and without 
incident.  On the contrary, we see that horrible scenes of misery, brutality, and sadism 
occurred on an intimately personal level.  The victims did not go quietly to the pits, resigned 
to their fates; they cried, they screamed, they pleaded.  And the German Army was there—
guarding, escorting, and also shooting. 
Here, in Krupki, one sees the end product of the high-level staff coordination and 
promises of support and cooperation between the Einsatzgruppen and the Wehrmacht.  This 
was not just an agreement on paper, but one that on the ground resulted in German soldiers 
loading sick people onto trucks to be killed, guarding them in their last moments, and, in 
some cases, killing innocent men, women, and children themselves.  Wehrmacht collusion in 
the Holocaust has often been described as haphazard rather than systematic and of secondary 
rather than of primary importance.  Yet, Krupki shows how incredibly important this 
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participation actually was and how coordinated it was, even in the early stages.  Regardless 
of how the soldiers viewed their part, the Army was essential in the murder of this 
community and provided the manpower, the force, and the intimidation that allowed a small 
group of SS shooters to kill 1,000 people.  Moreover, as this and other cases show, the 
soldiers of the German Army did not remain aloof but instead pulled triggers themselves.  
  There was an afterlife to the Krupki massacre.  Just one week after the massacre, 
Major Waldow traveled to the regional capital of Mogilev to participate in a conference on 
the antipartisan war in the rHGM.  He brought with him the lessons of his collusion with the 
Einsatzgruppen.  Along with other officers, he would share these experiences as the 
Wehrmacht codified its role in the anti-Jewish policy and deliberately began to target Jews.  
In this way, the lessons learned by Major Waldow became part of the blueprint for future 
Wehrmacht collusion in the Holocaust by bullets.  It is to this conference that we now turn.   
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IV. Exhortation, Clarification, Execution- The Mogilev 
Conference and Wehrmacht Targeting of Jews 
 
Introduction: From Conference Table to Execution Pit 
In October 1941, it was said that the Jews of this town were to be liquidated.  
Because they did things with the partisans.  Who said this first, I can’t say.  It 
spread by word of mouth. 
 - Sergeant Leopold W., 3rd Company, 691st Infantry Regiment301 
 
 On October 10, 1941, the soldiers of the 3rd Company, 691st Infantry Regiment were 
uneasy because the task ahead of them was something new: they were to kill the entire 
Jewish population of Krucha, a village in central Belarus.302  A few hours later, Private 
Wilhelm Magel stood with another soldier in front of four Jewish women and an old man 
with a long white beard. The company First Sergeant, Emil Zimber, ordered the Jews to turn 
away from the shooters, but they remained facing the German soldiers.  Zimber gave the 
order to fire but Magel and his colleague, a former divinity student balked, intentionally 
missing their targets.  They requested to be relieved from the execution detail and were 
assigned to guard the remaining Jews waiting in the village square.303  This German Army 
unit without assistance of any other organization murdered a minimum of 150 Jewish men, 
women, and children as a result of an antipartisan conference that had taken place over a 
                                                
301 "W., Leopold Statement, 29 July 1953,"  (LA NRW-H: H-13 Darmstaft, Nr. 919 I, Bd. II.), 326. 
302 The 691st Infantry Regiment was part of the 339th Infantry Division, a regular infantry unit. 
303 "M., Wilhelm Statement, 8 August 1951,"  (LA-NRW-H: H 13 Darmstadt, Nr. 979 I, Bd. II), 172. 
105 
week earlier at the headquarters of Army Group Center (Rear) in Mogilev.304  Two officers 
from the 1st Battalion (of which 3rd Company was a part) had returned from this conference 
with the message “where there is a Jew, there is a partisan.” A week later, the battalion 
commander, Major Alfred Commichau, ordered that all Jews in his area of control be killed. 
 The Mogilev Conference offers us the rare opportunity to investigate the relationship 
between the antipartisan war and the Wehrmacht’s participation in the Holocaust on the 
ground.  This little-studied conference was an important turning point in the Wehrmacht’s 
participation in the Holocaust, at least in Belarus. The evidence strongly suggests that, at 
least in Army Group Center (Rear) or rückwärtige Heeresgebiet Mitte (rHGM), the 
antipartisan war was used as a vehicle (and a willing vehicle) by which to enlist greater 
support from the Wehrmacht in executing Nazi genocidal policy.  Jews were added to an 
approved list of enemies to be systematically eliminated. This chapter will examine how the 
Mogilev Conference accomplished this expansion of Wehrmacht responsibility into genocide 
and present evidence of its increased complicity in the murder of Jews throughout rHGM and 
Belarus. 
 As explained earlier,  Wehrmacht complicity in the Holocaust occurred in the context 
of a military campaign and of long term cultural and organizational inputs such as latent 
antisemitism, military discipline, and social-psychological pressures. The intent of this 
chapter is not to discount these long-term contextual factors, but to investigate how the 
antipartisan war and the Jew-Bolshevik-Partisan construct were used to more fully 
incorporate the Wehrmacht into the Nazi genocidal project.305  Many historians have noted 
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and stressed the connection between the antipartisan war and the killing of Jews. However, 
what is less clear is how this argument was instrumentalized at the unit level, that is, how it 
influenced behavior on the ground.  The nature of the partisan threat was intentionally 
mobilized to provide useful ideological, psychological, and tactical expedients with which to 
bring the substantial manpower of the Wehrmacht to bear against the Jews. The Mogilev 
Conference, which has not received much treatment historically, is a very significant event in 
this regard.306  It is evidence of an intentional effort to include the Wehrmacht in the 
Holocaust. 
 
The Mogilev Antipartisan Conference, 24-26 September 1941 
 The town of Mogilev is a provincial capital, located on the Dnieper River in eastern 
Belarus.  Founded in the 13th century, the city functioned mainly as a center for commerce 
between Russia and Western Europe.307 The Germans entered the largely destroyed city on 
26 July after almost a month of stiff resistance. On 7 September, the staff of rHGM set up the 
corps headquarters in the city.308  The Wehrmacht quickly conquered the wooded and 
swampy region, advancing over 280 miles from Warsaw to Minsk in less than two weeks.  
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While the armored spearhead rushed forward, infantry units followed more slowly behind to 
reduce the huge pockets of encircled Red Army units.  However, given the sheer numbers of 
soldiers involved, large groups of versprengte (dispersed or bypassed) Red Army soldiers 
remained at large in the countryside.   
While most of these groups were leaderless and probably seeking either to return to 
Soviet lines or simply to their civilian lives, some armed groups carried out minor attacks on 
German infrastructure and units.  The popular image of the partisan movement, however, is 
the 1943-44 experience of substantial units of agile, vicious, well-armed, and well-organized 
guerillas harrying German troops in the snows of Russia.   The effectiveness of the partisans 
in German rear areas is still under debate; only now can much of the triumphalist Soviet 
historiography of the partisan effort be more evenly evaluated.  Certainly, as time passed the 
partisan movement had increasingly greater impact on the German war effort by tying down 
troops, destroying communications, and interrupting logistics efforts.  Though Russia had a 
history of effective partisan units such as the Cossacks, Stalin’s prewar refusal to 
countenance any thought of combat behind the lines left the Soviet Union woefully 
unprepared for the occupation of its territory.  In the summer of 1941, large-scale, organized 
partisan resistance had not yet developed, and only fifteen regular or security divisions were 
employed in the rear areas out of 100+ divisions fighting the Red Army.309   Even by October 
1943, of 2.6 million men on the Eastern front, only 100,000 were concerned with security 
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behind the lines, and this can be seen as an indication of the relative threat level the partisans 
posed, even at their most dangerous.310 One historian goes so far as to argue that the 
“fragmented and largely unpopular partisan movement posed no major threat to the German 
occupation” through the end of 1941.311 
In the summer and fall of 1941, the partisan organization and combat ability remained 
“rudimentary at best” as the rapid advance of German forces occupied large amounts of 
territory, leaving little time to organize.312  The effect was that, in the vast areas of occupied 
Soviet territory hundreds of miles behind the front lines, resistance was at first left to 
spontaneous and scattered groups of NKVD, die-hard Communists, so-called “destruction 
battalions,” and dispersed Red Army soldiers willing to carry on a fifth column war in the 
enemy rear.  Indeed, at this point in the campaign, one can reasonably argue as Hannes Heer 
does for an “antipartisan war without partisans.”313 
Thus, the actual partisan threat in rHGM was still low in the summer and fall of 1941, 
which makes both the Wehrmacht paranoia about it and the use of the civilian “danger” as a 
cover for more direct genocidal policies more apparent. In July 1941, for example, rHGM 
already warned of “partisan detachments” and ordered that they and any civilians supporting 
them be treated as freischärlers, that is, summarily executed.314 However, German casualty 
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figures do not support the depiction of a lethal partisan movement.  rHGM reported a total of 
1,993 German soldiers killed in the period between June 1941 and March 1942, which 
equates to 200 soldiers a month.315 The 286th Security Division in the same area recorded a 
total of 18 killed between June and December of 1941, out of an average strength of 5,700.316  
Yet from August through December, the same division reported 598 enemy combatants 
killed in action and 8,131 prisoners taken.  This works out to roughly 30 partisans killed for 
every German and one German killed for every 451 prisoners taken.  These casualties hardly 
indicate a vibrant and dangerous insurgency.317 Ratios such as these would be extraordinary 
for actual combat, let alone for fighting against an elusive enemy like the partisans.  This 
begs the question, who were the Germans fighting?  Along with bypassed soldiers and 
questionably suspect civilians, unarmed civilian Jews were killed as well. 
Implicit in the killing in the summer and fall of 1941, especially on Soviet territory, 
was the Jew-Bolshevik-Partisan calculus.  In this formulation, all Jews were Bolsheviks, all 
Bolsheviks were partisans (or at the very least supporters of partisans), and thus, all Jews 
were also partisans or partisan supporters.  This formula is important in explaining the 
murder of Jews under the guise of the antipartisan war.  The Jew-Bolshevik conflation was a 
well-worn trope of Nazi propaganda.  However, its extension to partisans was something 
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newer.   Indeed, this construction had been used by many  Russians themselves during the 
Russian Civil war to justify violence against Jews.318 Emphasizing the communist and 
“enemy” nature of Jews likely helped activate in the Wehrmacht a greater support for 
genocidal policy based on latent anti-communist feeling and the appearance of a legitimate 
military threat.  In effect, this construction along with the criminal orders “militarized” the 
Jewish population of the Soviet Union and allowed them to be “legitimately” targeted by the 
Army.  The units represented at the Mogilev conference already had been conflating Jews 
and partisans and had also been working with rHGM and General Schenckendorff.   
Schenckendorff himself was fully aware that the majority of killings reported to him as 
partisans and “plunderers” were primarily Jews.319  These killing operations are important as 
a prehistory to the conference for their key commanders, Fegelein and Lombard, would 
participate in the conference.  
 The regional characteristics of Belarus or the Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic as it 
was called at the time are critical to both the nature of the Mogilev Conference and the events 
that followed.  In many ways, this region was fundamentally different from the regions 
occupied by the Germans to the north and south, the Baltic states and the Ukraine.  As we 
have seen, unlike the Baltic and the Ukraine, Belarus had no highly developed or long-
running nationalist movement.  Thus, it had far fewer local inhabitants willing to support the 
Nazis in response to promises of or even just wishful thinking about eventual sovereignty.   
 Partially due to the lack of a more polarizing nationalist influence, relations between 
                                                
318 Henry Abramson, A Prayer for the Government : Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917-1920 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 112. 
319 Martin Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah : die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS und die 
Judenvernichtung 1939-1945 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), 201. 
111 
Jews and non-Jews were comparatively better in Belarus, decreasing the appeal of Nazi 
antisemitic propaganda.  Indeed, in some instances this led to notable support and rescue of 
Jews.  Barbara Epstein notes in her study of the Minsk ghetto that “if the Germans assumed 
unanimous local support, they turned out to have been wrong.”320   Moreover, “the large 
numbers of Jews and Byelorussians who engaged in resistance from outside the organized 
underground also played a crucial role, creating a solidarity between Jews and non-Jews.”321  
The reticence of locals to collaborate caused an even greater manpower problem for the 
killers, to the extent that units of Lithuanian and Latvian collaborators were often brought in 
to fill the roles that local auxiliaries performed in the Baltic and Ukraine. 
On September 16, rHGM requested that officers who “as a result of their performance 
and experience in the battle against partisans can provide a valuable experience report” 
participate in a three day “exchange of experiences.”322 Gen. Max von Schenckendorff, the 
commander of this rear area, welcomed the officers who represented units from across 
rHGM.    
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Figure 1. Mogilev Conference Wehrmacht Attendees by Rank 
An analysis of the participants yields some telling clues about the nature of this 
conference.  Sixty-one officers from various units in rHGM traveled to Mogilev.  Wehrmacht 
personnel represented an overwhelming 82% of the participants and came mostly from the 
three major divisions in rHGM (221st, 286th, and 403rd Security Divisions) as well as rHGM 
staff.  There was also one representative of the Army High Command (OKH).  Also notable 
is that 38% of the officers attending were commanders at the battalion or company level.323 
Over half of the Army officers were captains or lieutenants.  Thus, the attendees were heavily 
Wehrmacht, largely junior officers and low-level commanders who were responsible for 
executing policy rather than making it.  In this context, we see another example of the center-
periphery dynamic in Nazi policies, with local actors contributing directly to what became 
higher level policy. 
Some of these men had already distinguished themselves as particularly violent or 
complicit with genocidal policy.  Major Waldow, of the 354th Infantry Regiment is a prime 
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example as his battalion had directly supported Einsatzkommando 8 and participated in the 
murder of 1,000 Jews in the town of Krupki less than a week earlier. Captain Balitzki of the 
350th Infantry Regiment also attended. This regiment had already assisted in the removal of 
Jews from the Bialowiezer forest to create a private game preserve for Herman Goering.  An 
officer in this regiment also had earlier recommended that “the Jewish Question must be 
more radically solved.  I recommend the collection of all the Jews living in the countryside in 
guarded detention and work camps.  Suspect elements must be eliminated.”324 Indeed, 
Michael Wildt’s description of the leadership of the RSHA as “flexible, mobile, eager, able 
to fulfill their job everywhere” could be applied to these men with a high  degree of 
accuracy.325 Thus some of the Wehrmacht officers attending had likely been chosen for their 
extreme and brutal records and certainly not in spite of them. 
The non-Army attendees are also critical in understanding the tenor of the Mogilev 
Conference.  First among these was Arthur Nebe, the commander of Einsatzgruppe B, the 
mobile killing unit assigned to murder the Jews overtaken by Army Group Center.  Nebe had 
“promptly” volunteered for service in the East with the Einsatzgruppen in an attempt to 
advance his career and “curry favor” with Heydrich.326 He had also arranged for 100 people 
to be shot as a demonstration for Himmler on 15 August 1941 and had experimented with 
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dynamite and exhaust gas as killing methods on mentally disabled people in September.327 
By the end of the year, over 190,000 Jews had been murdered in Belarus, most of them by 
units under Nebe’s command.328  The presence of an Einsatzgruppen commander indicates 
that the conference’s focus would not remain a purely military one. 
Nebe was joined in Mogilev by the Higher SS and Police Leader (HSSPF) for Army 
Group Center, SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski.  Philip Blood 
describes him as obsessed with restoring family honor after the disgraceful death of his uncle 
and most of his unit at the hands of HeHe tribesman in German East Africa and as a man 
who “behaved like the champion of all the Nazi rhetoric and dogma that punctuated the SS 
cult. His frequent meetings with the head of the SS would bear out this close relationship. He 
was a driven man motivated to exterminate Jews and Communists in the name of 
Lebensraum.”329  After some early criticism for not being sufficiently radical, Bach-Zelewski 
strove to be more extreme and won the patronage of Himmler himself.330  Interestingly, the 
brutal nature of his work took a psychological toll on him as well and Bach-Zelewski had a 
breakdown in the winter of 1941/42.331 In any case, by September 1941, he had already 
proven himself a great supporter of anti-Jewish actions. It is not surprising then that he would 
go on to become the Chief of Antipartisan Warfare where he would again preside over the 
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wholesale slaughter of civilians and Jews during massive sweeps and the creation of “dead 
zones” in Belarus.  Bach-Zelewski would also direct the large “antipartisan” operations such 
as Hamburg and Bamberg in the summer of 1942 which would murder huge numbers of 
Jews. 
The cast of experienced killers was rounded out by men like the commander of the 
SS-Cavalry Brigade, Hermann Fegelein, and the commander of its Cavalry Regiment 1, 
Gustav Lombard.  Interestingly, the other regimental commander, Franz Magill, was not 
invited to participate.  He was, perhaps, viewed as the less extreme officer, having mainly 
restricted himself to killing Jewish men.332  This brigade began killing Jews in early August 
in the Pripet marshes and would kill over 11,000.333  Along with the Police Battalions, it also 
presided over the turn toward killing all Jews regardless of age or sex. Christopher Browning 
has convincingly argued that, at the end of July/beginning of August 1941, Himmler verbally 
notified subordinates that now all Jews, regardless of age or sex would be targeted for 
execution.334 Shortly after, Jewish women and children who had been previously excluded 
from mass shootings were now included.  Himmler had ordered on 1 August that “all Jews 
must be shot.  Drive the female Jews into the swamps.”335  Lombard had then informed his 
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troops that “in future not one male Jew is to remain alive, not one family in the villages.”336  
The 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment reported in the same period, “We drove women and children 
into the marshes, but this did not yield the desired result, as the marshes were not deep 
enough to drown them.  In most places, the water was not more than three feet deep.”337  
Also present was the commander of Police Regiment Center, Lieutenant Colonel Max 
Montua, and the commanders of Police Battalions 307 and 316, which had already conducted 
numerous mass killings of Jews in Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk, and elsewhere.338    
It was, then, both these experienced killers who had already been dealing with the 
“Jewish Question” and Wehrmacht officers—some with proven records of violence and 
complicity—who arrived in the regional capital of Mogilev on the morning of 24 September 
1941.339 General Max von Schenckendorff encouraged them to participate in a “frank 
discussion because the war against the partisans is completely new to all of us.”340  He 
informed them from the outset that “townspeople will be used [by the partisans] as guides, 
scouts, and informants. Particularly the elderly, women, and adolescents, because they are 
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least suspicious, will be utilized for reconnaissance.”341  The commanding general thus 
convened the conference by immediately placing women, children, and the elderly in play as 
enemy combatants. 
The morning was taken up by fifteen minute presentations of lessons learned in the 
antipartisan war by various high-level commanders, including SS-Cavalry Brigade 
commander Fegelein, Lieutenant Colonel Montua of Police Regiment Center, and Colonel 
von Rekowski of the 354th Infantry Regiment.342  At 11:30, Einsatzgruppe commander 
Arthur Nebe gave a presentation covering three areas: first, cooperation between the troops 
and the SD during antipartisan operations; second, the selection and employment of local 
collaborators; and third, and most ominously, the Jewish question with particular 
consideration toward the antipartisan war.343  While we do not know what exactly was said 
here, it is safe to assume that the importance of the killing of Jews, and the growing 
participation of the Wehrmacht in this endeavor were stressed. Nebe had already reported in 
July that “a solution of the Jewish Question during the war seems impossible in this area 
[Belarus] because of the tremendous number of Jews.”344  Certainly he is referring here to the 
insufficient numbers of Einsatzgruppen killers available. Nebe must have been interested in 
leveraging the manpower of the Wehrmacht in solving this problem. 
This manpower problem originated from a convergence of several factors.  First, the 
decision to kill all Jews naturally increased the number of Jews to be shot to such an extent 
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that the Einsatzgruppen and SS foresaw problems in accomplishing this mission, as Nebe 
indicated.  Secondly, Hitler’s decision to allow deportations of Jews from Europe to the East 
before any death camps had been constructed meant that room would have to be made for the 
deportees.  This would entail killing operations directed at the main ghetto cities, one of 
which was Minsk.  These operations would then occupy much of the SS/SD killing 
manpower, leaving little for other areas.  Third, with the advance deeper into the Soviet 
Union beyond what had been the Pale of Settlement, Jews were more geographically 
dispersed, making operations against them more manpower intensive. Christian Gerlach 
argues that an early October killing of women and children in Mogilev marked the “start 
signal” for the general murder of Jews in rHGM.345  Certainly, as we have seen, this 
massacre had already begun.  However, Gerlach is correct in marking an important surge of 
Police Battalion activity in killing, particularly in the countryside, which is further evidence 
of an expansion in targets.  
Nebe was followed after lunch by Bach-Zelewski who spoke on “The Capture of 
Kommissars and Partisans in ‘Scouring-Actions.’”346  The HSSPF had already been 
particularly active in such operations with the SS Cavalry Brigade in the Pripet marshes. In 
the afternoon, the officers observed an exercise conducted by Police Regiment Center, which 
demonstrated the occupation of a village by surrounding it, and also the dissemination of 
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leaflets.  In the evening after dinner, the participants adjourned for a concert of Russian 
music in the headquarters building.347 
 The next morning, the exchange of experiences continued with SS Cavalry Regiment 
1 commander Gustav Lombard leading off.  Then, various company grade officers gave short 
classes or led sand table exercises on a variety of tactical situations, such as the entry of a 
battalion into an unsecured area, securing a stretch of highway, and reacting to the murder of 
a mayor by the partisans.348 In the afternoon, the collection of officers observed an actual 
operation conducted by 7 Company, Police Battalion 322.  Approximately 14 km northwest 
of Mogilev a town was searched and its inhabitants interrogated.  A summary written 
afterward states: “Suspicious strangers to the village (Ortsfremde) and a few Jews were 
discovered. (32 executions).”349 Supporting the police was a 16-man detachment from the 
SD.350 The war diary of Police Battalion 322, which carried out the operation, provides more 
telling detail. “Strangers to the village, in particular partisans, could not be found.  Instead, 
the investigation of the population revealed 13 Jewish men, 27 Jewish women, and 11 Jewish 
children.  Of these 13 men and 19 women were executed with the help of the SD.”351  Here 
the participants were provided with an actual demonstration in which the murder of Jews was 
carried out as a default targeting option in the antipartisan war. 
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 At dawn the final morning, the participants observed another actual operation, 
executed this time by Security Regiment 2.  According to the operations order, the goal was 
to “practically experience not only the registration of a town but also the seizure of partisans, 
commissars, and communists and the investigation of the local population.”352  The order 
contained descriptions of the individuals targeted who appeared to be mainly former 
communist functionaries, though four individuals were suspect because they apparently spent 
large amounts of time in the forest.353  After the suspects were rounded up, the participants 
were to observe the interrogation of these suspect civilians and a subsequent “instruction” of 
the population.354  It is unclear exactly what was meant by “instruction.”  This could have 
been some kind of political statements or even the killing of suspects.  Upon completion of 
this operation, the participants left to return to their units. 
 The final product of this conference was a sixteen-page summary of the lessons 
learned under the signature of Gen. Schenckendorff.  This document began with a discussion 
of the history of partisan warfare and discussed mostly organization, equipment, and tactics 
of the partisans as well as recommended techniques for combating them.  Much of the 
document was devoted to the nuts and bolts of conducting various forms of antipartisan 
operations.  Other recommendations, however, advocated far more extreme measures.  
Readers were advised that the elderly, women, and children were used for enemy 
reconnaissance.355  Moreover, streets were to be kept free of “wanderers,” who were to be 
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handed over to the GFP [Geheimfeldpolizei or military secret field police] , SD, or civilian 
labor camps.  The guideline was to have “streets free of any Russian.”356 Individuals not 
native to a village, for whom the mayor was not willing to vouch, were also to be turned over 
to the GFP, SD, or nearest transfer camp.357 The most chilling statement introduces the 
section on fighting the partisans. “The enemy must be completely annihilated,” it declared. 
“The constant decision between life and death for partisans and suspicious persons is difficult 
even for the hardest soldier.  It must be done.  He acts correctly who fights ruthlessly and 
mercilessly with complete disregard for any personal surge of emotion.”358  This document 
was distributed to the company level in all units in Army Group Center (Rear) which meant 
that its lessons both became approved policy and reached units that had not had 
representatives in Mogilev. Even more telling, it appears that this same document was 
retransmitted to the police battalions in November 1941.359  It is certainly interesting that 
police units were instructed in brutality by the Army.  Moreover, the conference led directly 
to participation by the Wehrmacht in the murder of Jews. 
 
License to Kill: The Impact of the Mogilev Conference on Wehrmacht 
Participation in The Holocaust in Army Group Center (Rear) 
 
In the fall of 1941 around the end of September, a training course was held in 
the city of Mogilev.  As far as I remember, the Regimental commander and 
an officer from each battalion took part.  From my battalion, I/691the 
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adjutant, Lieutenant Großkopp was sent….The subject of the training was 
primarily: Jews and Partisans. 
- Josef Sibille, former commander of 1 Company, in a letter to the 
court, 1953360 
 
Reports indicate that large partisan bands remain in the large swampy forest 
near the village of Moschkowo.  Further, regular traffic takes place of 
strangers to the region who possess no identification and that also in the 
entire region non-native Jews roam around. 
 - Report of 1st Company, 354th Infantry Regiment, 30 October, 
1941361 
 
Jews were not mentioned specifically at all in this executive summary of the Mogilev 
conference.  What, then, was the impact of the conference on the Wehrmacht’s participation 
in genocidal policy?  It seems that a goal and a result of the conference were  to more fully 
incorporate the Army in killings of Jews, in conjunction with an increasing brutality toward 
civilians in general.  What evidence supports this?  First, it is no great leap to assume that 
Nebe’s presentation regarding the “Jewish Question” and the partisan war contained 
exhortations for the killing of Jews both during and outside of antipartisan operations.  He 
was, after all, presiding at the time over the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews in 
Belarus.  Indeed, the very composition of those attending strongly suggests that the inclusion 
of Jews as targets was an experience to be shared and emphasized. Second, the demonstration 
operations carried out reinforced the messages from the conference: Jews were clearly both 
targeted and executed in the operation carried out by Police Battalion 322.  In this action, the 
murder of Jews present in the village was obviously a default position when other “suspects” 
could not be found.   Finally, throughout the conference (and in meetings afterward at Corps 
level) greater cooperation with the SD was encouraged.  In several subsequent operations, 
this cooperation entailed Wehrmacht support of the Einsatzgruppen in mass killing. 
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The most damning evidence appears a little over two weeks after the conference.  In 
the small town of Krucha, soldiers of the 3rd Company, 691st Infantry Regiment rounded up 
and executed all the Jews in their area.  The order to do so originated from their battalion 
commander.  The battalion adjutant, Lieutenant Großkopp, had just returned from the 
Mogilev conference with the message that “where the Partisan is, there is the Jew.  Where the 
Jew is, there is the Partisan.”362  The commander of the 1st Company, Josef Sibille, who 
refused to carry out this order, wrote after the war to the prosecuting attorney, testifying to 
this connection in the 3rd Company case.  He recalled that an antipartisan conference had 
taken place in Mogilev and further contended that “the main subject was Jews and partisans.”  
He further believed that the conference and the battalion order to kill all the Jews in the area 
in early October were connected.363 The battalion commander, Major Commichau, upon 
receiving this message from the conference, ordered his battalion to carry out mass shootings 
of all Jewish men, women, and children in his area of operations.  This is significant because 
it is a rare documented case of the German Army independently carrying out Nazi genocidal 
policy.  It did not merely assist other killing units, but instead carried out all aspects of the 
mass killing on its own, and by all accounts, as a result of the Mogilev Conference.  
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Figure 2. Kills Reported by 286th Security Division, August-December 1941 
 
Figure 3. Prisoners reported by 286th Security Division, August-December 1941 
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Figure 4. Kills reported by 354th Infantry Regiment, August-November 1941 
A survey of operations reports across Army Group Center (Rear) also provides 
quantitative evidence for a deadlier turn in “antipartisan” operations.  We can see the stark 
increase in individuals reported killed  by the 286th Security Division beginning in October.  
The 354th Infantry Regiment was the main combat force in this division and had three 
attendees at the conference.  The 1st Company reported that it had shot three Jewish families 
and two young women of Jewish appearance it termed “Flintenweiber” or female soldiers, 
though they were shot trying to flee and there is no indication they were armed.364 It is 
important to note that with typical euphemistic language, the racial identity of many 
Wehrmacht victims remains intentionally unclear.  Categories such as partisan, partisan-
helper (Partisanenhelfer), suspect civilian (verdächtige Zivilisten), stranger to village 
(Ortsfremde), wanderer (Wanderer), and civilians without identification (Zivilisten ohne 
Ausweis) could easily be applied to both Jews and non-Jews.  
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Yet the numbers for the last three months of 1941 are striking and demonstrate a 
marked increase in violence against civilians, as partisan activity had not risen to the same 
extent and German casualties do not indicate any real combat. In the October reports from 
the 350th Infantry Regiment (which also had attendees at Mogilev), every Jew mentioned was 
formulaically noted as “shot while trying to escape.”365  Captain Balitzki, an attendee at the 
conference from the 350th Infantry Regiment, wrote on October 14th that “it is unacceptable 
that officers have to shoot while the men watch.  The majority of the men are too soft.  This 
is a sign that they have never or only poorly been instructed about the meaning of the 
’Partisan War.’”366 This officer, a leading figure at Mogilev, apparently found some of his 
men had not yet absorbed its lessons, though he and his fellow officers were attempting to 
model this brutal behavior for them.  It is also worth noting that the numbers of those 
captured skyrocketed as well.  This was no benign activity either, as these people were 
handed over to the SD or transfer camps (Dulags) with typically lethal results, their deaths 
merely being delayed.  
Another observable effect of the conference was greater collaboration with the SD by 
Wehrmacht units. Westermann notes that Himmler “placed great emphasis on maintaining a 
cooperative relationship” with the Army and had already on 2 August encouraged his 
leadership to “maintain the ‘greatest amity’ with” the Wehrmacht. 367 This cooperation was 
manifested after the Mogilev conference in two ways: first, increased utilization of SD 
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detachments in interrogations of suspect civilians and vetting of local auxiliaries, and second, 
more active support of those SD units directly involved in anti-Jewish measures that went far 
beyond mere logistical support.  Three days after the conference, rHGM instructed its units 
that “cooperation is to be still more closely organized between the divisions and the SD and 
GFP….Requests for local [ortsfesten] operations by individual troops of the 
Einsatzkommandos of the SD are to be requested from the commander.”368  “Cooperation 
with the SD” was also on the agenda for the rHGM staff meeting with its subordinate 
division staffs on September 30th as a lesson from the conference.369  In its report for the 
period from September to December 1941, the intelligence section of the 286th Security 
Division appeared eager to report that “constant contact was maintained with the Security 
Service, specifically the Einsatzgruppe of Gruppenführer Neumann, the Einsatzkommando 8 
of Sturmbannführer Dr. Bratfisch [sic], and in particular with Untersturmführer Reschke’s 
Orscha-based squad.”370 In November, the 339th Infantry Division (which contained the 691st 
Infantry Regiment) published a guide to the duties and responsibilities of the Security Forces.  
Under the SD, listed as “keywords” were “politically suspect civilians, Bolsheviks, Jews, and 
Gypsies.”  Among the SD responsibilities were listed “Solution of the Jewish Problem” and 
the “Gypsy Question.”  Finally, the memo instructed that “the troops must shoot Jews and 
Gypsies only if they are proven to be partisans or their supporters. In all other cases, they are 
to be handed over to the SD.”371  Thus, we can see both a clear knowledge of the mission of 
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the SD and an emphasis on improved cooperation and coordination with it. In its most 
extreme form, the 707th Infantry Division to the west in the Reichskommissariat Ostland, on 
the orders of its commander, explicitly targeted Jews in the countryside, freeing the SD to 
focus on cities. The Division Commander, General von Bechtolsheim, published orders in 
November 1941 that clearly stated that “where larger or smaller groups of Jews are 
encountered in the countryside, they may either be executed [by the units themselves] or 
consolidated in ghettos in designated places where they will then be given over to the civil 
administration, that is, the SD.”372   
The preponderance of the evidence surrounding the Mogilev Conference and the turn 
in Wehrmacht “security” operations that followed demonstrate that these three days were an 
important galvanizing moment in deepening the complicity of the German Army in the 
Holocaust in Belarus.  The conference instructed the Wehrmacht to intentionally target Jews 
in its antipartisan operations.  This verbal transmission of guidance regarding Jewish policy 
was not without precedent, as we have seen already regarding Jewish policy. On July 8 in 
Bialystok, Himmler himself met with Bach-Zelewski, General von Schenckendorff, Colonel 
Montua of Police Regiment Center and the commanders of Police Battalions 322 and 316. 
That same night the police began killing Jews there.373 Given the attendees at the conference, 
the nature of the presentations, and the actions that followed, it appears that such a discussion 
also occurred in Mogilev.   
Why? As previously mentioned, anti-Jewish policy had changed radically the month 
before and the numbers of Jews to be killed had now greatly increased.  It was this 
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exponential growth in targeted victims that spawned the deployment of more police 
battalions to the East and the systematic recruitment of native auxiliaries.  It seems logical, 
then, that the SS desired greater participation of the Wehrmacht  in this process as well.  
Nebe himself had already noted that manpower limitations would prevent him from killing 
the many Jews in Belarus. A second factor could also have been the changing demographics 
of Jews in eastern Russia.  As the Germans moved out of the area of the former Pale of 
Settlement, communities of Jews became less densely populated and more dispersed.  The 
difficulties this settlement pattern caused for the smaller Einsatzgruppen and Police 
Battalions could also be alleviated by a further inclusion of the Wehrmacht.  Given the prior 
history of the German army regarding civilians and the already well-established belief that 
the Jews were behind Bolshevism, the antipartisan war was the perfect vehicle for harnessing 
the combat power of the army to help solve the “Jewish Problem.” The commander of the 
German Army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, published “Guidelines for the Fighting of 
Partisans” to the entire Army one month after the Mogilev Conference. An indication of the 
importance and far-reaching impact of the conference is that he copied word for word the 
closing text of Schenckendorff’s summary: “The constant decision between life and death for 
partisans and suspicious persons is difficult even for the hardest soldier.  It must be done.  He 
acts correctly who fights ruthlessly and mercilessly with complete disregard for any personal 
surge of emotion.”374 
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Antipartisan War as Anti-Jewish War 
Because throughout the “Triangle” region enemy mines are to be expected, 
“Minesweeper 42s” (members of Jewish labor battalions or captured bandits 
with hoes and rollers) are to be available in sufficient quantities.  Units are to 
equip themselves with cords to use as leashes with which to control the Jews 
or bandits. 
- Operations order for antipartisan Operation “Dreieck-Viereck.” 11 
September 1942375 
 
2nd Battalion, 727th Infantry Regiment which was employed as the lead 
battalion, broke the enemy resistance in a quick attack, in spite of the fact 
that the advance proceeded slowly due to heavy mining.  4 “Minesweeper 
42s” were blown up into the air, thereby sparing any losses of our own 
troops. 
- After-Action Report, Operation “Dreieck-Viereck,” 19 October 
1942376 
 
  
 How and why did the German Army become so deeply involved in enacting Nazi 
genocide? Clearly, from the perspective of those like Nebe and Bach-Zelewski, additional 
manpower was necessary in the fall of 1941 to accomplish the murder of the expanded 
number of targeted Jews resulting from the inclusion of women and children.  Including Jews 
under the aegis of the antipartisan war was intended to ease and expand the participation of 
the Army in the Nazi racial project.   Indeed, the SS/SD lacked the ability to systematically 
search for Jews in small villages in the countryside.  By killing Jews in the course of its 
normal antipartisan patrolling in these areas, the Wehrmacht relieved the Einsatzgruppen of 
this difficulty.   
While the Wehrmacht was not in opposition to the execution of the Final Solution in the East, 
it was reluctant to dirty its own hands in it.  Incorporating Jews into an already 
hyperaggressive anti-civilian policy likely eased this transition and paved the way for greater 
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complicity by the Army up to and including shooting.  Raul Hilberg explained some of this 
complicity, writing that “the generals had eased themselves into this pose of cooperation 
through the pretense that the Jewish population was a group of Bolshevist diehards who 
instigated, encouraged, and abetted the partisan war behind the German lines.”377  Not 
everyone bought this argument.  An inspector in the Army Economic and Armament Office 
in the Ukraine, for example, reported to his boss in December 1941 that “there is no proof 
that Jewry as a whole or even to a greater part was implicated in acts of sabotage.”378 For 
both officers and soldiers who may have been reluctant to kill women and children, explicitly 
connecting all Jews with a developing antipartisan movement would have both partially 
allayed these concerns as well as lessened inhibitions by placing anti-Jewish actions (and any 
resistance to them) in the context of “legitimate” combat operations.  The statements above 
demonstrate that in a little over a year, the Wehrmacht had become comfortable with using 
Jews and other civilians as human minesweepers. 
Testimony from former soldiers of 3rd Company supports this conflation of 
antipartisan operations and Jew killing.  One soldier claimed “it was generally known that 
Jews made up the lion’s share of the partisans and that the partisans were constantly 
supported by the Jews in the villages, particularly the women.”379 Another noted that “at the 
time of the shooting, many attacks by the partisans had taken place and that the battalion had 
suffered losses.”  He continued, “the members of the company were of the opinion that the 
                                                
377 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 301. 
378 "Memo from Armament Inspector, Ukraine to Chief of Industrial Armament Department (Gen. Georg 
Thomas), 2 December 1941,"  (Nazi conspiracy and aggression, Washington, U.S. G.P.O., Vol. V, 1946: 
Document 3257-PS), 995. 
379 "V., Adam Statement, 7 July 1953,"  (LA NRW-H: H 13 Darmstadt, Nr. 979 I, Bd. II), 271. 
132 
Jewish shooting was a reprisal and preventative measure as a result of partisan attacks….Any 
harmless civilian could be a partisan.  There were observations of Jews supplying the 
partisans.”380  However, again, there is little indication that the unit had taken any serious 
casualties. From September to December 1941, the 339th Division reported only 20 killed and 
37 wounded.381  While at some level these statements certainly reflect the postwar 
environment and attempts at self-exculpation, they are also likely echoes of justifications that 
the soldiers found convenient to believe in 1941.  In many ways, remarks such as these parrot 
similar ideas from the Mogilev Conference. 
Antisemitism among the officers and men also likely eased this conflation of Jews 
and enemy combatants.  This prejudice could come from a variety of sources.  Certainly 
some men carried anti-Jewish feelings from home.382  The official sanction of discriminatory 
measures and then outright collaboration in mass killing by the Army inevitably allowed 
those with racist predilections to act on them and normalized anti-Jewish brutality within an 
organizational climate that prescribed excessive brutality against civilians as a matter of 
course.  Instances of Wehrmacht participation in killing throughout Belarus repeatedly 
featured officers and men who stood out in the memories of their comrades as particularly 
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virulent antisemites, convinced Nazis, or simply as brutal men.383  A soldier in 3rd Company 
remembered, for example, one sergeant who was “radically opposed to partisans and 
Jews.”384 Racist soldiers and officers were often tasked or volunteered to carry out Jewish 
killings, thus minimizing the necessity of compulsion within the unit and potential disruption 
of morale. 
Finally, the tactics of participation allowed soldiers to compartmentalize and 
minimize any psychological trauma associated with the murder of people who did not fit the 
conventional image of the enemy.  Consider the tactics and procedures involved in capturing 
partisans in “small operations” that were demonstrated at Mogilev and disseminated to the 
units in rHGM.   Villages were to be surrounded in the last hour of darkness or shortly before 
dawn.  Assault troops were then to enter the village and assemble the population and the 
mayor.  Those who were not native to the village (Ortsfremde) or who supported the 
partisans were to be identified and handed over to the SD, GFP, or nearest transfer camp.385  
If Jews were by definition partisan supporters, the import of these tactics was clear.  
Moreover, in operations where the Wehrmacht assisted in the murder of Jews, these were the 
same tactics used to identify and round up the victims.  The use of these tactics had a 
secondary effect: it could help minimize the psychological discomfort inherent in these 
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actions, which was one of the reasons the Wehrmacht had attempted to limit or avoid direct 
participation in mass killing 
Assisting in this process was the use of vague and euphemistic terminology in both 
reporting those killed and describing those targeted.  Terms such as “stranger to village,” 
“wanderer,” “suspect civilian,” “partisan helper,” and “civilian without identification” 
demonstrate the inexact and elastic nature of these categories.  Moreover, consider the 
equally fluid “evidence” used to prove collusion with the enemy and the very real situations 
of Jews.  German persecution of the Jews inevitably induced behaviors among the victims 
that were then cited as evidence justifying the necessity of the persecution. Women, children, 
and the elderly were particularly suspect as supporters; in many areas, Jewish men had either 
been killed or had fled, leaving a majority of women and children.  Behavior such as running 
or hiding was treated as highly suspect if not incriminating, and Jews naturally often 
attempted to flee and hide from the Germans, particularly in the forest.  Similarly, civilians 
without identification were immediately suspect, and Jews did not receive identification 
cards from German authorities (with the exception of work permits, which also clearly 
identified them as Jews.)  Thus, if they were caught outside of their villages, they would 
likely have forged identification or have no identification at all. Finally, the SD was to be 
employed in ferreting out suspected communists and partisans as well as finding and killing 
Jews.  The cumulative effect of these similarities was that Jews were easily merged into 
categories in which inclusion amounted to an automatic death sentence. 
This “tactical muscle memory” from other actual antipartisan actions created at least a 
semblance of familiarity and an illusion of legitimate military operations to those who 
wished to take comfort in it.  A similar type of emotional refuge could be found in the 
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compartmentalized nature of these operations: sentry duty during the encirclement, searching 
houses, escorting victims, and cordoning off the execution site.  Every action save actual 
shooting offered soldiers the opportunity to tell themselves they were not really participating 
in murder.  This was decisive because many soldiers recognized that these killings did not 
fall under the category of conventional combat. Private Magel admitted that “we also knew 
that the Jews hadn’t done anything and that the shooting represented an injustice, at least as 
far as it concerned women and children.”386  It is also interesting to note here that Magel 
appears to have still believed that male Jews deserved to be shot.  The illusion of a standard 
military operation and the false justification of Jews as partisans may have helped soldiers 
relieve the cognitive dissonance resulting from their knowledge that these actions were 
beyond the bounds of conventional warfare.  A comment from a soldier involved in the 
Krupki shooting a week before the conference is instructive. “We soldiers were merely 
employed in the encirclement, “he said, “We had nothing to do with the killings.”387  Surely 
this is postwar self-exculpation, but it also likely demonstrates a conscious distancing from 
the act itself that was in effect at the time as well. Given the well-known concerns of both the 
SS and the Wehrmacht regarding the psychological impact of face-to-face killing on their 
personnel, the utility of exploiting the similarity between antipartisan and anti-Jewish 
operations was not lost on Army leadership. 
The Mogilev Conference is not a smoking gun proving beyond a shadow of a doubt 
that the Wehrmacht was specifically ordered to increase its complicity in the Holocaust, but 
few decisions regarding the evolution of the Final Solution are clear and simple.  The 
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conference and the events that followed provide a convincing convergence of evidence 
highlighting the Mogilev conference as an vital turning point in the German Army’s 
participation in the Holocaust, at least in Belarus.  The prior records of the conference 
participants, the messages and “demonstration” operations observed, as well as the 
subsequent sharp increase in divisional “body counts”  and in anti-Jewish killings are all 
signs pointing to the significance of this event.   
The conference by itself cannot be seen as the sole cause of increased Wehrmacht 
complicity in the Holocaust, but more as a point of convergence, a lens that focused a variety 
of existing factors and influences to mobilize the support of the Army in genocidal policy.  
Extant antisemitism and anti-Bolshevik fervor combined with a history of paranoia and 
excessive brutality toward civilians.  Hitler himself had remarked in a meeting on 16 July 
1941 that “the partisan war has its advantages: it gives us the opportunity to exterminate 
those who oppose us.”388  In Mogilev, men like Gen. Schenckendorff, Nebe, and Bach-
Zelewski intentionally blurred the line between the “Jewish Question” and the methods of 
antipartisan war which--however excessive by international standards--were at least deemed 
legitimate within German military tradition.  They instructed lower-level officers, men at the 
sharp end of the spear, at least some of whom had been selected intentionally for their past 
record of brutality and/or extreme beliefs.  These men of action then brought this message 
back to their units, resulting in an observable change in behavior of the Wehrmacht in 
Belarus.  
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In order to better understand the larger context of the Mogilev context, the Serbian 
experience provides a valuable comparison.  In the Balkans in the fall of 1941, the 
Wehrmacht faced a very real insurgency and a dangerous movement that inflicted real 
casualties, even though they were not connected to the partisan groups.   Here, too, the 
German military viewed the local population through a racial lens and adopted the most 
extreme of measures to subdue them.389  Military-aged male Jews and Gypsies were routinely 
executed in  reprisal for German casualties. On 23 September 1941 (the day before the 
Mogilev Conference began), Wehrmacht troops launched a “punitive expedition” in Serbia, 
executing 1,127 “suspected communists” and interning over 20,000 men.390  After this 
operation, the key divisional commander, who was not as brutal as the commanding general 
in Serbia Franz Böhme demanded, was demoted for being “too slack.”391  It appears that the 
more violent interpretation was rewarded professionally.  After a concerted and ruthless 
campaign against partisans and civilians alike, the Balkan insurgency was, in fact, brought to 
heel.  However, as Christopher Browning notes, “if the policies of the Wehrmacht did not yet 
constitute the “Final Solution”…the killing of adult male Jews and “Gypsies” simply because 
of the ethnic identity was quite simply genocide.”392 The Tribunal in the Hostage Trial at 
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Nuremberg concluded emphatically that “pre-existing international law has declared these 
acts…unlawful.”393 
Thus, Serbia provides an critical pre-history and continuity for the Mogilev 
Conference.  Before Barbarossa, we can already see a Wehrmacht tendency to incorporate 
racial thinking in its attitudes toward local populations.  The Army also demonstrated its 
ready acceptance of Jews and other “racially inferior” groups as legitimate targets for 
execution.  In addition, German commanders were already being recognized positively for 
their extreme brutality.  Mogilev, then, represents both a continuation of these trends and a 
departure: no longer were only male Jews targeted and no longer were these killings 
associated with a legitimate counterinsurgency.  Instead, though the antipartisan war had a an 
important rhetorical purpose, the Wehrmacht was harnessed directly to the Nazi genocidal 
project in killings that even commanders in Serbia would have recognized had no connection 
to the war.394   
It is a sad tribute to the effectiveness of the intentional conflation of Jew, Bolshevik 
and partisan that the instrumentalization of this concept on the ground has not been more 
deeply explored.  The view that the antipartisan war was a simple counterinsurgency action is 
one perpetuated by the killers themselves.  Phillip Blood rightly describes this process as 
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“how the fallacy of antipartisan warfare expunged the record of Bandenbekämpfung.”395  The 
Nuremburg Tribunals did not uncritically accept the term as one synonymous with a “clean” 
antipartisan war, as some argue. During the High Command Trial, the Tribunal categorically 
dismissed any legality of German reprisal killings stating that “the safeguards and 
preconditions required…were not even attempted to be met or even suggested as necessary.” 
Referring to the Hostage Case, it termed the killings in the Balkans where “hostages” were 
overwhelmingly Jews, to be “merely terror murders.”396 While the court recognized the 
theoretical legality of reprisals and hostage killings after a lengthy list of requirements had 
been met, it noted that such a case of the correct use of reprisal could not be found in the war 
and roundly condemned the German Army for its actions.  It is, perhaps, more correct, that 
the police battalions found that “the destruction of the Jews could be semantically disguised 
as Bandenkampf and later after the war used with initial success as an exculpatory myth for 
the perpetrators.”397 This was not a successful legal strategy at the Nuremburg hearings but 
may have had more success in later trials and certainly in the constructed memory of 
veterans. It appears that the Wehrmacht benefited from a similar mythmaking strategy.  If the 
German Army used the antipartisan war as an excuse to murder Jews, historians of the 
Holocaust must examine and deconstruct this justification.  Victimization of Jews was not 
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due to frustration or losses in the vein of the My Lai massacre, but instead to a conscious, 
deeper incorporation of the Wehrmacht in Nazi genocidal policy.398 
One prominent historian has suggested that “evidence for the motivation of central 
and regional [Army] commanders in the murder of Jews is lacking” but contends that the 
food shortage played a decisive role.399  While these economic concerns were certainly 
important factors for some leaders, particularly in the civilian realm, the Mogilev conference 
and the events surrounding it offer an alternative and more convincing explanation for the 
motivation of Army decision-makers at the regional (and local) levels.  It seems that the 
military leaders involved were primarily concerned with perceived security considerations 
where Jews were all supporters of the Bolsheviks and thus partisan accomplices.  This 
justification dovetailed nicely with existing Wehrmacht violence against communists and 
Red Army soldiers.  However,  one cannot overlook the very real possibility that at Mogilev 
these leaders were informed of their role in the overall Nazi genocidal project and at least 
some of them needed no additional  justification as camouflage for their actions. 
The Holocaust and the antipartisan war have long remained separated in the 
historiography of the period with anti-Jewish actions remaining part of a history of Nazi 
genocide and the antipartisan war a part of the military history of the war on the Eastern 
Front.  This is a false division.  As Edward Westermann concludes, the “fact that the Jewish 
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population of the Soviet Union became a major target of the antipartisan campaign is 
indisputable.”400The Mogilev Conference shows that these two were never separate, but 
intentionally connected in an effort to more efficiently include the combat power of the 
Wehrmacht in Hitler’s genocidal projects in the East.  The behavior of the 691st Infantry 
Regiment provides us with an example of just how these two efforts were conjoined. 
 
62 km from Mogilev to Krucha: One Remarkable Case 
These things can only be judged in light of the situation at the time, where 
the troops had to live in the worst conditions for weeks on end and were 
exposed to constant treacherous partisan attacks. 
- Colonel Erich Müller, commander 691st Infantry Regiment, 19 
September 1952401 
 
It is inconceivable that one could now describe us old soldiers as 
murderers….I am also of the opinion that a civilian court cannot pass 
judgment on a wartime event. 
- Emil Zimber in letter to the office of the German Delegate for 
Security, 10 March 1954402 
 
 In May 1951, forty-three-year-old master joiner Wilhelm Magel returned to the 
apartment building where he lived above his estranged wife. He was accompanied by the 
mayor and a police officer. Magel confronted his wife about her refusal to give their son 
suitable clothing.  He further accused her of hoarding the good clothes for their daughter who 
lived with her.  Not surprisingly, an argument ensued.  As Magel, the mayor, and the police 
officer left, Magel’s wife leaned out the window with, in his words, a “smirk on her face” 
and screamed at him, “You murderer, you dirty murderer, what else do you want?”  Magel 
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yelled back, “Watch out, you lying bitch! Shut the window!”403 With his daughter and many 
of the neighbors looking on, the three men beat a hasty retreat.   Magel then filed a libel 
charge against his wife and, in the process, was forced to explain about a shooting that had 
occurred in Krucha, Belarus, in 1941 by the 3rd Company, 691st Infantry Regiment, 339th 
Infantry Division. 
The 339th Infantry Division was formed in Thuringia in central Germany in 
December 1940, with the 691st Infantry Regiment created out of a fortress infantry 
regiment.404  The Division was nicknamed the “Kyffhäuser Division” after a mountain range 
in Thuringia, and the unit patch featured the turn of the century Kyffhäuser monument.405  In 
an ironic twist, this monument sits atop the mountain where, according to legend, Frederick 
Barbarossa sleeps, waiting to be awakened in Germany’s hour of need.  From May to August 
1941, the division performed occupation duty in the Loire Valley in France.406 By 7 
September, however, the 339th was just north of Minsk, moving to take over the duties of a 
security division in Army Group Center (Rear), which it did officially on 19 September.407  
 By 9 October, the 1st Battalion, 691st Regiment found itself in the small town of 
Krugloje, in what had once been the 354th Infantry Regiment’s sector.408 The 3rd Company, 
commanded by Captain Friedrich Nöll, was stationed in Krucha, just 29 km from Krupki. 
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Nöll’s company was the only German unit in the town and was quartered in the local school 
house.409  In 1941, Krucha had a Jewish population of approximately 150 out of a total 
population of around 500.410 3rd Company soldiers remembered that the Jews lived together 
in a particular part of town, but there does not appear to have been a closed ghetto.411 
Around 6 or 7 October, the company messenger, Sergeant B., walked into the 
company headquarters bearing a verbal order from the 1st Battalion instructing the unit to kill 
all the Jews in its area. It seems that upon receipt of this order there was a discussion among 
the company leadership about what to do. Present in the company office were the 
commander, Captain Nöll, First Sergeant Emil Zimber, and, likely, the platoon leaders. 
Another soldier present testified that, from the discussion, he “gathered that ties existed 
between the partisans and the Jewish population and that the Jews had supported the 
partisans.  The discussion centered upon how the order should be interpreted, namely 
whether the Jews should be shot.”412 According to Nöll, this order caused him “great 
confusion and agitation.”413  He then testified that, after meeting with Zimber and the platoon 
leaders, he intended to ignore the order.  However, shortly thereafter a second written order 
arrived stating: “To 3rd Company, 691st Infantry Regiment: Jews in [Krucha] are to be shot.” 
This order was signed by the battalion commander, Major Alfred Commichau.414 
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 The decision was evidently made to proceed, for one of the platoon leaders stated 
that Nöll had asked for volunteers to carry out the killing but none had stepped forward.415 
Company tailor Adam V. had his workshop in the same building as the headquarters and 
recalled hearing a “loud argument” from the office regarding the order to shoot the Jews. He 
recalled hearing Captain Nöll saying that he had until the next day to report to Major 
Waldow that the order had been carried out, but because he did not want to do it himself, he 
would have to assign this mission to someone else.416  That someone else appears to have 
been his co-defendant Zimber.  Nöll claimed after the war that Zimber ”in his capacity as 
First Sergeant took over the assembly and disposition of the company”417.  Zimber, however, 
vehemently denied that he had volunteered to carry out the shooting order.418 
Regardless of whether he volunteered or not, Zimber did take over the organization 
and execution of the killings in Krucha.  Soldier Wilhelm Magel described what happened 
next.  His platoon, the first, had just returned around noon on the 10th from an overnight 
operation.  After the soldiers had cleaned their weapons and eaten, they were resting when 
they received the order to assemble without helmets and gear, only field caps, rifles, and 
ammunition belts.  When the men had formed up, First Sergeant Zimber read out the order 
that all the Jews in the village were to be shot.  Magel remembered that there was apparent 
“indignation” among the soldiers.  Zimber reacted to this by saying, “we can’t change 
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anything.  Orders are orders.”  Zimber then divided the men into four kommandos: shooting, 
guarding, evacuation, and cordon.419  Local police would also assist. 
The evacuation kommando then moved to the Jewish quarter and began rounding up 
the Jews.  One soldier remembered that the Jews of Krucha “who in the beginning did not 
know what was going on came voluntarily out of their houses.”420  In the end, approximately 
114 Jews had been assembled in the small square where they were guarded by German 
soldiers.421  Once the roundup was complete, another kommando began leading the Jews in 
groups of about thirty to an execution site in the forest.422 
A member of the Absperrung described the operation at the shooting site.  “The 
Jews,” he remembered, “were taken from us in groups of four to five and led about 200m 
away where they disappeared into a depression.”423  This depression was likely an excavation 
for an alleged munitions bunker that the Jews had been forced to dig.424  Here Zimber was in 
full command of the executions. Two German soldiers were paired off with each Jew and 
then Zimber gave the order to fire.  Some soldiers remembered that he also walked among 
the victims, shooting those still alive.425 Because the executions took place so near the 
village, the Jews heard the shots and screams from the forest and “cried out for they had 
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concluded what stood before them.”426 One Jewish woman asked a soldier before she was 
shot “is this German culture?”427 
 After all the Jews had been shot, the soldiers returned to their quarters.  Local Soviet 
civilians and possibly militia were also likely present.  One soldier recalled hearing that the 
killing “ended horribly” with Soviet civilians “eagerly” beating to death those Jews who 
were not already dead.428  These civilians also were tasked with covering the grave but had 
left arms and other body parts protruding from the ground.  Once this task was complete, 
they were “allowed to plunder the homes of the murdered Jews.”429  
 
One out of Three: Reactions to the Krucha Killings 
“A certain unease was noticeable in the company the whole day.” 
 - Sergeant Adolf Z., 24 September 1951430 
 
“Not much was said in soldier circles about the execution.  The events rushed 
ahead so that one had no time to indulge his own thoughts.” 
 - Private Karl B., 5 December 1953431 
 
 
 In contrast to the Krupki killings, the responses of the soldiers in the Krucha action 
are well-documented. It is important to note that, while statements of regret and disagreement 
with such actions are common in postwar testimonies, the detail and variety in the 3rd 
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Company case are exceptional and, thus, lend a greater degree of credibility to the 
statements. Perhaps due to its intimate nature, the action appears to have caused intense 
emotional reactions among the men. One man remembered that he “could read on the faces 
of my comrades that they detested this method of dealing with the Jews.”432 The company 
clerk presented a more even differentiated analysis of the company’s reactions. “Overall,” he 
testified, “I had the impression that the larger part of the company carried out the order with 
reluctance and felt its rationale to be poor.  However, there were also people who found the 
order, while brutal, necessary with regard to the experience with the partisans.”433 Another 
man reported that “the shooting was derided amongst the men because it had been people 
who had not fought and were only being shot because of their race.”434 The experience was 
both collective and deeply personal.  Willi S. explained, “we were all so shocked that as we 
sat down together that evening, hardly anything was said about the incident.  In particular, no 
one related what he personally had done.”435  
One soldier who had been in the shooting detail told a comrade that he would never 
forget what he saw.436 Another told a friend that it “affected him so much that he couldn’t 
eat.”437 Wilhelm Magel, who had also been at the shooting pits, wrote his brother that 
evening that “this had been the most terrible day of my life and that it was said that an evil 
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seed had been sown.”438  Many who had been in close proximity to the shooting were 
“completely shaken and very close to a nervous breakdown.”439 
The men of 3rd company demonstrate a wide variety of emotional reactions to this 
killing.  Clearly most men felt some form of shock.  By all accounts, this type of operation 
was not something that they had been exposed to before, certainly not in the Loire Valley.  
The men were upset, uneasy, and disgusted.  However, the reasons behind this reaction are 
varied and often unclear.  For many it simply felt wrong.  Some soldiers thought that this was 
not a job for the army or that the Jews were not legitimate targets. For others engaged more 
intimately in killing, the violent scenes and physical revulsion were traumatic.  There also 
seems to have been a sense of shame and denial for some who did not wish to speak about or 
recognize what they had participated in.  It is not apologetic to recognize the stress and 
emotional trauma the killings caused.  These emotional reactions do not by themselves signal 
disagreement with the policy in principle or an increased tendency to resist or evade 
participation.  They do, however, at the very least indicate that, at this point in time, these 
men were neither zealous killers nor numb to the gravity of what they were doing.  “If I was 
asked today,” one former soldier stated, “what my comrades said about the execution, I can 
only say that everyone back then said that they would never do something like that again.”440 
This case does contain two examples of men who made the decision not to participate 
in the first place.  One of them, Wilhelm Magel, had been selected by First Sergeant Zimber 
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as part of the shooting detail.  Magel found himself walking next to a sergeant who was also 
a doctor of theology.  He stated that as they walked they discussed “how they could get out 
of the situation as quickly as possible.441  At the shooting site, Magel was paired off with the 
theologian, and a soldier brought five Jews to stand in front of the ten-man firing squad.  
While a local policeman yelled at the Jews to face away from the soldiers, the theologian 
asked Zimber if they could be relieved from this detail.  He replied that as soon as the next 
two soldiers arrived to relieve them, they could return to guarding the Jews in the square.  
Zimber then gave the order  to aim and  fire.  Magel fired as well, though he claimed that he 
closed his eyes and did not aim, and that “his” Jew had not been hit.  At Zimber’s order, the 
local policeman shot this remaining Jew, and Magel and the theologian returned to Krucha 
for guard duty in the square.  
While Magel was one of the defendants in this case with a vested judicial interest in 
denying direct involvement in the killing at Krucha, there was supporting evidence that he 
was telling the truth.  He told his brother of this occurrence while lying wounded in a hospital 
in 1942, as well as his wife after the war .  One soldier supported Magel’s claim of being 
released from shooting. Magel was certainly disturbed by the action and wrote that evening 
in a letter home, “Here, a bad seed was sown.”442  Another man, Sergeant Leopold W., stated 
that Zimber had told him the night before the execution that he would be in the shooting 
detail.  W. replied that “this wasn’t my thing and there were enough people who would do 
this voluntarily.” Zimber then reassigned Winter to guard duty.443  
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If we accept Winter’s version of events, Magel’s story raises several crucial points.  
First, clearly there was an opportunity to withdraw from the shooting without any negative 
consequences.  Second, if this opportunity was apparent at least to Magel and the theologian, 
then it would presumably have been apparent to others as well.  This, then, raises another 
question.  Given the general unease and discontent with this operation, why didn’t more 
soldiers ask not to participate?  Of course, it is possible that others did and their stories did 
not make it into the record.  However, it seems more likely that most did not.  One significant 
factor in the men’s reaction of traumatized compliance may have been the paralyzing effect 
of the newness of the operation.  This was a unit recently on light duty in France and not yet 
accustomed to the brutalities of the eastern front.   Indeed, the use of two soldiers for each 
victim speaks of a traditional military firing squad, not the more economical one bullet, one 
victim technique of killers experienced in mass executions.    
However, one man chose to refuse, not just for himself but for his entire unit. This 
most remarkable example of a refusal to participate in killing comes not from 3rd Company, 
but from the 1st Company, commanded by forty-seven-year-old Josef Sibille.  Sibille refused 
the order outright.  In fact, what makes the 3rd Company case so unique is that the historian is 
confronted with a situation in which three companies of the same unit in the same area were 
presented with the same order to kill Jews and that this order resulted in three different 
outcomes.  The 2nd Company, under First Lieutenant Kuhls, thirty-three, who was both a 
party and SS member and considered to be “radical and anti-religious” and an outspoken 
anti-Semite, complied immediately and eagerly with the order, executing Jews in its nearby 
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area of operations.444 The officers of 3rd Company hesitated, but eventually complied, yet the 
commander of 1st Company,  Sibille (also a Nazi party member), refused.   
There is frustratingly little information about why this commander took this action.  
He briefly explained himself in a letter written to the senior prosecutor in February 1953.  In 
it, he states that on 6 or 7 October, he received a telephone call from the battalion 
commander, Major Alfred Commichau, in which he was ordered to kill all the Jews in his 
area.  Sibille testified at the Nöll/Zimber trial that Commichau had told him “as long as the 
Jews are not eliminated, we will not have any peace from the partisans. The Jewish action in 
your area must therefore be completed in the end.”445 Sibille relates that this order caused 
him “anxious hours and a sleepless night” until he made his decision.  After repeated urgent 
phone calls, he informed Commichau that “my company would not shoot any Jews.”  He 
explained that he could not “expect decent German soldiers to dirty their hands with such 
things.”446 Major Commichau then asked Sibille when he would ”be hard for once,” to which 
the lieutenant replied, “in this case, never.”  Commichau then said, “Enough.  You have three 
days to carry out this order.”  Again, Sibille refused, saying he would never carry it out and 
that he would not besmirch his honor or that of his company.447 
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There appear to have been no real consequences to Sibille’s disobedience.  He wrote 
that “as a result of my behavior, I later heard that I had been judged as too soft.”448  Indeed, 
First Lieutenant Sibille saw Major Commichau five days later, and Commichau did not 
mention the incident at all.449  Sibille attributed this to and considered himself vindicated by a 
later alleged Army order forbidding the participation of the Wehrmacht in Jewish shootings.  
This is likely a misinterpretation of Army policy forbidding soldiers to participate without 
orders.  As the Mogilev Conference indicates, the Army was certainly willing to do so when 
the antipartisan rationale was marshaled.  
Beyond his honor argument, we know very little about Sibille’s motivations.  Were 
his objections based solely on some form of honor and professionalism or was that a standard 
cover for a deeper moral objection? There is some evidence from the his family to support 
both.  As a World War I veteran who had fought on the Western Front, Captain Sibille would 
likely have found the conduct of World War II in the East disagreeable.  According to his 
granddaughter, he was also a religious man who refused to allow his two sons to attend Hitler 
Youth gatherings because they conflicted with church.  He only acquiesced after he received 
pressure in the school where he taught.450  Sibille’s membership in the Nazi party seems less 
instructive in this context.  What is undeniable is that First Lieutenant Sibille refused openly 
and repeatedly to carry out an order to kill and that he suffered no repercussions for this 
behavior.  If Sibille and Kuhls represent the extremes of response, then Nöll and Zimber 
likely represent the norm (and the reactions of the majority of soldiers and officers in similar 
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positions). Therefore, understanding their response is vital.  Given the hesitation and debate, 
how did they come to the decision to obey rather than to choose Sibille’s path? 
 
A Leadership Dilemma: Nöll and Zimber’s Partnership in Murder 
When examining any unit’s participation in mass murder, one must begin with the 
leaders themselves, for it is improbable that 3rd company soldiers would have killed had their 
commander, like Sibille, refused.  Captain Nöll was forty-four and, like Major Waldow, a 
school teacher.  He had served in World War I and joined the reserves in 1919.  
Characterizations of him by his soldiers are mixed.  One soldier judged him to be “respected 
and beloved due to his correct and fair attitude.”451  Another, however, described him as 
“ruthlessly strict and bureaucratically minded,” an officer who “had only his favorites but 
was otherwise not well liked by us.”452  One noted that, “like many schoolteachers who 
became officers, he was excessively correct, one could say exaggeratedly so, and considered 
all orders to be carried out with pedantic accuracy.”453 His nephew recalled that he tolerated 
no “back talk” from the children and was very strict even in his own family.454 Nöll does not 
come across as a particularly strong leader.  He “mostly remained in his quarters” while 
sending squads out on antipartisan operations.455 Indeed, Nöll himself claimed that on the 
day of the shooting he stayed in the company office.456 Subsequently, as a battalion 
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commander, he apparently was accused of cowardice before the enemy and only escaped 
execution when the Russians overran the German position.457   
Nöll, a weak and indecisive man, felt perhaps that he personally should not 
participate, but instead of refusing also on behalf of his men, he chose to delegate the 
unpleasant assignment to his subordinate.  During his trial, Nöll stated that one of the reasons 
for his failure to protest the order was that he did not want his actions to be “interpreted 
badly” by others.458  He did not want to appear weak or disloyal…and because of this he 
allowed at least 150 people to be murdered.  He further attempted to minimize his 
responsibility as a decision-maker under oath regarding Commichau’s order, “as a company 
commander, I didn’t need to know the details.  It was enough that the Major knew them.”459  
Certainly this was partially a desperate attempt at self-exculpation but also reflected Nöll’s 
unwillingness to take any ownership of his actions. 
 
In many ways, First Sergeant Emil Zimber was the perfect complement to Nöll. 
Zimber was born in Switzerland but moved to Freiburg, Germany, at the age of seven after 
his parents divorced.  In 1934, he joined the state police in Freiburg.  Zimber entered the 
Wehrmacht as a non-commissioned officer with a twelve-year commitment in 1937.460  By 
the time 3rd Company arrived in Kovno, he was the First Sergeant, the highest ranking 
enlisted man in the company.  His soldiers, however, did not hold him in high regard.  Adam 
Veit was Zimber’s orderly and knew him well.  “He was very timid,” Veit remembered. “I 
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also don’t believe he was a good soldier at the front.  From my perspective, he lacked 
courage. He had, however, a good appearance.”461  Company clerk Hans Wallenstein 
confirmed this opinion, and his characterization bears repeating in its entirety. 
If I remember correctly, he was a career soldier.  When I first met him, he was still a 
sergeant. His single ambition was to become a First Sergeant, which he finally had 
achieved.  He was very ambitious.  From outward appearance he came across as 
extremely tough and brusk.  One could tell that he took great pains to give this 
impression to the outside world.  In reality, however, he was of a weak disposition.  
As a result, he sometimes hazed us.  For example, when minor infractions occurred 
within the company, he was anxious to cover them up so that they wouldn’t come 
back on him as First Sergeant.  This had the effect that he would avenge offenses that 
he couldn’t officially punish through petty treatment, extra duty, etc.  The weakness 
of his character explains how he could quickly become enraged but in a few minutes 
be reconciled and calmed by a few appropriate words.462 
 
Zimber’s character is vital to understanding how the Krucha shooting took place.  He was an 
ambitious, career soldier, but a small, petty man, concerned about keeping up appearances.  
Zimber’s nature cast serious doubt on his claims of great reluctance in organizing the action.  
It seems clear that when Nöll could not passively evade following the order, he delegated it 
to Zimber and withdrew from the situation.  Zimber, ambitious but also intent on hiding his 
weakness, then took charge of the operation to such a degree that his orderly who had 
followed him to the execution site observed him “walking through the bodies when the 
shooting was over.”463 Actions such as these, as well as choosing to personally lead the 
shooting detail (rather than one of the other two) and giving the fire commands, do not 
indicate merely carrying out orders, as Zimber later protested.  He claimed that he thought 
the killing to be a mess [Schweinerei] at the time; However, the judge in his trial referred to a 
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letter he had written in reference to his prosecution that wondered why people were “seizing 
on these old war stories.”464 However, perhaps Zimber was telling the truth when he 
lamented, “if Captain Nöll would have found the courage, his subordinates would all have 
been relieved.  He has burdened all our consciences.”465 
 The discussion of the Krucha killing must also be viewed in the context of the 
organizational culture of the unit.  Why were these orders given?  The first stop after the 
Mogilev Conference must be Major Alfred Commichau.  Those soldiers who testified about 
him remembered him as a good superior. There was no mention of antisemitism. However, it 
seems clear that Commichau’s orders were tolerated if not approved by the regiment despite 
the regimental commander’s protestations that “Jewish shootings were neither ordered nor 
carried out in my regiment.”466  Indeed, the commander, Colonel Erich Müller, had the 
temerity to claim that he had reprimanded Commichau and had him transferred from the 
regiment.  Even then he couched it as telling Commichau that he had “gone too far” in a 
“reprisal measure.”467  However, if Commichau was to have been transferred for bad 
behavior, why was he still in the regiment five months later and why did Müller himself rate 
him as an officer of “impeccable character” who demonstrated “agility and vigor in the 
leadership of his battalion?”468  The answer is that Commichau’s actions were neither 
deemed objectionable nor condemned at the time, and that Müller’s postwar account is a 
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transparent fabrication, possibly aimed at deflecting attention from an organizational 
participation in genocide in which he was also complicit if not responsible. 
In a 15 November memo to rHGM, the 339th Division commander, General 
Hewelcke, noted that the employment of Ordnungsdienst units “led to unpleasant incidents 
during the execution of the Jews of Borissow [sic].  Local actions should only be carried out 
with simultaneous coordination with the troops.  Instructions of the SD for the 
Ordnungsdienst may only be given through Orts-, Standort-, or Section commanders.”469 Far 
from distancing the Wehrmacht from anti-Jewish actions, this memo directed that they be 
more closely integrated.  In the same memo, General Hewelcke suggested that some of the 
possessions taken from the murdered Jews of Borisov be handed over to the local civilian 
populations.  The November operational summary from the 339th Infantry Division contained 
even more telling evidence of an organizational anti-Jewish stance.  It noted, “in places 
where a cleaning up of Jews by the SD has not yet taken place, a greater reticence of the 
population can be detected.  In such areas, pacification actions only rarely lead to full success 
because the approach of the troops is betrayed in time.”470  The lessons of the Mogilev 
Conference could hardly be more clearly articulated than in this entry: Jews were the enemy 
or, at the very least, supported the enemy and their removal made things easier and safer for 
the Wehrmacht. 
For the men, the situation was at least in some ways similar to Krupki.  These were 
men unaccustomed to such actions and, by extension, they were as unpracticed in methods of 
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evasion as they were in the techniques of mass executions.  However, the nature of the 
environment also undoubtedly intensified some important social-psychological pressures.  
First, 3rd Company was isolated, alone in the village, ten miles from its headquarters.  The 
unit was also still in the process of adapting to the nature of the war in the East, having only 
two months before been in France.  While the threat from partisans was low, patrolling the 
hostile environment of Belarus with its dark forests and swamps must have created a degree 
of apprehension. Secondly, here the antipartisan justification was explicitly used to play upon 
these fears and to justify killing Jews.  Finally, the same compartmentalizing division of 
labor was used as in Krupki with the crucial exception being that there were no SS units 
present to carry out the actual killing.  3rd Company carried out the Krucha execution 
completely on its own. However, while these pressures perhaps made evasion or refusal 
harder for individual soldiers, it was clearly not impossible, as the Magel and Winter 
examples demonstrate.  Moreover, it is possible that First Lieutenant Sibille interpreted these 
same conditions of isolation as giving him the space to ignore the order, knowing that his 
commander could not easily check up on him or personally confront him. 
The Krucha killing is highly instructive in a variety of ways.  First, it demonstrates 
the dissemination of the Jewish-Bolshevik-Partisan calculus as formulated in Mogilev, from 
the highest level to the lowest.  It is a rare example of a direct causal link between such 
exhortations to increased violence against Jews as partisans and actual killing actions.  
Secondly, the case of 3rd Company demonstrates the intense emotional impact of these 
killings on soldiers, the factors leading to their participation in spite of these responses, but 
also the real opportunities at both the soldier and officer level to avoid this participation 
without adverse consequences.  Moreover, we see the importance of leadership at the ground 
159 
level in determining whether units would participate or not participate.  In other words, the 
draconian discipline of the Wehrmacht worked both ways.  Finally, the progression from the 
Mogilev Conference to the Krucha action to the November reports from the 339th Division 
demonstrate, at least for this unit, a movement from ad hoc complicity in genocide to a more 
regimented habitual form.  It is this further routinization of Wehrmacht participation in 
genocide, then, to which we now turn.  
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V.  Routinization- Daily Participation in the Nazi 
Genocidal Project in Slonim and Novogrudok 
 
Introduction 
My cousin Hanna Eilender from Suwalki was at the 14 November 1941 
shooting.  She was among the few— perhaps 60—who were considered 
already shot, but in reality not dead.  A few were completely untouched.  My 
cousin had not been hit.  She lay under a few bodies and worked her way out 
of the grave later in the night.  She told me as soon as she returned to the 
ghetto that Lithuanian auxiliaries had been left behind at the grave, who were 
completely drunk.  In this way, a few others also were able to escape.  My 
cousin Hanna Eilender was still alive when I left the Slonim ghetto.  I have 
not heard anything of her whereabouts since. 
 -Kasriel Eilender, Slonim survivor471 
 
I had been given a silver cigarette case by a Jew as a gift that had a Czarist 
eagle engraved on it.  I took it to a Jewish jeweler to have it made into a 
locket for my wife.  The jeweler asked to see my hand. I showed it to him.  
He then said something to his wife that I didn’t understand.  I asked him 
what he had said.  He had said to his wife, “He wasn’t there.” Upon my 
further questioning, he said, “at the digging of the mass graves meant for the 
Jews.” 
 - Franz L., 20 March 1961472 
 
 On the evening of 14 November, Franz L. climbed out of a truck on the outskirts of 
the town of Slonim.  The darkness was broken only by a series of campfires built by the 
soldiers there. L. was met by his sergeant, Hans R.  “Franz,” he said, “it would be better if we 
just put a bullet in our heads now.”  Together they walked to the edge of one of three mass 
graves, where Sergeant R. explained that several thousand Jewish men, women, and children 
had been forced to strip naked and were shot in the pit.  By the firelight, Franz could see 
                                                
471 "Eilender, K. Statement, 11 February 1961,"  (BA-ZS: B162/5088), 2205-6. 
472 "L., Franz Statement, 20 March 1961,"  (BA-ZS: B162/1550), 130-1. 
161 
thousands of naked bodies. He noticed that several containers of alcohol stood near the grave.  
Piles of clothes divided by age and sex lay nearby.  As Sergeant R. spoke, tears ran down his 
cheeks.473  Soldier Karl M. was also tasked with guarding the Slonim execution site.  He 
remembered that the scene was “terrible and ghastly to see.  The air stank of blood and 
sweat.”  Suddenly, he heard a child’s voice cry out several times for “Mama.”  The voice, it 
seemed to him, “sounded buried, crying out from the depths.”  Then all was quiet.474  At 
dawn after spending an icy night keeping watch over the murdered Jews of Slonim, the 
soldiers of the 6th Company, 727th Infantry Regiment returned to their barracks. 
 The actions of the 6th Company in Slonim (and of other 727th soldiers in surrounding 
areas) are emblematic of an escalation in Wehrmacht collusion in the Holocaust.  German 
soldiers were no longer merely assisting in killings in towns they happened to be in while 
advancing. The units in the following cases lived side by side with the Nazi administration 
and its victims and found themselves deeply complicit in their deaths.  The behavior of 
German army units in Slonim and Novogrudok demonstrates the depth of this cooperation, in 
particular how the role of the Army in the Nazi genocidal project was negotiated and the 
extent to which it became routinized. 
 The 707th Infantry Division was created on 2 May 1941 in Bavaria. It had two 
infantry regiments: the 747th and the 727th Infantry Regiment coming from the Munich 
area.475  The division was intended to function as a second-line occupation unit, and the 
average age of thirty reflected this. At the same time, however, it was made up of a large 
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number of elite mountain troops from the 1st Gebirgsdivision and had, perhaps, been 
envisioned for action in the Balkans.  Indeed, its future commander had been getting a 
“refresher” in troop leading on the staff of the 99th Gebirgsjägerreiment in Serbia in April 
1941.476  
 This commander, fifty-two year old Generalmajor Gustav Freiherr von Mauchenheim 
gennante Bechtolsheim, was a Bavarian whose father had also been a general.477  As in 
Krupki and Krucha, leadership was vitally importantly, at all levels.  Gustav Bechtolsheim 
had fought in World War I from beginning to end.  An infantryman, he had been wounded at 
Verdun and then again in Macedonia, and had seen extensive action, fighting on the Western, 
Eastern, Serbian/Macedonian, and Italian fronts.478  After World War I, Bechtolsheim served 
in various positions in the Reichswehr. 
 Bechtolsheim was a dedicated Nazi.  An evaluation report in 1939 credited him with 
“a high sense of responsibility and a positive attitude toward the National Socialist state.”479  
In 1943, he was evaluated as someone “embodying the major ideas of National Socialism” 
who “understands to communicate the national socialist body of thought to others.”480  Part 
of this body of ideas was a rabid antisemitism. As a fervent racist and Nazi, Bechtolsheim 
was certainly a driving force behind the behavior of his division, as many of his directives 
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indicate. 
 The 707th Division arrived on the Eastern front in August 1941 with the 2nd Battalion, 
727th Infantry Regiment reaching the Baranovichi region on the 14th.481  A number of 
companies of the 727th were stationed in the area: the 6th Company in Slonim, the 7th 
Company  in Novogrudok, the 8th in Baranovichi and Stolpce, the 12th in Sczczuczyn, and the 
10th and11th Companies in the vicinity of Lida.  On 1 September, the region of Belarus 
roughly from Borisov west to the Polish border became part of the Reichskommissariat 
Ostland (RKO).  This division marked the boundary between continued military and newly-
established civilian administrative control, with everything to the east remaining part of 
rHGM.  The RKO fell under the control of the Ministry for the Occupied Territories led by 
Alfred Rosenberg, a Baltic German and one of the Nazi party’s chief racial theorists.  While 
four Reichskommissariats were envisioned, the circumstances of the war allowed only for the 
establishment of two, Ostland (which included the Baltic states and Belarus), and the 
Ukraine. 
 The RKO was under the command of Heinrich Lohse.  Lohse was a forty-five-year-
old politician, a heavyset party functionary who also served as the Oberpräsident of  German 
Schleswig-Holstein. Though he claimed to be guided by a dedication to “construction and 
culture,” in reality he was “neither a significant personality nor a dynamic leader.”482 Indeed, 
at times his more economic approach to Jewish policy conflicted with the more 
annihilationist bent of the SS.  Within RKO, the territory Lohse presided over was divided 
into four administrative units called Generalbezirken.   
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 Of these, we are most concerned with the Generalbezirk Weißruthenien governed by 
Wilhelm Kube, a fifty-four-year-old Prussian bureaucrat.  However, for the Nazi 
administration, White Russia was not nearly as important as the Baltic States or the Ukraine.  
Kube had been removed from his position as president of Brandenburg due to corruption in 
1936.  Fortunately, Hitler felt “sympathetic toward him and fingered him for a position in the 
occupation administration in the East.483 Kube saw this appointment as a new start and 
sought to “optimize the economic exploitation of the region through cooperation with the 
population.”484 His attitude toward the Jews was pragmatic but certainly not beneficent.  He 
stated in July 1942, for example, that he would “prefer to eliminate the Jews in 
Generalbezirk Weißruthenien once and for all as soon as the Jews are no longer needed by 
the Wehrmacht for economic reasons.”485 Kube would be assassinated in 1943 when a bomb 
was placed under his bed by a partisan. The final civilian administrator of interest was 
Gerhard Erren, Gebietskommissar for the Slonim region.  It is to Slonim that we now turn. 
Zyrowice and the Czepielow Forest: Two 6th Company Killing Operations 
Esther Fuchsman (herself a nurse)... and her younger sister, half-naked in the 
cold, had been standing at the edge of the ditch.  A bullet had gone through 
her hand and into her sister's head.  Both of them fell into the ditch.  Still in 
possession of her faculties, she had struggled to keep her head high enough 
to breathe, but her moving body out of sight of guards. Her sister had died 
instantly….Meanwhile, the astounded guards who reported for duty at the 
ditches, found traces of blood going from the graves to the woods and 
concluded that during the night some of the corpses had escaped. 
 - Nachum Alpert, The Destruction of Slonim Jewry486  
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 The 6th Company was stationed in the town of Slonim in western Belarus by 21 
August.487 Slonim is a very old town, first mentioned in medieval chronicles around 1040. As 
the town rests in a valley along the Sczara river, its name  Slonim likely derives from a 
Slavic word for valley or lowland.488  By 1551, there was a Jewish community there.489  This 
Jewish community was a large portion of the town itself.  In 1897, the total population of 
Slonim was 15,893 of whom 10,588 were Jews.490 According to Gerhard Erren, in 1941 there 
were around 25,000 Jews in the surrounding area with 16,000 in the town itself.491   
However, this number greatly increased after 1939 as Jewish refugees from Warsaw, Lodz, 
and other cities under Nazi occupation flowed into the area around Slonim. The town itself 
had a vibrant Jewish life with at least seven synagogues, the largest of which remains today 
in a semi-ruined state.  Slonim was the center of an important Hasidic dynasty as well.  
Down a small alley from the main synagogue is the Old Marketplace, where the Jewish 
merchants would gather to sell their wares. The river provided the basis for a relatively brisk 
economy centered around Slonim’s breweries, tanneries, and brick factories; the monopoly 
for brewing in Slonim, in fact, had been held by Jews since 1558.492  One historian noted that 
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even though Slonim developed into an industrial locale near the railroad junction of 
Baranovichi, it became even more a “Jewish shtetl.”493 
 Slonim was occupied by German troops on 24 June 1941, likely by elements of the 
47th Panzer Corps.494  Killings began almost immediately.  Located along the R2 main 
logistical route, the town was frequently visited by various Einsatzgruppen units.  Elements 
of Einsatzkommando 8 were stationed in Slonim on 3 July.495  On 17 July, the 252nd Infantry 
Division reported that   “police roundups”  had netted a large number of “communists and 
unsafe elements.”496 This was likely the first major action by Einsatzkommando 8 that killed 
approximately 2,000 Jews, including some of the leading inhabitants of the town.  Police 
Regiment Mitte reported this killing to Berlin, writing: “During yesterday’s ‘cleansing 
action’ [Sauberungsaktion] 1,153 Jewish plunderers were killed by Police Regiment 
Center.497 On August 12, Einsatzgruppe B reported killing 52 “followers of Bolshevism” and 
“looters.498 
 The commander of the 6th Company, First Lieutenant Fritz Glück, set up an 
Ortskommandantur to administer the town upon his arrival.  Several men of the company 
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were permanently employed in this capacity.  Glück was a Nazi party member and rabid 
antisemite.  A 6th company soldier described him as a “Jew-hater” who “drank lots of 
schnapps and was often drunk.”499  Another painted him as a “fanatic National Socialist.”500 
His top NCO in the Ortskommandantur remembered he was a wearer of the prestigious 
“Blood Order” medal and was “mostly drunk.”501  This witness had also heard that a drunken 
Glück had dragged two Jews out of a house and shot them.  Franz L. recalled that “not a day 
went by that he didn’t stagger around the kaserne courtyard in a very drunken state, firing 
wildly with his pistol.”502 
 It was this man and his soldiers who governed Slonim until the civilian administration 
became fully operational.  During this time, Glück carried out at least one killing operation 
on his own authority.  One early morning sometime before mid-November 1941, Glück 
mobilized at least one platoon (likely the 3rd) and read them an order whereby the Jews in the 
region were to be liquidated.503  In a letter alerting the Ludwigsburg authorities, former 
soldier Robert Re. said that the order to kill the Jews had been justified due to Jewish support 
of the partisans, which he termed “an out-and-out lie.”504 
 Glück and the 3rd platoon leader, Lieutenant Hauck, then marched their men to the 
small town of Zyrowice, four miles south of Slonim.  Zyrowice is distinguished by a 
beautiful and massive Eastern Catholic monastery.  In the shadow of its bright blue dome and 
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green metal roofs, some of the soldiers of 6th company searched homes for Jews.505  Others 
surrounded the town in a cordon or Absperrung.  Glück and Hauck stood on the square as the 
Jews were assembled.  Private Otto Stocker wrote, “that during the round-up of the Jews 
force naturally had to be used.”506  Once the round up was complete, the Jews were loaded 
onto trucks.  Soldiers rode along to make sure no Jews jumped out on the way to the killing 
site.507 
 The trucks drove about 4 km north of the town into a forest where they met a 
detachment of Lithuanian soldiers.508 Glück ordered his men to dig a grave, which they did. 
It appears that the Lithuanians did the bulk of the shooting, making marks on their rifles for 
each Jew killed.509  It is unclear, but probable, that some 6th company soldiers also joined in 
voluntarily.  As in other executions, the Jews were forced to strip and hand over valuables.  A 
day or so after the killing, driver Franz L. retrieved two truckloads of clothing from the 
shooting site.  He estimated the number of dead at two to three hundred.510 
 The Zyrowice action represents a relatively decentralized and self-initiated action and 
also the depth to which Glück was committed to the murder of Jews.  It was undertaken 
under his authority and using mostly his soldiers. Indeed, many men remembered that the 
Lithuanian unit was under Glück’s control as well.  Also, his choice of one or two platoons 
suggests that he had already identified junior leaders and soldiers ready and willing to 
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participate in these types of killings. 
  The November action in the Cziepelow forest by contrast represents Wehrmacht 
participation in mass murder as a highly coordinated, more complex, comprehensive, and 
organized operation in conjunction with local civilian authorities. Sometime before 14 
November, a meeting took place between the Gebietskommissar Gerhard Erren, First 
Lieutenant Glück, SS Unterstürmführer Waldemar Amelung, and the platoon leader of a unit 
from Reserve Police Battalion 69, which was also stationed in Slonim.511  Amelung was head 
of the SD office in nearby Baranovichi.  The outcome of this meeting appears to have been a 
relatively detailed plan of action, in which the 6th company played a vital role. 
 First, soldiers of the company were responsible for digging the graves.  A few weeks 
before the shooting, the men were marched into the Czepielow forest, several kilometers 
south of Slonim, on the road to Baranovichi.  Here trucks met them with shovels.  The men 
then dug three or four trenches, approximately 100m long, 3 m wide, and 3 m deep with a 
few sloping entrances.512  The work took two to three days but was “not hard due to the 
sandy ground.”513  At least one Jewish survivor stated that sixty Jews were taken to dig 
graves and did not return.514  One soldier claimed that the men thought these were to be 
antitank ditches.  However, it is unlikely that many soldiers believed this; at the time Slonim 
was over 700km behind the front and anti-tank ditches do not require sloped entrances for 
people. 
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 The men of the company, assembled in the early morning hours of 14 November, 
would follow a routine procedure similar to that first used at Krupki and Krucha.  First 
Lieutenant Glück appeared along with an SS officer.  Several soldiers recall Glück telling the 
men that a large Aktion against the Jews of Slonim would take place.515  “We knew then,” 
stated one, “that the Jews would be shot.”516 A company cook, Alexander L., recalled that the 
SS officer informed the company “the Führer has ordered the extermination of the Jews.  
Because the SS will be occupied with the execution, our company would have to take over 
the Absperrung.  The shootings would be carried out by a Lithuanian company that already 
had experience in this area.  However, soldiers from the company could also volunteer for 
this duty.”  L. was then ordered to fall out and prepare coffee and breakfast by 2 am.517  
Several soldiers remember this call for volunteers.518 According to at least two witnesses, 6th 
company men did volunteer to participate in shooting.519  
 The operation began shortly thereafter and followed what is now a familiar process.  
Some soldiers conducted the outer Absperrung of Slonim.  Unlike Krupki or Krucha, Slonim 
was a large, populous town and many Jews attempted to flee. This time, the Absperrung 
soldiers were to check for specially issued IDs.  Some Jews did try to pass the cordon, but 
were turned around and sent back to town.  One Jewish resident of Slonim, Zvi Szeptynski, 
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remembered that he was stopped on his way to work by police and Werhmacht soldiers and 
told to return to his house and remain there for the rest of the day.520  A 6th Company private 
recalled a Jew who approached him and offered in “perfect German” to give him 50,000 RM 
to be allowed to pass. The soldier turned the man back, he later claimed, because he was 
being observed by his squad and platoon leader.521 
 In the town itself, other soldiers, along with police, Lithuanians and SS, rounded up 
the Jews and guarded them in the marketplace.  During the round up, worker identity cards 
issued by the Gebietskommissar were of vital importance.  Only those holding these so-called 
“life cards” were spared.  Dietrich Hick, head of Jewish Affairs for the region, had submitted 
a list of names, which Erren had personally edited and approved. All those not on this list 
were targeted for extermination.  This led to tragic scenes.  Eighteen-year old Rachel 
Klenicki stood with her uncle and her cousin as German soldiers sorted out those with work 
cards. She described what happened next. “When my uncle became aware of what was going 
to happen,” she remembered, “he leapt into the Sczara river. His daughter jumped in after 
him and both drowned.”522  German soldiers were firsthand witnesses to scenes such as these 
and must have understood the nature of their actions, if only through the reactions of the 
Jews. 
 Gerhard Erren, Hick, First Lieutenant Glück and countless soldiers from the 
Ortskommandant stood in the marketplace observing the selection process.  Erren himself 
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carried a whip with which he struck the Jews.523  The marketplace was the scene of countless 
horrors.  Nachum Alpert survived the ordeal and reported that his cousin, Chemke, refused to 
be separated from his family, though he had a work permit.  After being forced off the truck 
carrying his family, Chemke climbed on again and was allowed to accompany them to their 
deaths.524  The elderly and infirm were roughly shoved onto trucks, dressed only in 
nightgowns.  6th Company soldiers participated throughout.525 
 As in previous cases, the soldiers escorted the Jews to the killing site.  Some rode in 
trucks with them while others walked beside the long columns moving out of town in the 
direction of Baranovichi.  Accompanying them was a company of Lithuanian 
”volunteers.”526  At the killing site, the Jews were unloaded from the trucks and forced, along 
with those arriving on foot, to sit within sight and earshot of the execution pits.  Cook L. was 
ordered several times to deliver food to the killing site.  As he was passing a column of 
women and girls, several women pleaded with him, “Mr. German soldier, save my life! I will 
give you money and gold.”527 But L. kept driving. 
 What was now a standardized routine at the execution pits followed.  Here we see that 
the participation of soldiers was neither distant nor uninvolved.  Indeed, they themselves 
demonstrated brutality and a willingness to kill those trying to escape.  The Jews were forced 
to sit and wait their turn while others were shot in groups of ten.  They were required to take 
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off any valuable clothing and place gold, money, and jewelry in a box.  6th Company soldiers 
surrounded the execution site and guarded the waiting Jews.  Even at this late stage in the 
operation, it was necessary to guard against escape.  One sergeant admitted that he and a 
comrade shot at two escaping Jews (though they claimed not to have aimed at them.)528  
Further violence occurred at this site.  According to one  soldier, the Jews were “roughly 
pushed out of the trucks and driven to the pits.  They were beaten with rifle butts and there 
were heartbreaking scenes between the men and the victims.”529  These behaviors strongly 
suggest that the men exceeded the minimum requirements of the operation and approached 
their tasks with a certain dedication. 
 The shootings themselves appear to have been carried out mainly by the SS and a 
Lithuanian unit attached to the 6th Company.  We know that First Lieutenant Glück, however, 
was on scene because we have the testimony of a private who delivered several bottles of 
schnapps to him there around eleven o'clock.530  SS-Untersturmführer Amelung was in full 
command of the shooting, but Wehrmacht men also shot the Jews of Slonim.  A private 
stated clearly after the war that “there were also company members in the shooting 
kommando, who had voluntarily responded to First Lieutenant Glück’s request.  No one was 
ordered.”531  Soldiers of the company “held up Jewish infants in the air and shot them with 
pistols.”532  The men drank to the point of inebriation, and shot alongside the Lithuanian and 
SS soldiers.  As one soldier described the macabre scene, it was a “real massacre.  The 
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shooting was somewhat haphazard [and] the shooting kommandos were very drunk.”533  
Some Jews were not killed and screamed out.  Some soldiers who were shooting “felt ill” and 
were given more schnapps.534  The killing of between eight and ten thousand people 
continued until the late afternoon, so late in fact that the graves could not be covered that 
night but instead lay open, the murdered Jews exposed to the open air;   
 The 6th Company soldiers’ mission was not over.  They were required to spend the 
night at the execution site to prevent unhurt or wounded Jews from escaping.  Campfires 
were lit to warm the men who were not patrolling around the graves.  One soldier cried out in 
fright when a Jew crawled out of the grave near him.535  Despite the guards’ presence, a few 
Jews did manage to escape, aided by the drunkenness of the soldiers, as one survivor 
observed.536  Patrols during the night and the next morning did result in the recapture of some 
escaped Jews.  Private N. was part of the detail that marched out of Slonim the next morning 
to cover the grave. They found “a few wounded Jews, one of whom had been shot through 
the jaw.”  These people were returned to the grave and killed.  At this point, N. relates that 
there they learned that many Jews had managed to flee.  His squad leader, Sergeant Wörndle, 
then led the men on a patrol of the surrounding areas searching for escaped Jews.  N. 
remembered that he and his squad captured a woman, a man, and a twelve-year old boy and 
returned them to the gravesite where they were murdered.537  Other patrols were also 
conducted, searching for Jews who had escaped from the pit.  This search also led back to 
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Slonim, where wounded survivors were dragged out of the hospital where they had sought 
treatment and were shot by German civil officials and police.538 These post-execution patrols 
are incredibly powerful indications that these soldiers took their role in the murder of the 
Jews very seriously.  Indeed, it would have been incredibly easy to avoid this kind of killing, 
which was individual, decentralized, and far from supervisory eyes. 
 Gerhard Erren would report in January 1942 that “Slonim was very overpopulated 
upon my arrival, the housing situation catastrophic.  The Jewish Aktion of [14 November] 
provided a tangible relief…This Aktion carried out by the SD freed me of unnecessary eaters 
and the 7,000 Jews remaining in the town are completely engaged in the labor process.  They 
work willingly under constant fear of death.”539  He should also have recognized the 6th 
Company, 727th Infantry for the pivotal role it played in facilitating and carrying out this 
massacre, for the large role these men played in the rounding up, shooting, and guarding of 
the Jewish victims.   
 A month later in Novogrudok, the 7th Company of the 727th Infantry Regiment 
commanded by forty-eight year old Captain Johann Artmann, assisted in another murder of a 
Jewish community, killing approximately 5,000 Jews there.540  The participation of this 
Army unit was a virtual mirror image of that of the 6th in Slonim.  It is further evidence of an 
emerging standard routine for involvement in this phase of the Final Solution.  On 7 
December, the night before the executions, 7th Company soldiers assisted in the round-up and 
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imprisonment of the victims in several buildings in a judicial complex.  They stood guard 
outside and cooks from the company were even responsible for feeding the Jews.  The cook 
recalled they were only fed kraut and potatoes once a day.541  The next day, the men of the 
company escorted the Jews of Novogrudok out of town to a densely forested area known as 
Skridlevo.  One soldier saw Wehrmacht trucks loaded with Jews heading to the execution 
site.542 Also in the column were all the girls of the local Jewish orphanage, dressed in their 
best clothes.543 
 As in Slonim, soldiers guarded the execution site and witnessed similar scenes of 
terror and misery.  One exceptional scene was described by Private First Class Anton H. was 
a medic assigned to the soldiers surrounding the shooting.  As such, he was able to wander 
around the site at will.  He watched as one Jewish man attacked a policeman with a knife, 
wounding him in the face.  The man was then “handcuffed, thrown into the snow, and beaten 
to death.  He was beaten between the legs, on his genitals.  When he was dead, he was 
dragged to the grave and thrown in.”544  He also observed one of the killers who shot infants 
and kicked them into the grave, saying, “You are going to Abraham.”545  Again, the 
employment of Wehrmacht personnel reflected what had come to be a routine division of 
labor. 
 German soldiers likely participated in the actual shooting in Novogrudok as well.  
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The traveling 7th Company blacksmith reported hearing that a sergeant and a private had 
actively participated in the shooting and then bragged about it to him.546 Another 
remembered that a Private Kasberger was “brutal” and “ruthless” and along with several 
other soldiers had volunteered to participate in shooting Jews.547  Lieutenant Martin, the 1st 
Platoon Leader, was particularly active in this and other Jewish shootings.  One of his 
platoon members described him as “fanatic” and remarked that “the Jews did not suit 
him.”548  By ghettoizing, guarding, and shooting Jews, the 7th Company (like the 6th) assisted 
the Einsatzgruppen and their Lithuanian auxiliaries in completing the murder of 5,000 Jews 
in two days.  Major Schmitz, the battalion commander responsible for both 6th and 7th 
Companies, had nicknamed Novogrudok the “El Dorado of Jews” which was certainly an 
indication of his disdain for the Jews.549 
 
“Girlfriends,” Gold, and the Gebietskommissar: Deepening Complicity on Daily 
Basis 
We Wehrmacht officers were indignant over these measures 
and took the position: why not put these people to work? 
- Ludwig Greiller, Ordnance Officer 727th Infantry 
Regiment, 5 June 1961550 
 
If members of my company stood sentry duty at the execution 
site, then someone must have ordered them to do so.  I was 
certainly not that person.  I ordered nothing of the kind and had 
no knowledge of it…I am aware of no guilt. I have done 
nothing that would justify the charges leveled against me. 
- Johann Artmann, 7th Company Commander, 22 
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 Unlike the German units in Krupki and Krucha, the 6th and 7th companies were 
stationed in Slonim and Novogrudok for a relatively long period of time, approximately 
seven months.  This lengthy occupation led in many ways to a much deeper and much more 
normalized complicity in the Nazi genocidal plan.  Geography played a crucial role.  As 
Slonim and Novogrudok were deep in the Generalbezirk Weißruthenien of 
Reichskommissariat Ostland, these towns fell under the jurisdiction of Nazi civilian 
authorities.  This situation placed the Wehrmacht units stationed there in a triangular 
relationship with both the civilian authorities and the SS/SD.  Officially, the Wehrmacht 
authorities were responsible for security issues and for managing critical logistical operations 
that impacted the military.  The Wehrmacht was, in fact, a major player in all policies of 
occupation and did not confine itself to simple security concerns.  One such area was the 
disposition of Jewish property.  In addition, the long stay led to some interesting and bizarre 
personal relationships between Jews and the German soldiers.  Finally, the longer duration of 
stay in these towns allowed the small minority of soldiers who wished to aid and perhaps 
even rescue the Jews with whom they came into contact the opportunity to do so.   These 
personal relationships between occupier and occupied, especially Jews are rarely seen in 
scholarship yet are very important in our understanding 
  An examination of 727th units, mainly the 6th Company in Slonim but also the 7th 
Company in Novogrudok, yields examples of such behavior that are instructive for two 
reasons.  First, they offer rare documentary evidence of issues that both survivors and former 
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soldiers were loathe to talk about, particularly regarding theft and personal relationships.  
Indeed, sometimes these situations are actually corroborated by testimony from both victim 
and perpetrator.  Second, these areas complicate our picture of soldier motivations.  In the 
course of postwar investigations, most soldiers claimed that their involvement in killing 
resulted from superior orders and that they participated only to the minimal extent that they 
were required.  While this is itself a tendentious argument, examining German soldiers’ 
relationships to Jewish property offers what may be clearer insights into attitudes toward 
participation in the Holocaust.  If some element of duress induced soldiers to participate in 
the killing process, no such pressure existed to handle Jewish goods or engage in personal 
(and sexual) relations with Jews.  Before moving to relationships between Jews and soldiers, 
however, we must first explore the complicated relationship between the Wehrmacht and the 
local civilian authorities who came to roost in this area of the occupied East. 
 The first real structures of occupation established by the Army in the newly 
conquered eastern territories took roughly three forms: direct rule by the local military 
commander, control by the local commander via an ad hoc Ortskommandantur (OK) 
comprised of personnel from his unit, and control by an actual numbered Ortskommandantur 
unit deployed for the express purpose of governance.  In larger towns and cities, a 
Feldkommandantur (FK) would be erected to which the OKs would report.  These initial 
military governments were responsible first and foremost for the security of the local area 
and of logistical routes, but quickly found themselves involved in economic and racial 
matters as well.  These commanders wore two faces, looking out for the interests of the 
native inhabitants in their area while also “participating in the massive terrorization the 
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population.”552 On 1 September, the area of Belarus west of Minsk came under civilian 
control as Generalbezirk Weißruthenien of the Reichskommissariate Ostland administered by 
Alfred Rosenberg. The addition of a third power center along with the military authorities 
and SS created a different dynamic in this region than that in the previous cases.  This 
tripartite relationship added additional power struggles and competing interests and 
personalities. 
 First Lieutenant Glück had been in control of Slonim for several weeks by the time 
the Gebietskommissar, Gerhard Erren, arrived in the beginning of September 1941.  Erren 
was representative of the so-called “Golden Pheasants [Goldfasanen],” named for their 
brown uniforms, medals, and strutting, arrogant behavior.  Erren was a teacher of history, 
geography, and biology at a Reichswasserschutz academy and later a Freikorps fighter.  In 
1936, he began his training at a NS-Ordenburg school for future Nazi elites, where he later 
became an instructor.  He participated in the French campaign in 1940 and was appointed 
Gebietskommissar Weißruthenien in August 1941.553  Erren was an outspoken antisemite 
who had once remarked after personally killing a Jew working on his headquarters building, 
“when one has done it once, it is as easy as jumping over a piece of straw.”554  A man named 
Polenz was a member of the civil administration in Slonim.  He killed himself before 
standing trial in 1961 and described Erren in his suicide note as “intelligent, a very good 
speaker, musical, unfortunately without morals, extremely refined, and without a doubt an 
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alcoholic.”555 
 Erren was assisted by Dietrich Hick, his Referent (or special assistant) for Jewish 
Affairs.  One survivor recalled that Hick had a large dog that he had named “Jew.”  He liked 
to walk into the ghetto and shout “Jew!”  When a Jewish inhabitant appeared, thinking he 
had been called, Hick would beat them mercilessly and walk away.556  Another Jewish 
inhabitant of Slonim termed him simply a “fanatic” and a “psychiatric case.”557  Assigned to 
the civilian authorities were two branches of the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei or Orpo): a 
gendarme detachment commanded by Lothar Schulz and a local urban police post [of the 
Schutzpolizei or Schupo] under Lieutenant Walter Bonke.  The leader of the SS/SD station 
responsible for Slonim was SS-Untersturmführer Amelung, based out of nearby Baranovichi. 
 Like many power dynamics in the Third Reich, the official  relationship between the 
military and the civilian authorities in Reichskommissariats was somewhat ambiguous.  For 
example, a Führer order dated 25 June 1941 detailed the duties of the Wehrmacht in civilian 
administered areas.  In addition to security concerns, the Army was expected to “support the 
Reichskommissars in their political and administrative tasks and represent them to the 
military, particularly regarding the exploitation of the land for the provision of the fighting 
troops.  Given a risk of delay, the Military Commander has the right, also in civilian areas, to 
order measures that are necessary for the execution of military tasks.  The Military 
Commander can temporarily delegate this right to the local commander.”558  Clearly, in areas 
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of logistics, reprisals, and even participation in racial policy, this decree allowed the Army in 
the Generalbezirk authority that overlapped and on occasion even superseded that of the 
civilian administrators.  This could cause friction when the interests of the civilian authorities 
and those of the military differed, particularly regarding logistical issues.  A memo from the 
Military Commander in Reichskommissariat Ostland gives an indication of the prevalence of 
this tension.  Apparently, German soldiers had not been showing proper respect to civilian 
authorities, for General Walter Braemer wrote “In view of the close connection and 
cooperation between German soldiers and German administrative organs, moreover, in 
uniform, it is forbidden that they pass one another without taking notice….Every German has 
the duty to outwardly document the unity of the Germans….It is a rule of politeness and 
comradeship, not to wait long, but to greet.”559  It is apparent from  documents such as these 
and testimony of soldiers that often some level of irritation or disrespect existed between the 
military and the civil authorities.  However, when the military commander was a man like 
Bechtolsheim, ambiguity over what was considered “military necessity” also allowed for 
initiative taking in the escalation of policy.  Subordinate leaders could choose to participate 
in activities against Jews for exactly this reason, given the lessons of the Mogilev conference. 
 In Slonim, civil and military authorities were bound together from the beginning.  
Glück had established an Ortskommandantur upon arrival in mid-August 1941.  Though 
company members later claimed that their mission had been limited to security (read: 
antipartisan operations), this is largely a postwar fabrication.  The men of the unit were 
actually engaged mainly in guarding and operating key commercial and factory sites in and 
around Slonim, among other things a tannery, sawmill, warehouse for appropriated goods, an 
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oil depot and a munitions dump.  While the handover of authority to the civilian 
administration officially occurred on 1 September, the Gebietskommissariat in Slonim was in 
no position as yet to actually govern.  When Erren moved into his headquarters, a large stone 
building on Zamkowa street, he had only three subordinates, including his driver.  The early 
days of civilian administration were thus plagued by shortages of equipment and personnel.  
Erren noted in a report that he had to send two officials back to Germany to get supplies and 
equipment.  Two of his key officials arrived four weeks late and one returned to Germany 
two days later due to illness.560 By the end of October, however, Erren had received more 
personnel and equipment, including several female German civilian secretaries, and could 
finally begin to administer his new realm, which in turn encroached upon practices to which 
the military administration had now become accustomed to controlling. 
 Many soldiers after the war commented upon the strained relations between the 
Wehrmacht and the civilian administration, particularly during the long transition.  There 
appears to have been reluctance on the part of the Army to hand over the logistical operations 
it controlled to the Gebietskommissariat and the civil administrators who “carried themselves 
as little kings.”561  Erren himself testified to the initial tensions between the military and the 
civilian authorities.  “The Wehrmacht,” he said, “completely refused in the beginning to hand 
over administrative authority and it took a while before we were completely in operation.”562  
The military perhaps correctly feared that the political authorities would be less efficient and 
more corrupt, resulting in poorer logistical support.  Certainly, given the 
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Gebietskommissariat’s dearth of personnel and equipment, Erren and his office frequently 
requested or demanded support from the military.  Indeed, one soldier reported that upon 
arrival Erren demanded that the company’s soldiers vacate a building so that his staff could 
live there.  This allegedly so enraged Glück that he deployed a light antitank gun in front of 
the building in order to “dissuade” them.563  In these areas, perhaps, the relationship between 
the two was, as one soldier described, “tense.”564  While sensationalistic reports that Glück 
had placed the Gebietskommissariat under house arrest or deployed artillery are likely gross 
exaggerations of the friction between the military and civilians, the records clearly point to 
tension between the military and civilian authorities.565  These tensions should not, however, 
be mistaken for principled opposition to Nazi policy. 
 It is not, perhaps, surprising that differences would arise between the military men 
and the civilian officials.  These Nazi bureaucrats were not the best that Germany had to 
offer.  Often, they were posted to the East as a form of organizational exile, or they 
volunteered believing that it was the only place they could earn advancement in an otherwise 
stalled career.  These were not all-stars.  They spawned the nickname Ostnieten (Eastern 
nobodies or failures).  The commander of Einsatzkommando 2, Eduard Strauch called them 
“'blockheads and ass-lickers, whose careers for the most part had depended on that of the 
Gauleiter”.566  A Nazi press officer described them in a private memo in detail: 
Now in the expanses of the East, with pretentious uniforms, titles, salaries, daily 
allowances and rations…a type who decks himself out with revolver and whip or 
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whatever he feels will lend him a natural mastery, superior bearing and genuine 
manliness.  The idle and worthless type of …bureaucrat…the eternally hungry 
‘Organizer’ with a swarm of like-minded Eastern hyenas, his whole multitudinous 
clique, recognizable by the two big ‘Ws’—women and wine…people who enjoy 
Eastern luxury in food, lodgings and transport all the more the more modest their 
original circumstances.567 
 
Thus, it is understandable that professional soldiers would take an instant dislike to 
these kinds of political hangers on. 
 However, if bureaucratic and personal disagreements were commonplace, they did 
not extend to Jewish policy in Slonim.  In a letter to Erren dated 4 December 1941, Glück 
writes “according to a Regimental order from 29 November 1941, the countryside is to be 
cleared of all Jews.  Jews in villages of less than 1,000 inhabitants are to be ghettoized in the 
nearest towns and forbidden to return to the countryside.”  Glück addressed Erren directly, “I 
am not personally in the position, due to a lack of transport to carry out this order.  I request 
from you written response regarding this issue.”568  Erren’s reply, that same day, is 
instructive.  After expressing similar logistical difficulties on his end, he wrote to Glück, 
“You have supported me up till now in my political and racial tasks in an extremely 
praiseworthy fashion.  I would not have been able to accomplish it with my weak police 
forces alone.  I must therefore ask…that you seek to work with your higher headquarters so 
that you can continue to support the German mission in the East by making your forces 
available.”569  While Glück and Erren both bemoaned their lack of resources and attempted 
to avoid overextending their own limited manpower in moving mid-sized Jewish populations 
into the Slonim ghetto, the civilian administration and military authorities were in agreement 
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on Jewish policy in principle and had been for a significant time.  The exchange between 
Erren and Glück shows that the frequent protestations of Glück (and others) regarding poor 
relations with the civil authorities did not extend to the “Jewish Question.”  Moreover, this 
letter is documentary evidence that the 727th Infantry Regiment was directly involved in 
rounding up Jews.  Finally, this order falls nicely in line with General Bechtolsheim’s order 
at the end of November, directing that his soldiers kill Jews in the countryside, freeing up the 
SS and police to kill Jews who had been collected in ghettos.570 
 In Novogrudok, military interactions with the civil authorities were a bit more 
complicated.  Relations between them were “cool” and Captain Artmann was “not amenable 
to the wishes of the Gebietskommissar” about which he remained “stubborn.”571  As in 
Slonim, there were initial frictions regarding the handover of “different tasks” in which 
Artmann “held back.”572  Unlike Glück, however, Artmann does not appear to have been 
overly energetic in leading his company against the Jews of Novogrudok.  His soldiers 
described him as “a good-natured fellow”, as “friendly toward the Jews,” “no Jew-hater, in 
fact, the opposite.”573  Moreover, the 7th Company cook recalled that as they left 
Novogrudok, Artmann rode with him in the field kitchen on the train to Bobruisk.  Artmann 
told the cook that the killings in Novogrudok “had nothing to do with the war” and that he 
could “hardly bear it.” It appeared that “the whole Jewish persecution cut very close to 
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him.”574 Certainly, we cannot take these comments completely at face-value, but the 6th 
Company case does indicate that former soldiers were often not hesitant to characterize their 
officers as racist or fanatical. 
 While the depth of Artmann’s regret can be debated, he does not appear to have been 
an eager or aggressive commander.  One of his men had the impression that he would “rather 
be at home.”575  Another depicted him as a man who would “rather be 100 meters behind 
than in front.”576  There is no evidence that he led any actions on his own initiative in the 
manner of Glück.  However, if Artmann was not pro-active in either killing Jews on his own 
or in collaborating with the civil authorities, his second in command, Lieutenant Martin, was.  
Martin was the 1st Platoon Leader, the “elite platoon” as one soldier called it.577  He was a 
“fanatic” who had once remarked “there was nothing better or gave greater pride than being 
in the party.”578  He was described as more “energetic” than Artmann and as an “arrogant” 
man who “did not have a particularly affectionate relationship with the company.”579  
Perhaps this is reflected in the willingness of former soldiers to testify against him. 
 Martin appears to have been more independent and active than Artmann who was 
“hardly around” when the men trained or conducted patrols.  One soldier noted that he had 
“never seen Artmann on an antipartisan operation and only saw him perhaps once a week.”580  
                                                
574 "L., Xaver Statement,  15 November 1963,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3453), 316. 
575 "B., Georg Statement,  3 November 1963,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3454), 519. 
576 "K., Alois Statement, (Undated),"  (BA-ZS: B162/3454), 536. 
577 "B., Georg Statement,  3 November 1963,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3454), 519. 
578 "K., Alois Statement, (Undated),"  (BA-ZS: B162/3454), 536-7. 
579 "N., Arthur Statement,  21 May 1965,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3454), 579. 
580 "M., Kaspar Statement, 5 November 1964,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3454), 527. 
188 
Martin was a man for whom “nothing could be done quick enough” while Artmann was 
“calmer and more easygoing.”581  Martin and Artmann also did not get along personally.  
Beyond their different styles of leadership, the two were allegedly “in conflict” over a 
woman who worked in the Gebietskommissariat.”582 
 As a go-getter, Martin appeared to have exercised an exceptional amount of control 
over the operations of the company.  One soldier from his platoon stated “at least 50% of the 
company was of the opinion that Artmann was the commander in name only and that Martin 
did the essential organizing and held the company together.”583  Captain Artmann himself 
admitted that because he was busy with other tasks as Ortskommandant, Martin “was more 
concerned with the company.”584  “Martin was not,” another platoon member testified, “the 
kind of man who preferred to do only what he had been ordered to do.”585  Artmann’s orderly 
had the impression that Martin and another platoon leader “overrode” the commander.586  
Further, the company First Sergeant noted that Martin “always wanted to take the helm of the 
company himself, even though he was only a platoon leader.”587  It appears that Martin often 
did take over company leadership, certainly when it came to supporting the civil authorities. 
 This streak of independence and ambition is of increased importance because 
Lieutenant Martin, unlike Captain Artmann, maintained a close personal relationship with the 
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civil authorities.  He was “often with the ‘Golden Pheasants,’” one man recalled.  He would 
attend parties, smoking and drinking, and often did not return to his quarters at night.588  He 
often hunted with members of the Gebietskommissariat as well.589  Several soldiers also 
confirm that he was dating a secretary from the civil administration.  One man joked that, 
while on sentry duty, they would often see him head after duty hours toward the 
administration buildings and the men would say, “there he goes again.”590  The effect of all 
this was, as a former soldier stated, that Martin “sat together with the masters of 
Novogrudok” and “acted more as a liaison and had…taken on many of the suggestions of the 
civil administrators.”591  While the relatively passive and apathetic Artmann himself may not 
have wanted to engage this way, he did not or could not prevent the more active and 
ambitious Martin from doing so. 
 It seems clear that Martin was both ideologically and practically aligned with the 
Gebietskommissariat and often acted in the furtherance of their goals.  Captain Artmann 
accused Martin, who did not survive the war, of having acted independently in cooperation 
with the civilian authorities, saying that he believed he could have issued orders behind his 
back for the participation of the company in “Jewish Actions.”592  He claimed further that he 
had no knowledge of his soldiers’ participation in the Absperrung and that he had not ordered 
such actions.593  There is both truth and obfuscation in Artmann’s statements.  It is highly 
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unlikely that Lieutenant Martin acted against orders or without his commander’s approval.  
This is both a common postwar defense tactic and, given the draconian discipline of the 
Army described by the same witnesses, an extraordinarily improbable event.  However, the 
preponderance of evidence indicates the following: Captain Artmann was an indecisive and 
lethargic commander who delegated the day-to-day running of the company to the much 
younger and much more energetic Lieutenant Martin.  Indeed, Artmann appears content to 
have remained in the background both physically and as a leader.  Martin was given the 
authority to employ the company as a tool of genocidal policy by Artmann; he did not usurp 
it.  Finally, given Martin’s close ties both ideologically and socially with the civil 
administration, he was more than willing to help his new friends fulfill their missions and 
used his de facto authority as commander to do so. 
 The German policy of extermination in the East was, as elsewhere, accompanied by 
the expropriation and collection of Jewish property.  The connection of anti-Jewish actions 
with financial gain was not causal but rather institutionalized from the beginning in the 
Reich.594 While the process in Germany and Western Europe followed a “more 
circumscribed and ‘rational’ path,” in the East the almost complete power exercised by local 
authorities made systematic looting (and corruption) an ever present facet of racial policy.595  
Frank Bajohr examines the element of corruption directly.  Given the morally and 
professionally questionable quality of many of the civilian administrators in the East, it is 
                                                
594 Götz Ally takes a much more extreme view of the financial element of the Holocaust, granting it perhaps 
excessive siginificance as a cause of anti-Jewish policy.  However, his work is important in its frank depiction 
of the myriad ways in which the murder of Jews and finances came together in the Third Reich.  See Götz Aly, 
Hitler's Beneficiaries : Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State (New York: Metropolitan, 2007). 
595 Martin Dean, "Seizure of Jewish Property and Inter-Agency Rivalry in the Reich and in the Occupied Soviet 
Territories.," in Networks of Nazi Persecution : Bureaucracy, Business, and the Organization of the Holocaust, 
ed. Gerald D. Feldman and Wolfgang Seibel (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 89. 
191 
perhaps not surprising that the occupied Soviet Union was the scene of widespread theft, 
embezzlement, and other forms of corruption.  Bajohr rightly concludes that these forms of 
“wild” plundering were a “mass phenomenon;” they were also widely tolerated as long as the 
theft was not from the party itself and remained within reason.596 
 Another area in which the Slonim case demonstrates increasing complicity by 
German soldiers is the disposition of Jewish property.  While often the image these men 
attempted to portray of their participation after the war was one of isolated incidents, their 
relationship with Jewish property reflects a deeper, continuing role in  Germany’s 
comprehensive genocidal project.  For some men, personal enrichment began immediately, in 
the Cziepelow forest.  Franz L. recalled that, on the truck ride back from the shooting site the 
morning after, he observed that several fellow soldiers had “acted as graverobbers.  They had 
taken 10-15 rings, watches, valuable pieces of clothing.”  He had then seen them send these 
things home to Germany, from the post office in Slonim.597  First Lieutenant Glück himself 
took advantage of this opportunity as well.  According to one private, Glück sent a train car 
full of Jewish possessions to his hometown of Rosenheim in Bavaria, along a detachment of 
soldiers to escort it.598  News of Glück's self-enrichment was widely known. A blacksmith 
from the 7th Company in Novogrudok noted that he had taken “confiscated Jewish property, 
particularly fur coats.”599 There appears to have been little reluctance to loot the bodies of the 
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dead, though some men certainly viewed such behavior with distaste.  This very intimate 
form of enrichment weakens claims of neutrality or passivity toward the killings themselves. 
 The expropriation of property went beyond this opportunistic looting.  Several large 
garages near the 6th Company barracks were used to warehouse clothing from the shootings.  
The visiting 7th Company blacksmith recalled “huge mountains of ‘good as new’ clothes” 
that were guarded by 6th Company soldiers.600  The Slonim synagogue was also used to store 
appropriated Jewish property.  One Jewish worker received a written order from Dietrich 
Hick to remove the bathtub and sink from the apartment of a Jewish dentist and install them 
in a German official’s house.601  It is probable that soldiers, too, availed themselves of this 
kind of opportunity.  Some of these goods were likely also destined for a special store set up 
in Slonim where these items were sold to the soldiers.  One private recalled that the company 
members would shop there for items to send home to their families.  “I wanted to buy a 
watch,” he testified, “but I didn’t because there wasn’t anything good left to buy.”602  
Another soldier knew a Jewish woman named Nina who worked in the shop sorting the 
clothing of murdered Jews.  He said that one day she told him, “buy something for your wife 
and child before those brown scoundrels sell it all.”603  The commoditization of murdered 
Jews’ property is a particularly disturbing turn and one that was only possible given a long 
term association with the murder of the Jews. 
 Testimonies from Krupki and Krucha do not mention this kind of personal 
enrichment  
                                                
600 "K., Joseph Statement, 13 May 1965,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3454), 549. 
601 "Rotstein, I. Statement, 26 September 1962,"  (BA-ZS: B162/5102), 295. 
602 "N., Anton Statement, 7 February 1961,"  (BA-ZS: B162/1550), 144. 
603 "N, Wilhelm Statement, 4 December 1961,"  (BA-ZS: B162/5088), 2159. 
193 
from killing.  The men of these units had no more prior experience with the intentional 
expropriation of Jewish property than they did with these mass killings themselves.  The 
tempo and newness of these operations likely meant that the opportunity for personal 
enrichment was perhaps not as apparent.  In Slonim and Novogrudok, soldiers had plenty of 
time to realize that the murder of Jews offered the chance for personal gain.  They also 
recognized how they could do this.   
 Indeed, in Slonim, Gerhard Erren set the example,  demanding a payment of 
2,000,000 rubles from the Jewish council or Judenrat.  This and other extortions were 
publicized on posters throughout Slonim.  After delivery of this sum at the end of September 
or beginning of October, Erren had the entire Jewish council murdered.  A new council was 
assembled and again forced to deliver a high ransom for three members of the Jewish 
community.  After the payment of this sum, this second Jewish council was again murdered 
just one week before the mass executions.604  In this environment, many soldiers asked why 
they too could not profit?  The looting of the property of murdered Jews also suggests a 
growing desensitization to the brutality of Jewish policy.  In short, this intimate connection to 
property is both an indicator and a result of prolonged daily exposure to Nazi policy, one not 
seen to this extent in earlier cases. 
 An area that has been both somewhat neglected and at the same time difficult for 
historians to access is the relationships between soldiers and Jews at the local level.  Indeed, 
there is very little, if any, scholarship that directly addresses the issue of friendships, for 
example.  Work done so far has focused on sexual relationships and sexual violence at the 
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hands of German occupiers.605  Even less research has examined these issues in the Soviet 
Union.  Therefore, a search for some evidence of the nuanced relationships of soldiers with 
Jews requires reading at the edges of rescuer historiography, the aforementioned sexual 
violence scholarship, and postwar soldier and survivor testimony. 
 From this focus, we see that one of the defining characteristics of this period of 
routinization was the frequency with which these German soldiers came into contact with 
Jews as part of their daily duties.  Jewish women cooked and cleaned for them.  6th Company 
men supervised Jewish laborers on a daily basis.  For example, predominantly Jewish women 
were employed in the ammunition dump, working on the captured weapons there.606  Some 
remembered them by name twenty years later.  6th Company men retrieved Jews from the 
ghetto and returned them after work.  They were aware of the restrictions and privations of 
the Jewish inhabitants of Slonim, for their workers talked about them.  German soldiers were 
also treated by Jewish doctors in the local hospital until Erren had them all shot.607  One 
soldier recalled that he often brought bread and potatoes to a Jewish family in return for 
laundry service; they disappeared during the November killing.608  In Novogrudok, the 7th 
Company also “employed” Jews as laborers, craftsman, and assistants in its kitchen.  This 
familiarity inevitably brought German soldiers into closer contact with the victims of Nazi 
                                                
605 See for example Birgit Beck, Wehrmacht und sexuelle Gewalt : Sexualverbrechen vor deutschen 
Militärgerichten 1939-1945 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004), David Raub Snyder, Sex Crimes under the 
Wehrmacht, Studies in War, Society and the Military; (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), Jeffrey 
Burds, "Sexual Violence in Europe in World War Ii, 1939--1945," Politics Society 37, no. 1 (2009), Regina 
Mühlhäuser, "Rasse, Blut und Männlichkeit: Politiken sexueller Regulierung in den besetzten Gebieten der 
Sowjetunion (1941–1945)," Feministische Studien 25, no. 1 (2007), Wendy Jo Gertjejanssen, "Victims, Heroes, 
Survivors: Sexual Violence on the Eastern Front during World War II" (Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 
2004). 
606 "T., Heinrich Statement, 2 October 1959,"  (BA-ZS: B162/25532), 8. 
607 "S., Otto Statement, 2 February 1960,"  (BA-ZS: B162/5088), 114. 
608 "E., Kurt Statement, 15 May 1962,"  (BA-ZS: B162/5088), 2756. 
195 
policy. 
 Some of these relationships apparently went beyond work.  During his testimony, one 
soldier stated, “in the course of the morning [November 14], I went into the town  to see 
about my Jewish girlfriend, Ida, because I was afraid she had been caught up in the Aktion.  
This was, however, not the case.”609  Unfortunately, the police did not follow up on this 
statement and so the details of this relationship remain unclear.  For two other men in 6th 
Company, it is clearer that they were engaging in some form of intimate relationship with 
Jewish women.  From the outset, it must first be stated from the outset that the German word 
“Freundin” that is used in all these testimonies is ambiguous.  It can mean “female friend” or 
“girlfriend” in a romantic sense.  Second, even if meant in the latter sense, when used by 
German soldiers, the meaning is still quite unclear.  Without a great deal of additional 
evidence, it would be difficult to term these relationships in any way normal.610  The power 
dynamics alone suggest that any relationship between a Jewish woman and an occupying 
soldier was at least partially exploitative.  At best, these relationships involved instrumental 
sex in which the woman expected and received some kind of compensation for her 
participation. 
 Relationships between Jews and Germans appear rarely in archival evidence for two 
reasons.  First, both soldiers and survivors were loathe to discuss these things.  Second, in the 
case of postwar statements, such events were not of judicial interest to investigators and were 
rarely pursued.  That such relationships can be documented from both the victim and 
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perpetrator perspectives gives us a rare opportunity to analyze them. 
 These relationships existed in at least two verifiable instances in this study.  The most 
bizarre includes First Lieutenant Glück himself.  Though described by his soldiers as a “Jew-
hater,” alleged to have shot two Jews in a drunken rage, and the man who personally led 
several killing actions, two of his soldiers explicitly testified that Glück also had a Jewish 
“girlfriend.”  One soldier stated “Glück had a Jew as his lover, who lived with him in the 
kaserne.  As the company was transferred by rail from Slonim, she was also at the train 
station.  I can still see before my eyes,” he continued, “as Glück went back and forth with the 
Jewish woman at the station.  He took her by the shoulders and kissed her goodbye, right in 
front of our eyes.”611  Another former soldier, Stocker, testified that, while Glück was an “old 
fighter [alter Kämpfer] and a Nazi Blood Order Wearer,” because of his Jewish “girlfriend” 
he was “tolerant” toward the Jews.612   How did a man like Glück come to have a sexual 
relationship with one Jew while he was actively exterminating others in large numbers? 
 The nature of this relationship is very difficult to understand.  Given Glück’s willing 
and even zealous participation in the murder of Jews, his party background, and general 
reputation, it is hard to see this as much more than a sexual relationship from which the 
Jewish woman perhaps benefitted materially.  Yet the description of his behavior at the train 
station and the general awareness by the men of this liaison complicate matters.  It would 
appear that the most likely explanation is that, for Glück, this was simply a mutually 
beneficial relationship and did not, Stocker’s testimony notwithstanding, in any way affect 
how he carried out genocidal policy. Perhaps his “girlfriend” was also receiving preferential 
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treatment or improved rations.  In any case, it appears that Glück was able to separate his 
professional hatreds and tasks from his personal needs. 
 Thirty-five year old Sergeant Major Erich Aichinger, too, had a Jewish “girlfriend” in 
Slonim.  In his own testimony to police, he does not mention this relationship (likely because 
he was not asked about it).  However, a detailed account of the relationship comes from a 
Jewish survivor, Abraham Orlinksi.613  Such testimony from a Jewish survivor, identifying a 
German soldier by name and describing his relationship, is exceedingly rare.  Aichinger lived 
in a room that had been requisitioned for him by the Ortskommandant in Orlinski’s 
apartment on Majakowskiego Street.614  He had at least two Jewish “girlfriends.”  His first 
lived with him in the apartment with the Orlinskis.  A friend of hers, Regina, was often also 
in the apartment where she worked as a housekeeper.  After Aichinger’s first girlfriend fell ill 
in October 1941, she moved out and Aichinger began living with Regina.   
 Unlike Glück, Aichinger seemed to have deeper emotional feelings for his 
”girlfriend.”  On the evening of 14 November, he came to Mr. Orlinski, distraught and drunk, 
from the Czepielow forest shooting.  He described the murder of Orlinski’s neighbors, the 
Gadzinkis and Epsteins, and the murder of his first girlfriend.  He said that he had wanted to 
save his “girlfriend” but she said he had to save her mother too.  Aichinger told Orlinski he 
could not save her mother and so the girl went to the pits.615  When asked why the Germans 
had done this, Aichinger replied that he “believed there would not be enough food to feed all 
the inhabitants of Slonim and that it had been decided to liquidate 10,000.”  He added a 
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second reason, “the Führer had declared that no Jews in Europe should remain alive and that 
only those behind the Urals had a chance of survival.”616 As Aichinger did not discuss his 
relationship during his testimony, it remains unclear why he could not save his “girlfriend’s” 
mother.  However, given his relationship with the Ortskommandant and civil authorities, it 
would have been well within his power to do so. 
 Aichinger’s relationship and his behavior illustrate some of the complexities and 
contradictions that appeared as German soldiers participated in the execution of Nazi racial 
policy on a daily basis.  One of these seems to be conflicting personal and professional 
obligations, in this case complicity and rescue.  Aichinger’s other girlfriend, Regina, recalled 
that a meeting had taken place the evening before in his apartment.  Aichinger left the 
apartment at 4 am on the morning of the massacre.  Orlinski had been warned of the 
impending killing several weeks earlier by Regina, who often served drinks at Aichinger’s 
get-togethers with staff of the Gebietskommissariat.  While he apparently did not care to 
conceal information regarding the upcoming Aktion and tried to save his girlfriend, 
Aichinger did not make any effort to warn his flat-mates, nor was he willing to make any 
additional effort to save his girlfriend’s mother which was very likely in his power. 
 For some soldiers, “rescue” behavior did not even approach the level of the kind of 
individual rescues in which Aichinger might have been willing to engage.   One 6th Company 
soldier recalled standing guard on a bridge to prevent Jews from escaping.  A Jewish woman 
approached him and a comrade, requesting that they let her pass.  “Actually, we let that 
woman pass,” he stated, “because we knew that the next sentry post would arrest her.”617  For 
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these men, their actions had far more to do with evading responsibility for the almost certain 
death of this woman than they did with any desire to evade orders or to help her escape.  This 
behavior (or the description of it after the fact) is more an indication of self-deception, 
rationalization, and moral compartmentalization than of a desire to help. 
 In Slonim, there were examples of genuine aid given to Jews and of aiding Jews in 
escaping.  Survivor Szymon Goldberg testified that on the way to the killing site “many were 
able to flee from the column.  The soldiers and policemen acted as though they hadn’t seen or 
they shot without aiming.  Of those fleeing, no one was shot or wounded.”618  In his history, 
The Destruction of Slonim Jewry, Slonim resident Nachum Alpert relates several similar 
examples of Germans (including soldiers) allowing Jews to escape and actively rescue them: 
Twenty Jewish barbers, who had been cutting the hair of German soldiers in 
their barracks, were rounded up and taken to the ditch. The soldiers ran after 
them, released them and started back toward town.  A spark of hope arose in 
the hearts of the barbers, but on the way, Hick and his squad appeared and 
ordered them taken back to their executioners.619 
 
A German guard, on duty at a post near the corner of Ruzany and Jurdzitka 
Street, used the roundup as a "cover" to chase a score of Jews into the cellar 
of a yeshiva in the Shulgass.  When the roundup was over, he let them out 
one by one. 
 
In one Jewish home a German found a Jew hiding under a bed, but did not 
report this to the local police.  When they found the Jew under the bed, the 
German blamed his "nearsightedness" and under his breath swore at the 
"verfluchte Schwein." 
 
Several German soldiers, "escorting" Jews into the forest in a truck, not only 
let the Jews "escape" but showed them where to hide until the massacre was 
over.620 
 
Another survivor, Leon Small, noted that the “medics who were temporarily stationed in 
                                                
618 "Goldberg, S. Statement, 16 August 1961,"  (BA-ZS: B162/5088), 2436. 
619 Nachum Alpert, The Destruction of Slonim Jewry: The Story of the Jews of Slonim During the Holocaust 
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620 Ibid., 92. 
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Slonim showed themselves to be very helpful and behaved favorably [toward us.]”621 It 
seems that more than a few soldiers took it upon themselves to help Jews when possible.  
That these examples do not appear in postwar testimonies is likely because the men involved 
either had not survived the war, did not mention these actions to the police in order not to 
become involved as witnesses against their former comrades, or simply because the police 
did not deem these statements to be relevant to the investigation. 
 Similar incidents also occurred in Novogrudok.  A 7th Company soldier stood with a 
comrade on a railroad bridge, as part of the Absperrung.  An elderly Jewish man approached 
and asked if he could pass to get his wife and child.  He was allowed through and returned 
shortly with his family.622  Another private was on Absperrung duty around Novogrudok 
when several Jews approached.  He recalled, “we let them by unmolested….I remembered 
the words of our captain that we shouldn’t take it so seriously.”623 It seems, that for this 
soldier, Artmann’s desire to remain uninvolved provided a positive example. 
 The routinization in Slonim was also a contributing factor for those who sought 
within the limits of their abilities to aid Jews.  One area in which there seems to have been a 
larger amount of helping behavior, either self-interested or altruistic, was in the distribution 
of work permits.  Approximately three weeks before the November killing, 
Gebietskommissar Erren decided to identify necessary workers among the local population.  
A list of names was drawn up. The Gebietskommissar was seeking to eliminate what he 
termed “unnecessary eaters.”  According to one survivor, Erren himself crossed names off 
                                                
621 "Small, L. Statement, 9 February 1962,"  (BA-ZS: B162/5088), 2481. 
622 "S., Peter Statement, 5 October 1963,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3453), 294. 
623 "W., Anton Statement, 21 August 1963,"  (BA-ZS: B162/3454), 394. 
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this list, effectively condemning those people to death.624  The selected workers were issued 
special work permits printed on yellow cardboard.  The cards also listed the names of the 
worker’s family.  “Family,” however, was limited only to the wife and two children. For 
eighteen-year-old Rachel Klenicki, this meant that one of her brothers did not receive one 
and the family had to scrounge for a third card.625  Survivors such as Zvi Szepetynski said 
that, for the Jewish inhabitants of Slonim, the yellow cards were literally “tickets to life.”626 
The distribution of these cards presented a relatively easy and unobtrusive way for soldiers to 
help Jews. It was also an opportunity for the less scrupulous men to sell these cards to Jews 
for personal profit. 
 For Jewish laborers, the yellow cards (and their meaning) were no secret.  Regina, 
Sergeant Aichinger’s Jewish “girlfriend,” had learned from him of the impending Aktion and 
tried to warn her flatmate, Mr. Orlinski.  According to him, she told him that he should try to 
obtain a work permit because there was a “plan to liquidate 10,000 non-working Jews and 
children.”627  Some soldiers used these permits as a way to help Jews they knew.  Company 
Cook Alexander L. recalled that a Jew named Jakob who had built their baking oven came to 
him asking for a work permit.  Alexander then went to the company First Sergeant and 
requested a card for him.  The First Sergeant replied that many men had already come to get 
additional permits and this would cause him difficulties but he would see.  According to the 
cook, Jakob did receive permits for him and his family, which he told L. with “tears of 
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joy.”628  The procurement of these documents seems to have been the most common method 
of aiding Jews employed by soldiers.   
 Sergeant Walter K. worked in the Ortskommandantur and was assigned two Jews, 
one for manual labor and another for clerical work.  In November, one of these men came to 
him asking for a work permit that would show he worked for the Wehrmacht.  At Sergeant 
K.’s request, a permit was issued, not by the Gebietskommissariat but instead by the 
Ortskommandant, that is, by the German Army itself.629 This is an interesting statement for 
two reasons.   First, it shows how deeply 6th Company (particularly those manning the 
Ortskommandantur) was occupied with the day-to-day administration of Jewish policy.  But 
second, it demonstrates how easy it was to aid Jews through the issuing of these yellow 
cards.  For those who wished, this was the least challenging and least confrontational way to 
obstruct total implementation of the Final Solution, because German economic interests on 
behalf of the war effort rather than opposition to Nazi racial policy could be invoked as the 
justification.  The statement by the 6th Company First Sergeant that many men had already 
come to get permits for their laborers perhaps indicates that others took this route.  Yet, as in 
all instances of Wehrmacht aid to Jews, soldiers who aided or rescued Jews constituted a tiny 
minority of those involved.  These actions seem limited as well to Jews the men knew 
personally.  Finally, while they saved their bearers from the November execution, they did 
not rescue them from danger entirely. 
 It is important to address here the veracity of the sources themselves.  None of the 
men questioned were on trial or charged with a crime.  Moreover, they were testifying 
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203 
against Gerhard Erren and only rarely against a fellow Wehrmacht veteran.  These men had 
little reason to fabricate stories of supplying work permits to Jews.  The fact that these men 
supplied “their” Jews with life-saving work permits does not on its face prove a moral 
justification and could indicate nothing more than a desire to retain a skilled worker.  
Sometimes this was the case.  However, in these instances, the evidence does not support 
such a conclusion in Slonim.  The fact, for example, that Alexander L. remembered Jakob’s 
name probably indicates at least some personal concern.  Much soldier testimony indicates 
that they knew the Jews who worked for them, to such an extent that the Jews felt 
comfortable to share their concerns with them. The bureaucratic nature of the permits, the 
ease with which they could be obtained, and the relatively low level at which they were 
issued likely made this a very attractive option for those helping to ameliorate the condition 
of Jewish workers they had become familiar with.  On the other hand, those who cynically 
exploited Jewish desperation by selling work permits for self-enrichment—a practice often 
noted by Jewish survivors— were not likely to testify to such behavior after the war. 
 
An Oasis in Lida: A German Soldier’s Rescue of Jews in the Pupko Brewery 
 One of the clearest examples of altruistic rescue comes from a soldier in 10th 
Company, 727th Infantry Regiment.  Thirty-one year old Joachim Lochbihler had been a 
brewery engineer in Nürnberg before he was called up.  Because of his experience, he was 
assigned in August 1941 to manage and run the two local breweries in Lida, a town fifty-five 
miles north of Slonim.  One of the breweries was almost totally destroyed and Lochbihler 
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concentrated his efforts on the other.630  This brewery had been owned by two Jewish 
brothers, Marc and Simon Pupko, and had produced award-winning beer since its founding 
in 1876.631 The Pupko brothers stayed on to work in the brewery along with other Jewish 
workers.  One survivor remembered that Lochbihler had allowed her husband to choose 
whomever he wanted from the ghetto to work and live there.632 Lochbihler had arranged with 
Leopold Windisch, the official in charge of Jewish affairs in Lida, that these families could 
stay in the brewery outside of the ghetto.  As he recalled, “at the request of the Jews and also 
for technical reasons, I called on Stabsleiter Windisch and requested that the Jews be allowed 
to live in the brewery.  I advised him that the Jews were necessary also at night and that the 
operation of the brewery depended on it.  He allowed this.”  There was, however, a 
stipulation.  Windisch told Lochbihler, “You are responsible to me in this to see that no one 
escapes.”633  Lochbihler was taking some personal and professional risk in assuming 
responsibility for the behavior of all the Jews in the brewery. 
 Often, Germans protecting Jews did so for their own self-interest, to ensure that 
operations that they oversaw (and thus, themselves) were successful.  In this case, however, it 
is clear that Lochbihler protected the Jews of the Lida brewery due to his opposition to Nazi 
genocidal policy or at least a genuine concern for the welfare of the Jews he could help.  
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Lochbihler was described as a “very liberal, very decent man.”634  His humane and generous 
behavior toward the Jews in his care, which he does not mention, was noted by several 
survivors in their testimony.  Simon Pupko himself called the brewery “an oasis.”  They were 
allowed to celebrate the Seder and to live as normally as possible.635  Other Jewish workers 
such as the carpenters lived in the ghetto and came to work in the brewery during the day.636 
 In May 1942, Lochbihler learned from a German railway worker that Lida’s ghetto 
and its 6,000 inhabitants were to be liquidated.  He informed his comrade, Lorenz Fischer, 
who also ran the brewery with him, that “they were going to snatch up our Jews and we had 
to prevent this.”637  At the same time, the Jews working in the brewery came to Lochbihler 
asking for help.  He stated that “the Jews were understandably frightened and implored me to 
protect them from the execution….There were terrible scenes.  I still remember how a Jewish 
person fell on his knees and beseeched me to protect them.”638  Lochbihler promised that he 
would protect them and that he would devote his “whole person” to it.  He further told them 
that he would “simulate a Wehrmacht operation” and that no one would enter the brewery.  
Michael Stoll, who was fourteen and worked in the brewery as an electrician’s assistant, 
remembered Lochbihler telling him, “Michael, go into the house and wake everybody up and 
tell them to hide.  Tonight we are killing off the ghetto.  But don’t worry, they are not going 
to touch you.” Lochbihler added, “I am standing guard.  They can’t come into the 
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brewery.”639 Beginning that night, at Lochbihler’s insistence, the two German soldiers put on 
their helmets, shouldered their rifles and stood guard outside the door.640  Lochbihler heard 
shots later around dawn and bullets landed in his vicinity, leading him to believe that 
shooting had already begun during the round-up.  No one entered the brewery and the Jews 
there avoided the execution.   
 Shura Pupko, a Jewish woman living in the brewery, remembered that this was not 
the first time he had done such a thing.  In March 1942, she testified, there was a “rehearsal” 
of a round-up.  “For us,” she continued, “Lochbihler stood outside the business and said these 
are my Jews and you aren’t going to enter, they work for me and I don’t need this rehearsal. 
This was his first step to save us.”641 
 He could not, however, save the Jews who lived in the ghetto.  They did not arrive for 
work and were likely killed.642  According to Shura Pupko, Lochbihler returned from the 
front near Minsk in 1943 to pick up beer and again warned the Jews in the brewery of an 
impending action.  She remembered him saying, “He said there are many people in the 
woods, go, because they are going to kill you. It was a good warning.”643 This is more 
evidence of his altruistic motives and genuine concern.  After the war, Mr. and Mrs. Pupko 
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testified on Lochbihler’s behalf, and he was freed from an American POW camp where he 
was being held as a suspected war criminal.644 
Conclusions: Proximity, Duration, and Increased Complicity 
 What does this episode tell us about rescue in Slonim?  The Lida brewery case is the 
clearest example of German soldiers attempting to aid Jews.   The concurrence between 
survivor and soldier testimony shows that this was truly a case of a soldier wishing to help 
Jews. Lochbihler in his conversations with Erren couched his arguments in terms of military 
necessity, but his subsequent treatment of the Pupko family and others, allowing them to 
practice their religion and live as comfortably as possible, indicates a concern for his people 
beyond simply economics.  Lochbihler clearly took the initiative in saving Jews he had come 
to know within the limited opportunity and space that enabled him to do so.  His exact 
reasons, however, remain a mystery. 
 As positive as this episode may be, it is, like most examples of Wehrmacht rescue, 
both rare and limited.  Lochbihler saved those Jews whom he knew personally.  He was 
unable or unwilling to save even those Jews he knew who lived in the ghetto.  Moreover, 
Lochbihler and the soldiers with him were in a relatively unique position,  independent and 
isolated from their superiors.  This allowed them to manage their laborers as they chose.  In 
addition, being in charge of an important Wehrmacht economic operation allowed Lochbihler 
to negotiate the terms of its operation, including those regarding his workers.  This kind of 
situation unfortunately was not easily translatable to the more commonly experienced 
encounters with Jews by German soldiers. 
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 The helping and rescue behavior of German soldiers in Slonim (and elsewhere) must 
be defined by its rarity.  Most soldiers for a variety of reasons did not make efforts to help 
Jews.  Indeed, most non-conformist behavior of these men is best termed evasion or non-
compliance.  They were most likely to refuse to participate when in closest proximity to the 
actual carrying out of violence.  In contrast, soldiers were most likely to aid Jews when at a 
distance from violence.  In terms of the process of increasing complicity, the routinization 
seen in both Slonim and Novogrudok also demonstrates perhaps a greater potential for rescue 
as well.  As the tempo of killing operations slowed, those soldiers so inclined were able to 
work within a daily routine and a predictable system to help Jews.  Unfortunately, few 
soldiers attempted or were interested in such aid. 
 In conclusion, the Wehrmacht collusion in the Holocaust in Slonim and Novogrudok 
demonstrates a progression from improvised cooperation to routinized participation in Nazi 
genocidal policy.  Most importantly, a triangular relationship between the SS, the 
Wehrmacht, and the civil administration developed that led to greater complicity for several 
reasons.  First, Army units stationed in these towns were viewed by civilian authorities 
specifically with their participation in mass murders in mind. Second, apart from the closer 
structural and operational  relationships, these cases illustrate also the importance of 
cooperation between Wehrmacht officers and civil authorities on the personal level.  In each 
town, administrators found willing supporters in key Army leaders who facilitated the greater 
involvement of the military in all aspects of the Nazi racial project.  Additionally, the 
prolonged proximity to aspects of anti-Jewish policy not encountered in earlier killings like 
Krupki and Krucha led, in turn, to greater involvement of the soldiers.  Put another way, the 
tempo and newness of participation in mass killings as in Krupki and Krucha likely made 
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opportunities for both self-enrichment and rescue less apparent or more difficult for soldiers 
there. Involvement in ghettoization, forced labor, and appropriation of Jewish property that 
appears in the Slonim and Novogrudok cases and not in the prior cases support this 
argument. On another level, the permanence of units being stationed in towns also led to 
more complex relationships between Jews and soldiers.  While these relationships often 
produce more questions than answers, they do indicate that prolonged contact with Jews 
could result in connections that complicate our understanding of German soldiers’ 
mentalities.  This prolonged contact could also, as we have seen, lead to opportunities for 
rescue and assistance that were perhaps not as available or apparent earlier in the process. 
 Unfortunately, the trend toward greater complicity led Army units, on the whole, to 
become more not less involved in genocide.  Close cooperation between the army units, the 
SS, and civilian authorities in anti-Jewish actions did not breed resistance to the racial 
project.  Instead, most soldiers and units appear to have internalized the necessity of their 
role in assisting in the murder of Jews in the Soviet Union.  This internalization reveals itself 
in more frequent smaller and decentralized killings.  As the large-scale massacres were 
paused until the spring, soldiers in the Generalbezirk Weißruthenien repeatedly conducted 
“Jew Hunts” aimed specifically at rounding up Jews living in smaller villages who had 
escaped previous round-ups and executions and continued to kill Jews in smaller-scale 
executions.  The conduct of the 12th Company, 727th Infantry Regiment in Szcuczyn is 
representative of this final step in the evolution of Wehrmacht complicity. 
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VI.  Internalization- Hunting Jews in Szczuczyn 
 
Sometime in the fall of 1941, twenty-four year old Lieutenant Oskar Ritterbusch led a 
patrol out of the town of Szczuczyn, forty-five miles northwest of Slonim and forty-five 
miles east of Novogrudok.  He was the 1st Platoon Leader of the 12th Company, 727th 
Infantry Regiment.  The patrol rode in two Army trucks through the snow-covered 
countryside, rounding up Jews.  Ritterbusch stopped the patrol in a small village and his men 
got out.  As they searched the village, they discovered a Jewish shoemaker and his family, 
which included his adult handicapped son, a hunchback.  One soldier noticed that the family 
was also keeping bees and had honey.  Before taking two pails of honey, they made the son 
taste it, to ensure that it was not poisoned.  Another soldier ripped the pails out of the man’s 
hands.  When the Jew tried to grapple with the German, Lieutenant Ritterbusch ordered him 
thrown into the back of the truck with the other Jews who had been rounded up.645 When one 
of his men informed Ritterbusch that this man was a resident of the town and had just given 
them honey, he replied, “I don’t give a damn! He is a hindrance to his parents.”646  Paul B. 
recalled the lieutenant saying, “Away with him. It’s no big deal.”647 B. also testified that he 
prevented another soldier from shooting the hunchback’s mother.  The shoemaker was a 
skilled artisan and he and his family were likely to be spared temporarily.  As the 
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handicapped son certainly was no partisan threat, Ritterbusch’s decision to kill him appears 
especially gratuitous and unwarranted by even the most brutal interpretation of policy. 
In any case, the handicapped Jewish man was thrown into the back of the truck and 
the patrol continued.  After a short distance, Lieutenant Ritterbusch stopped the truck, 
dismounted, and his soldiers forced the Jews to climb out.  They were told to run toward the 
forest and were to be shot from behind.  Before Ritterbusch himself gave the order, the 
hunchbacked man clung to Ernst N.’s arm and began to cry for he had understood the 
officer’s instructions in German.  N. told him that he couldn’t do anything to help him: 
“orders were orders.”  However, he testified that he told the man to fall when the shooting 
started and not to move, and that he and an Austrian soldier had agreed to shoot over his 
head.648  This is highly improbable.  After all the Jews were shot, the men of Ritterbusch’s 
patrol returned to their base in Szczuczyn. 
The actions of the 12th Company in this town represent an end stage in the evolution 
of deepening Wehrmacht complicity in the Holocaust, one in which the tactical and 
ideological have rather seamlessly merged.  Unlike previous instances, there is was no major 
largescale massacre (at least not one that was uncovered in the course of the investigation).  
Instead, the face of complicity in Szczuczyn was characterized by repeated small-scale 
killings committed during normal operations over a long period of time with little or no 
contact with civil authorities. Such contact or pressure does not seem to have been necessary, 
for this unit had already internalized the need to kill Jews and was doing it on a daily basis.  
The “Jew Hunts” conducted by the 12th Company epitomized the ultimate fulfillment of the 
Jew-Bolshevik-Partisan calculus and the sadistic “Jew Games” its soldiers played on 
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Saturdays were the end result of prolonged exposure to genocidal killing as to the 
internalization of the necessity to kill Jews. 
 
Szczuczyn and the Leaders of 12th Company 
 The town of Szczuczyn (pronounced SHOO-CHIN) lies in western Belarus, seventy 
miles east of Bialystok near the 1941 Soviet border.649  The town itself began as the estate of 
a local noble family, the Scipions.650 Jews had first begun settling in the region in large 
numbers at the end of the 16th century.  In the 19th century, like Novogrudok, Szczuczyn was 
a center of the Mussar movement which stressed the incorporation of an ethical dimension in 
traditional Orthodox Judaism.  Around 2,500 Jews lived in the town or in the surrounding 
villages.651   
 The 12th Company, 727th Infantry Regiment arrived in Szczuczyn in mid August 
1941, leaving a detachment behind in Ostryna, eleven miles to the northeast.  The 3rd 
Battalion and the 10th Company were headquartered in nearby Lida.  The 11th Company was 
stationed in Grodno, thirty-five miles to the west.  Upon arrival in Szczuczyn, Lieutenant 
Josef Kiefer quartered his company in what all the soldiers remembered as a “palace.”  In all 
likelihood, this was the former estate of Count Drutsky-Lobatzky on the northern edge of 
town. 
 In Szczuczyn, the quality of leadership was decisive as the company officers appear 
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to have been the only decision makers.  They were relatively isolated (as Sibille was) and 
thus could essentially do what they pleased.  Though the leaders in the 12th Company 
disagreed on methods, unfortunately, they all agreed on end state, that is, the murder of the 
Jews.  The company commander, Josef Kiefer, was a thirty-two year old active duty officer 
from Munich.  With no high school diploma, he began a sales apprenticeship but was unable 
to complete it because his employer went out of business.  After working briefly in his 
father’s bakery, the nineteen-year-old Kiefer entered the Bavarian State Police in October 
1928.652 After seven years as a policeman in Munich, he was absorbed into the army in July 
1935.653 Kiefer served as an infantry non-commissioned officer during the occupation of 
Austria and the Sudetenland and then fought as a heavy machine gun section leader in Poland 
before being commissioned from the ranks as a lieutenant in 1940.654 
 In his evaluations, Kiefer was described as a man who had proven himself in battle.  
He was “slender and wiry” with “flawless etiquette.”  His superiors noted his “exemplary 
service as a platoon leader” and declared him fully qualified to be an officer.655  In his 
company commander training course, however, he was rated as only qualified to take 
command after further training.656  He perhaps was a man promoted past his capabilities, but 
seems to have been reasonably competent and motivated. 
 As a military commander, Kiefer appears to have been strict, but fair to his soldiers.  
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He was a “hard and disciplined soldier” but one loved valued  by his men for “knowing his 
job.”657  Kiefer was also “reserved and unapproachable.”658  In short, he appears to have been 
tactically competent and not disliked by his men.  It is perhaps telling that these men also 
characterized him as a political extremist.  While some men claimed that their commander 
held no particularly racist beliefs, the bulk of the evidence suggests otherwise, beginning 
with two important decorations that he held. 
 Kiefer’s personnel file indicates that he was awarded the Ehrenzeichen der NSDAP 
von 1923 [Nazi Party Badge of Honor from 1923].  This was better known as the “Blood 
Order,” for party members who had participated in the Munich Beer Hall Putsch on 9 
November 1923 and was later extended to allow for those imprisoned or wounded in the 
service of the party.  Less than 6,000 were ever awarded.659  Kiefer explained in his police 
interviews that as a fourteen-year-old boy he had merely served as a messenger during the 
Beer Hall Putsch and had later applied for the award during his police training.  His three 
older brothers were all SA-men as well.660  Regardless of Kiefer’s attempts to minimize its 
importance, this medal was not one awarded frivolously.  At least one man also remembered 
that he wore the Goldene Parteiabzeichen [Golden Party Badge] that was awarded to the first 
100,000 party members.661  That Kiefer chose to wear this optional party insignia on his 
Wehrmacht uniform indicates that he was proud of this distinction.   
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 Kiefer’s elite party status is powerfully suggestive of his ideological position.  His 
attitude toward Jews was described by his soldiers.  Though one man stated he was “not 
hostile to Jews and opposed atrocities,” the majority of the men characterized him somewhat 
differently.662 One soldier declared Kiefer a “convinced National Socialist [who] shared the 
National Socialist perspective on the Jewish Question.”663  Another observed that there were 
“already disputes between Kiefer and the Jews when they did not obey his ordinances.”664  A 
non-commissioned officer shed light on what kinds of regulations were meant here.  He 
remembered Kiefer yelled at him for allowing some Jews to walk on the sidewalk rather than 
in the street as required.  He further recalled that Kiefer took note of two Jewish women who 
cooked for the company and required that they be dismissed.665  Yet, Kiefer was “no brutal 
guy” and a man who believed that the “military should not dirty its hands in such things 
[meaning actions against Jews].”666  Instead, he appears to have been a believer and an 
antisemite but with a professional approach that did not countenance “unnecessary” violence. 
 The two other officers in the company were Lieutenants Ernst Schaffitz and Oskar 
Ritterbusch.  Schaffitz led the 2nd platoon, was a former SA man, and an “outspoken Jew-
hater.”667  He was described as “callous” and “harsh.”668 Several men recalled his high-
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pitched voice.  He confessed  to Polish authorities that he was a “fanatic Nazi.”669  Schaffitz 
is consistently described  by former soldiers as a brutal man who was deeply implicated in 
the murders of Jews.  The characterization that he was “generally disliked” is probably 
representative.670  One soldier went so far as to claim that several of his soldiers committed 
suicide as a result of his harassment.671  However, we must not overlook the postwar 
interrogation context and the tendency of witnesses to often vilify those who were dead or 
otherwise immune from prosecution.672  One man remembered that Schaffitz “had it in for 
the Jews.” When approached by a Jewish panhandler, he responded, “You damned dirty 
Jews, go home! You have no business here.”673  The strongest condemnation of Schaffitz was 
that he “particularly wanted to break the spirit of the Jews.”674  Schaffitz is portrayed as 
particularly vulgar and cruel in his antisemitism. 
 Oskar Ritterbusch appears to have been a more enigmatic character, somewhere 
between Kiefer and Schaffitz.  He was twenty-four and had taken four semesters of exercise 
and biology at university toward his goal of becoming an athletic trainer.675 Drafted in 1938, 
he served in the Polish campaign as a private and was promoted to lieutenant in September 
1940.  Ritterbusch served in a training unit before being transferred to the 727th Infantry 
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Regiment shortly before the invasion of Russia.676  The lanky, dark-haired officer was 
viewed as correct and strict.  Others described him as “spirited,” “self-confident,” and a 
“Hitler Youth leader type.”677  Ritterbusch’s disposition toward Jews appears a little more 
ambiguous.  Former soldiers remembered that he “did not speak well of the Jews” and was 
also “harshly positioned against the Jews.”678 Yet, another noted that “as a rule, Ritterbusch 
did not go after Jews….[he] only arrested them when ordered.”679  As we have seen at the 
beginning of this chapter, however, even this characterization is flatly contradicted by other 
accounts.680 
 These officers were the important leaders of 12th Company and their actions greatly 
affected the Jews in the local area.  None was sympathetic toward Jews but their various 
forms of antisemitism directly impacted the manner in which they placed themselves in anti-
Jewish policy and the ways in which they carried it out. 
 
A Kaleidoscope of Killing: Modes of Murder in and around Szczuczyn 
 Unlike in previous cases, the 12th Company in Szczuczyn killed Jews routinely in the 
course of its daily operations.  These killings took a variety of different forms but for the 
most part were all carried out at the company level and below, without much involvement 
from any other organization.  They indicate an acceptance and internalization of the necessity 
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of anti-Jewish policy as well as a certain vigor not previously seen. The killings in and 
around Szczuczyn were intrinsically motivated, decentralized, and repeated. 
 With its smaller Jewish population and location off more significant supply routes, 
Szczuczyn did not receive the attention from the Einsatzgruppen that other towns in the area 
did. The Germans entered the town on 26 June 1941 where they took the town’s leaders 
hostage but released them after three days.681  In July, a Judenrat was established but more 
draconian measures were not imposed.  William Moll fled to Szczcuczyn from Lida with his 
family after their home in Lida had been destroyed.  He remembered that there were cases of 
individual killings but nothing like mass murder.682  Artur Nebe remarked with 
dissatisfaction on 13 July that “only 96 Jews were executed in Grodno and Lida during the 
first days.  I gave orders to intensify these activities.”683  Thus, before the arrival of the 12th 
Company, the inhabitants of Szczuczyn had been left relatively unmolested by German 
forces.  This changed shortly after Kiefer’s arrival.  Sometime in mid-August, a ghetto was 
established.  It is unclear who presided over this action but it was likely the 12th company as 
German military maps do not indicate an external administrative unit being stationed there; 
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the nearest was OK I/849 in Lida 30 miles to the northeast.684  During this period, a local 
police force was raised.  The Yizhkor (or Jewish community) book for Szczuczyn states that 
this police force was made up of ethnic Poles who collaborated “willingly and whole-
heartedly.”685 Overall, with the exception of this force, it appears that the company was 
relatively isolated in the town and that Kiefer and the men of the unit wielded a great deal of 
power.  This is not to say that larger killings did take place, though not on the scale of Slonim 
or Novogrudok.  William Moll’s parents were killed in a shooting of Jewish prominent 
residents that he remembered occurred in December 1941.686 German records and 
testimonies remain silent on the role Kiefer’s men played in this action, though it is likely 
they were involved. 
 Regardless, of all the cases examined, Szczuczyn demonstrates most explicitly the 
prevalence of “Jew hunting” as a pastime of German soldiers.  Soldiers and officers broke the 
monotony of duty in a small rural town by conducting patrols into the countryside, ostensibly 
designed at rounding up partisans and suspected sympathizers.  Usually conducted in platoon 
strength, these outings rarely if ever encountered partisans.  One sergeant stated categorically 
that “during my time in Szczuczyn I never came into contact with partisans.”687 A company 
medic recalled that while “the mission of our unit was antipartisan fighting, I myself 
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encountered no partisans.”688  The general absence of partisans and combat is corroborated 
by many other former soldiers.  Interestingly, the battalion surgeon of the 3rd Battalion in 
Lida remarked that “no antipartisan operations were carried out during our presence in Lida 
because partisan activity was very low. Partisan activity first started after the large Jewish 
Aktion, after Jews fled to the forests.”689 Again, we see that the partisan “threat” was 
marshaled to support the killing of Jews, even when such a threat did not exist. 
 Most former soldiers agree that these patrols were generally made of volunteers, and 
while many different soldiers participated in these “Jew hunts,” they were usually drawn 
from the same group.  These soldiers were “always the same people who Schaffitz sought 
out; however, I don’t remember there being any direct orders.”690 At least one soldier 
supported this, saying “that these hunting patrols [Jagdkommandos] were usually created 
from the first platoon.”691  The first platoon, interestingly, belonged to Ritterbusch. 
 Usually led by a squad leader but sometimes by a platoon leader, these patrols appear 
to have been mainly conducted in captured Soviet trucks.  A soldier from the first platoon 
testified, “the patrol leader would then dismount in the village and talk with the mayor.  We 
ourselves often never left the truck.”692  As Schrade’s report noted several months earlier, 
this was not how one would go about fighting actual partisans.  Groups of men from the 
company would scour the countryside for Jews and either kill them where they were found or 
bring them back to the Drobsky Palace where the unit was quartered and execute them there. 
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One sergeant described the operations: “It is correct that we would repeatedly drive into 
towns, load Jews onto a truck and drive them to a gravel pit [1-2km behind the palace] where 
we had to shoot them.”693  He noted that the patrols were mostly led by Lieutenant Schaffitz.  
The fact that the men drove from village to village in trucks also indicates the low threat 
level, as this was not how actual antipartisan operations were conducted.694  Indeed, one can 
easily surmise that the discussions with village officials involved asking if there were Jews in 
the village.  As in previous cases, the men also took advantage of anti-Jewish operations to 
enrich themselves.  A 12th company soldier remembered that during “searches of Jewish 
houses a few comrades took what they found.”695  Another soldier took shoes off dead Jews 
and sent them home.696  Schaffitz, too, was accused of personally appropriating Jewish 
property.697 
 Moreover, the objectives and results of these “Jew Hunts” were no secret to anyone in 
the company.  Captain Kiefer himself testified that “as a result of a standing regimental order 
Jews were generally seen as partisans when found outside their place of residence.”  He 
clarified that these arrested Jews were only shot if they attempted to escape.698 Kiefer’s 
explanation reflects both the formulaic but conscious phraseology used during the war to 
describe the murders of Jews as well as his postwar attempt at self-exculpation.  Clearly, all 
Jews were targets, wherever they were found.  A company clerk, Georg L., confirmed this.  
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“I contend,” he said, “that Schaffitz actually issued orders to shoot Jews because I saw 
myself that kommandos were assembled by him in our office with the purpose of conducting 
raids against the Jews.” He added that “people from these raids returned and told that they 
had again shot Jews.”699  The 12th Company had moved beyond assisting in executions or 
when asked, to independently and actively targeting Jews for murder.  
 These Jews were then reported as partisan casualties.  L. recalled the process.  “When 
[Schaffitz] returned, he would report to the company clerk that several partisans were shot to 
death in the operation.  In actuality, it was generally known throughout the company that 
these were Jews who were in no way partisans.”700 L. also had been present being in the 
command post as various company outposts also reported Jews killed.701 The other company 
clerk corroborated these statements, adding, “there was an order by which all people without 
identification were to be shot.”702  Finally, the former company First Sergeant adds an 
important element to the issue of reporting.  He recalled “our company was required to 
complete activity reports for the battalion and for this reason conducted patrols in the area 
seizing Jews and shooting them.  In these activity reports, these people were portrayed as 
having been shot while trying to escape.  These reports were also compiled when Lieutenant 
Kiefer was present.”703  It was an open secret within the company that Jews were being killed 
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because they were Jews but that this was disguised in official reports with the use of the term 
“partisans” and the description “shot while trying to escape.” 
 The significance of these “Jew hunts” should not be underestimated.  They are 
indicators of how deeply this army unit had accepted its role in killing Jews and also how 
fully it embodied the fulfillment of the goals of the Mogilev Conference.  First, the 12th 
Company took the initiative in and around Szczuczyn to hunt down Jews and kill them.  It 
acted unilaterally, without the influence from civilian authorities that was felt by the 6th and 
7th companies in Slonim and Novogrudok.  Indeed, it appears that no SS, SD, or police units 
were involved in the 12th company’s activities.  Secondly, the reporting process and 
widespread knowledge of the real aim of these patrols demonstrates that no pretense was 
necessary to motivate soldiers to kill.  The participation of the men in actual killing seems far 
greater in Szczuczyn than elsewhere.  Thirdly, the company’s reporting practices indicate 
that its superiors were also well aware of the killings and condoned them.  Lastly, the focus 
on the killing of Jews in the small villages and countryside surrounding Szczuczyn (while 
maintaining a sizeable ghetto in the town itself) is powerful evidence of the impact of the 
organizational climate in the 707th. 
 The commander of the 707th Infantry Division, General Bechtolsheim, was a rabid 
antisemite. This might explain his eagerness to develop a “division of labor” between the 
Army and the SS in which the Army would consolidate and kill Jews in the countryside 
while the SS and Einsatzgruppen would murder Jews in established ghettos and larger towns.  
He published orders in November 1941 that clearly stated that “where larger or smaller 
groups of Jews are encountered in the countryside, they may either be executed [by the units 
themselves] or consolidated in ghettos in designated places where they will then be given 
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over to the civil administration, that is, the SD.”704  In a letter to Gebietskommissar Erren in 
nearby Slonim, First Lieutenant Glück alludes to a 29 November order from the 727th 
Infantry Regiment that the “flat lands are to be cleared and kept free of Jews.”705 The “Jew 
Hunts” around Szczuczyn were definitive evidence of the execution of this policy on the 
ground and must make us wonder about whether the 6th and 7th Companies also were 
following this guidance.706  The prevalence of these “Jew hunts” and the early ghettoization 
in Szczuczyn suggests that they had been well underway before this order was written.  
Kiefer’s leadership must also be seen, then, in the context of this higher level division and 
regimental guidance which appears to have established a standard operating procedure for 
participation in genocide.  
 The 12th company was not the only German Army unit to engage in this type of 
activity.  Serbia also saw similar hunts for Jews, prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union.  
Here, Walter Manoschek explains that the “Polish ghettoization phase” was skipped as 
German forces “developed a regional model” as a solution.707  In Serbia, battalions created 
Jagdkommandos that also included members of the SD.  For Manoschek, these mixed patrols 
“marked the transition from  a division of labor to direct cooperation between the Wehrmacht 
and police apparatus.”708  This is exactly the kind of cooperation seen in the 707th.  These 
hunts were conducted elsewhere as well.  Christopher Browning, for example, has found that 
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similar types of “Jew Hunts” took place in Poland.  In his research, these actions were carried 
out by Police Battalions searching for Jews who had escaped from the ghetto or from 
previously attempted round-ups.709  He, too, notes these were low-level, decentralized 
operations (and, thus, difficult to study).  While similar to the “Jew Hunts” around 
Szczuczyn, these operations were much more, as Browning wrote, an “end phase of the Final 
Solution.”  12th company’s operations were directed, however, at a slightly different 
population.  Unlike escapees from ghettos or previous round-ups, the victims of these hunts 
seemed to be simply Jews living in more remote areas yet to be reached by German troops.  
In this sense, then, these operations were less a mopping up and more an active extension of 
anti-Jewish policy into the hinterlands.  These operations were not aimed at rounding up 
remnants, but in capturing Jews.  Moreover, they required initiative to be successful. It would 
have been incredibly easy to not capture and kill Jews in this way, had that been the goal. 
 The Drobsky Palace where the 12th company was quartered was the starting point for 
its “Jew hunts” but also the foci for other killings.  According to the Yizhkor book for 
Szczuczyn, forty Jews were shot on the palace grounds by German soldiers in mid-August, 
which would have been around the time of the unit’s arrival. The Szczuczyn ghetto was 
created shortly after this killing, housing over 2,000 people.  Two weeks later the local police 
on German orders assembled the Jewish intelligentsia including the rabbi and teachers and 
                                                
709 Christopher R. Browning, ""Judenjagd". Die Schlußphase Der "Endlösung" In Polen," in Deutsche, Juden, 
Völkermord : der Holocaust als Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Jürgen Matthäus 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006). Browning also addresses the relative dearth of sources 
that mention “Jew Hunts” [Judenjagd].  It seems that, at least in the Wehrmacht case, this can be explained by 
the fact that such actions were clearly reported as “antipartisan patrols” though everyone knew their actual 
meaning. 
226 
the Germans then shot them outside of the town.710 This could very well be the same killing 
which claimed William Moll’s parents, though the timing does not match up.  Kiefer and his 
men likely played a role in this as well.711 
 But beyond this, the palace was the scene of regular shootings.  A noncommissioned 
officer stated, “I believe it was a few hundred meters behind the palace where the shootings 
took place.   These shootings must have been carried out by members of the company 
because only the 12th company was located in this palace.”712  Kiefer himself described a 
shooting that took place there.  A patrol arrested a Jewish family (mother, father, and son) 
and brought them to Kiefer.  He questioned them, recalling after the war that they had come 
from the Baltic.  Then, according to him, he ordered them taken to the jail.  He heard shots 
shortly thereafter and learned from his men that they had been “shot while trying to 
escape.”713  Of course, this is postwar dishonesty.  The Jewish family was not shot while 
trying to escape, but had been executed on his orders.  Several men of the company recalled 
the killing because various kinds of paper money had fluttered through the air when the 
victims were killed.  One soldier explained more honestly that “they were shot because they 
were Jews and because they had no identification [Ausweis].”714  This is a very revealing 
comment as it directly relates to guidance regarding Zivilisten ohne Ausweis which was 
mentioned at both the Mogilev Conference and in reports of “enemies” killed.  This shooting 
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in Szczuczyn again strongly suggests that many of the “enemies” reported killed in this 
period were indeed Jews.  While the First Sergeant attempted after the war to argue that there 
was simply a firing range behind the palace which explained the shooting, the men of the 
company clearly killed literally in their own back yard.  The shooting pit appears to have 
been the site of multiple killings over an extended period of time.   
 One of these killings appears to have taken place in December 1941 while Captain 
Kiefer was away.715  Lieutenant Schaffitz, as senior ranking officer, took over acting 
command of the company.  The First Sergeant H. (who himself was deeply implicated in the 
crimes of 12th Company) alleged that Schaffitz then rounded up twenty-five to thirty Jews 
and ordered that they be killed.716  It is unclear exactly how this shooting took place but the 
company clerk testified that it took place in the park behind the palace.  Moreover, he 
personally remembered seeing the “money, gold, jewelry, and valuables” from these Jews 
that were delivered to the company office and later sent on the battalion headquarters in 
Lida.717  Thus, we see that even in decentralized killing operations, expropriated property 
was collected and passed on to the higher headquarters who certainly knew where such 
things were coming from. 
 Schaffitz’s period of temporary command became an important element in postwar 
legal proceedings where Kiefer (and others) attempted to place all the blame for 12th 
Company’s atrocities on Schaffitz.  He was painted as a virulent antisemite and as having 
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carried out his killings unilaterally, without sanction or orders, and apparently without the 
approval of the vast majority of the company.  Given that Schaffitz died in a Polish prison in 
1956, this was no doubt a useful defense tactic.  However, like much postwar testimony it 
tells half truths.  Kiefer was often gone and often represented by Schaffitz.  Upon his return 
to the unit, Kiefer testified that he was informed of Schaffitz’s excesses by First Sergeant H..  
Further, he stated that he reported Schaffitz to his superiors and requested his transfer.718  
Kiefer further claimed that he had harshly reprimanded Schaffitz for his actions.  According 
to Kiefer, Schaffitz was disciplined by the battalion commander and was relieved for 
“independently carrying out shootings of Jews.”719  707th records indicate that by April 
Schaffitz was indeed transferred to the 9th Company in the same battalion.720  However, there 
is no evidence of any further “punishment.” 
 It was well known in the battalion that the relationship between Kiefer and Schaffitz 
was “hostile.”721  This conflict between Schaffitz and Kiefer tells us much about the nature of 
the killings in which the 12th company was active.  Perhaps Schaffitz had the company’s 
work Jews killed as a way to deliberately antagonize his commander. What it does not tell us 
is that Schaffitz was censured for killing Jews or that Kiefer and his superiors at the battalion 
level disapproved of the murder of Jews in principle.  It appears that Kiefer was angry at 
Schaffitz’s undisciplined and somewhat insubordinate behavior.   Kiefer was certainly well-
aware of the “Jew hunts” taking place in his command and that these were being reported to 
the battalion.  The battalion was aware of Jews being killed and would not have punished 
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Schaffitz simply for this.  However, Schaffitz’s zeal to kill Jews constituted a challenge to 
Kiefer’s authority in several cases.  Kiefer apparently had been meeting with a young Jewish 
woman who had been teaching him Russian and translating a book on the Russian 
revolution.722  This woman as well as other Jewish workers in the palace were among those 
allegedly killed on Schaffitz’s orders.  Among these workers was also a glassworker.  When 
Schaffitz had been told that there were no other skilled workers able to do this work for the 
Germans, he ordered the men to determine whether there was no one capable of this work.  
When the answer was no, Schaffitz ordered him to be killed along with the rest anyway.723  
Kiefer may well have been angered at the killing of his personal Jewish teacher as well as the 
killing of the Jewish workers who supported the company.  Killing Jews on patrol was  one 
thing, but rounding up and killing Jews from Szczuczyn or those “employed” by the 
company may have been actions about which Kiefer felt that Schaffitz was over-reaching.  In 
any case, beyond being transferred to a new unit, there do not seem to have been any real 
negative repercussions for Lieutenant Schaffitz. He continued his “patrolling” with the 9th 
company. 
 The killings committed by the 12th company in and around Szczuczyn demonstrate an 
important stage in the evolution of Wehrmacht complicity.  In a small town with little or no 
outside influence by SS or civil authorities, Kiefer and his company carried out killings of 
Jews on their own as a natural component of their day to day operations.  Moreover, they 
reported these killings to their superiors either plainly or in euphemistic language that did not 
conceal the truth from anyone.  This was a departure from earlier killings that were as a rule 
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either isolated or mass events.  This execution of genocide without direction emphasizes that, 
by this point, killing Jews in the countryside had become policy and that the unit had 
internalized the need to kill Jews. Participation in killing had become normalized and was no 
longer an extraordinary event but a daily element of duty in the East.  In the case of 
Szczuczyn, with no close supervision, leaders were able to act with as much (or as little) zeal 
and initiative as they wished.  Here, the leaders of 12th Company chose to carry out the “spirit 
of the order” to its maximum extent rather than in a perfunctory manner.  In his murder of 
working Jews employed by his commander, Schaffitz exceeded even this mandate.  Indeed, 
beyond the shift in German tactics, what further distinguished the behavior of the 12th 
company was the excessive brutality which accompanied it.  In these acts, we have arrived at 
the end result of prolonged participation in murder. 
 
“Jew Games” and Extreme Brutality  
 While the behavior of German soldiers toward Jews was certainly brutal from Krupki 
to Novogrudok,  Kiefer’s men exhibited particular brutality and sadistic behavior that 
appears to have resulted from the independent nature of the operations and a deeper belief in  
the necessity of killing Jews.  Individuals in previous cases may have carried out their duties 
with excessive cruelty, but in Szczuczyn such behavior became commonplace as German 
soldiers sought additional opportunities gratuitously to brutalize Jews. 
 Israel Zlocowski was a forty-eight year old father of four who had fled to Szczuczyn 
from the nearby town of Bilitsa.  In the ghetto, he would go from door to door to give the 
children food.724  One morning in the fall of 1941 he was standing in line by the Judenrat 
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waiting for work.  “Suddenly I heard a shout,” he remembered, “’They are coming.’ I hid 
myself in a nearby courtyard and watched as an officer and sergeant from the infantry 
regiment stationed in Szczuczyn approached.  At the same time, I saw an acquaintance of 
mine from Bilitsa named Dwora Kaplan walk out of her door.  The sergeant drew his pistol 
and shot her on the spot for no reason.”725  This kind of gratuitously unnecessary killing was 
a new development. 
 A few months later in February 1942, this random violence struck closer to home for 
Israel.  He and his son Jakob had worked especially hard the day before and spent the 
morning at home.  A neighbor appeared and warned that “the Germans were coming.”  “My 
son Jakob and I immediately leapt over the wire and hid outside the ghetto,” he said.  “When 
we returned to the ghetto a few hours later, we found my son David and my mother-in-law 
shot to death.”  His wife had hidden under the bed and told Israel what had happened.  The 
German “infantry soldiers” came into the living room, forced their son and her mother into 
the street, and shot them to death.726  Given that survivors are often understandably unable to 
distinguish between SS, Wehrmacht, police, and other German units, the fact that Israel twice 
identifies the perpetrators as German infantry soldiers is remarkable and means that, in this 
case, he is referring to the men of the 12th company. In addition, the size of the town and the 
apparent lack of other German SS or police units also makes it  highly likely that Kiefer’s 
unit is described in these testimonies.  Belarussian metalworker Viktor Schtemplewski 
recalled that “it very often happened that Jews were shot in the ghetto for the slightest sign of 
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insubordination.”727 In the nearby town of Ostrina, Schaffitz allegedly had a Jewish family 
shot when he saw them looking out of the window.728  Unlike in previous instances of 
complicity, here, Wehrmacht soldiers entered an existing ghetto and apparently shot Jews at 
random, taking Jewish lives without even the slightest pretence of  military rationale or 
connection to any organized action. 
 However, the brutality of the company did not stop with random killings.  Some 
German soldiers apparently found the ghetto a ready place to torment Jews.  Saturdays were 
special for the men of the 12th company and terror-filled for the Jews of Szczuczyn.  The 
ghetto became the scene of so-called “Jew games” where soldiers would arrive to torment 
and kill Jews there.  Chaja Kirszenbaum was twenty when the Germans arrived.  She 
remembered, “a German Wehrmacht unit was stationed in Szczuczyn which would amuse 
itself every Saturday with ‘Jew games.’ They tortured and shot Jews indiscriminately and for 
no reason.  I still remember how three soldiers demanded that a woman show them to the 
courtyard.  Suddenly, one took his rifle and shot her on the spot.”729  These outings were 
confirmed by other Jewish survivors.  Azriel Weinstein had been deported to the Szczuczyn 
ghetto from his native Rozanka.  He too remembered a Wehrmacht unit that often amused 
itself with “Jew games” and that many Jews were shot as a result.730  Golda Schwartz, who 
was twelve, moved with her family to Szczuczyn from Ostryna.  She remembered that “the 
Germans came mostly on Shabbat to see if the Jews were clean.  They killed those they 
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found on the street.”731  Liber Losh elaborated, describing a similar incident that occurred in 
February 1942.  During an inspection of sanitary conditions, German soldiers killed nine men 
and nine women.732 Sometimes the killings had frivolous justifications.  Jewish survivor 
Azriel Weinstein recalled one such incident. In winter 1941/42, thirteen to fifteen Jews were 
shot by German soldiers because “they had not pumped enough water.”733  Lieber Losh 
clarified that this killing resulted from a “brief water shortage in the German quarters.”734   
 The sadistic behavior of these Wehrmacht soldiers represents a qualitative change in 
the anti-Jewish violence, even when compared with other units in the 727th Infantry 
Regiment.  The initiative-taking here transcended even the dubious explanation of duty, 
reaching the level of sport.  German soldiers in Szczuczyn apparently not only acted brutally 
in the course of their assigned tasks, but also apparently sought out opportunities to entertain 
themselves by murdering and abusing Jews.  The “hygiene inspections,” the intentional 
scheduling of “Jew games” on the Sabbath, and the indiscriminate brutality are indicative of 
a significant sadistic turn that constituted a new and sinister development.  At least there is 
little testimony in the other earlier cases to indicate similar volume and tenor of sadistic 
behavior.  Soldiers were no longer simply carrying out orders, even if coldly or harshly; they 
were deriving pleasure from tormenting their victims.  How do we explain this shift to 
brutality? 
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 First, it appears that the leadership condoned it.  Earlier, a meeting had taken place at 
the battalion headquarters in Lida where the battalion commander, Captain Rudolf Mayr, had 
passed on orders that all Jews were to be treated as partisans.  There was no ambiguity as to 
what this meant.  Kiefer himself admitted during questioning that “this order meant in 
practice that we should kill all Jews.”735 At the small unit level, Jews were repeatedly killed 
at close quarters.  The “official” reporting of these killings by the company sent a clear 
message that the murders of Jews was a non-event and was part of normal operations.  The 
decentralized nature of these operations (such as the one commanded by Ritterbusch) likely 
allowed men who were so inclined to take liberties that they would not have taken when 
under closer supervision.  Still, what led to the Saturday “Jew games?”  While Kiefer was 
certainly supportive of killing Jews during operations, he does not seem to have instigated 
gratuitous brutality and sadism. 
 It is more probable that when Schaffitz, with his more rabid and brutal antisemitism, 
was in command of the company, such  “excesses” were readily encouraged.  The acting 
commander was, after all, “a beast who bullied his own men when there were no Jews left to 
shoot.”736  However, given that these activities seem to have been ongoing, we must assume 
that Kiefer himself was at least indifferent.  First Sergeant H. admitted that although “close 
contact with Jews was forbidden for soldiers, if a soldier was occasionally caught in the 
ghetto, he would not have expected any special punishment from Kiefer.”737  Indeed, it 
appears that the leadership adopted a permissive attitude toward this kind of behavior; there 
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certainly is no evidence of any punishment, even in postwar testimony where such testimony, 
even if fabricated, would be to Kiefer’s advantage. 
 Another explanation could be a certain level of boredom or desire for excitement.  
Over 500 miles from the front, with no real insurgent activity to speak of, perhaps soldiers 
sought to relieve the tedium by preying upon the local Jewish population.  The soldiers 
themselves do not even mention these more gratuitous atrocities much less offer any 
explanation in their postwar statements given the legal context of these interviews.  It seems 
that here, as in other atrocities in similar contexts, the deliberate dehumanization and 
targeting of civilians led inexorably to progressively more vicious behavior above and 
beyond that “required” of the military situation. 
 An increasingly virulent antisemitism among the men could also be a factor.  The fact 
that these “Jew games” took place on Saturdays, the Jewish Sabbath cannot simply be a 
coincidence.  The men of the 12th company deliberately chose to attack Jews on their holy 
day.  The brutality and cynical justifications for that brutality indicate a motivation to 
torment and kill beyond cold and clinical, even if specious, “military” calculations or even 
abstract scientific racism.  Certainly the brutal behavior of Schaffitz and the extreme racist 
views he shared with Kiefer could have spread among the men.  At a minimum, it would 
have encouraged similar behavior from those predisposed to act sadistically.  In Szcuczyn, 
killing became pastime. 
 Another powerful explanation for the more violent behavior of the 12th Company is 
simply that people are changed by what they do.  This is not just true in a numbing, 
brutalizing sort of way, though that kind of acclimatization happens.  The 
social/psychological theory of cognitive dissonance, first espoused by Leon Festinger in 
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1957, is instructive in this regard.738  The theory argues that when our actions and our beliefs 
are conflicting, we are thrown into a progressively more uncomfortable mental state.  This 
“dissonance arousal” is, in essence, a threat to our conception of self.739  The effect on our 
self-image is vital because “people experience dissonance after engaging in an action that 
leaves them feeling stupid, immoral, or confused.  Moreover, the greater the personal 
commitment or self-involvement implied by the action and the smaller external justification 
for that action, the greater the dissonance and, therefore, the more powerful the need for self-
justification.”740  In order to escape this threat to our mental well-being, we seek to change 
either our beliefs or our actions to bring our mental and physical states into congruence.  In 
many situations, it is easier to change beliefs than acts.   
 By this model, the brutality we see by the 12th Company (and by other units with 
long-term exposure to the Nazi genocidal project) can be explained as function of a mental 
change that attempted to justify actions that had already been committed.  In this sense, 
increasingly brutal action could be used to convince  soldier of his own virulent antisemitism 
which then justified his brutal actions. If participation in murder began incrementally, as we 
see beginning in Krupki, then perhaps Szczcuzyn represents the natural result of all these 
small decisions.  As Fred Katz notes, “through this type of localized incremental decision-
making the individual can readily become involved in profound evil.”741  Perhaps the killers 
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in Szczuczyn found themselves in Katz’ “Local Moral Universe” that “dictated behavior 
totally at variance with the ideals in which participants had been brought up to believe.”742 
 Of relevance here as well is Katz’s concept of “Cultures of Cruelty.”  He had noted 
during the trials of Auschwitz guards that some men had chosen to behave with excessive 
and imaginative cruelty beyond the already structurally cruel task to which they were bent.  
Certainly, latent antisemitism played a role.  However, Katz is also able to identify similar 
behavior in the murders at My Lai which arguably lacked a similarly powerful ideological 
underpinning.  It appears that a similar “culture of cruelty” developed at least for some 
soldiers in Szczuczyn and found its expression in creative and increasingly brutal 
degradations against its captive Jewish population. 
 And so the progressively deeper involvement of the German Army in the Holocaust 
culminates in soldiers murdering Jews for sport in the ghetto of a small town.  The “Jew 
hunts” and “games” conducted by the 12th company in Szczuczyn are qualitatively different 
from the actions of German units in Krupki, Krucha, Slonim, and Novogrudok.  Unlike 
previous killings, the behavior of Kiefer’s men, which extends into early 1942, is 
characterized not only by  a general acceptance of the specious military rationale for  killing 
Jews whenever they are encountered as part of normal  operations but also  by a greater 
dehumanization leading to ever more sadistic and brutal atrocities against Jews committed 
outside of military operations.  
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VII. Conclusion 
 
Justice Unfulfilled: Legal Outcomes of Wehrmacht Crimes 
The fact that countless suspects could give no explanation for why they were 
not engaged does not rule out that such circumstances could have presented 
themselves. It is well within the realm of possibility that as a result of the 
long passage of time or due to difficult experiences in the course of the war 
that the suspects have forgotten.  In any case, concrete evidence of their 
participation has not been found. 
-Dismissal of charges against Waldow et. al, Dortmund, 9 September 
1969743 
 
It has been shown to me that in the trial against Erren it has been made clear 
that the 6th Company, 727th Infantry under the command of First Lieutenant 
Glück participated in the transport of the Jews in Slonim with trucks to the 
killing site and in the cordoning off of the town during the Action of 14 
November 1941.  To this I declare that this occurred without my knowledge 
and against my order that units in my regiment could in no way participate in 
Jewish actions. 
- Statement Josef Pausinger, Commander 727th Infantry Regiment, 4 
May 1961744 
 
 Unfortunately, few of the perpetrators identified in this study even went to trial, let 
alone paid for their crimes.  In the case of the 354th Infantry Regiment and the murder of the 
Jews of Krupki, most of those investigated were not charged due to lack of evidence.  These 
were mainly soldiers.  Even the main Army perpetrators avoided any prosecution.  The 
regimental commander, von Rekowski’s case was dismissed because it could not be proven 
that he knowingly supported the action.  Lieutenant Nick and the commander of the 10th 
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Company escaped prosecution because it could not be proven that they were in personal 
danger if they disobeyed orders.  The battalion adjutant, Lieutenant Speth, was judged guilty 
of being an accessory.  However, due to a statute of limitations on crimes whose sentences 
did not exceed fifteen years, he was released as well.  Charges against the First Sergeant of 
12th Company, Hans H., were dismissed due to lack of evidence.  Major Waldow, the 
battalion commander, was found guilty of the charges but they were dismissed as a result of 
his heart condition and inability to stand trial.745  Werner Schönemann who had led 
Einsatzkommando 8 while it killed tens of thousands of Jews was found guilty of aiding and 
abetting murder on 12 counts of a total of 2,170 people and sentenced to only 6 years in 
prison.746 
 Friedrich Nöll, commander of the 3rd Company, 691st Infantry Regiment,  and his 
First Sergeant, Emil Zimber, went to trial and were convicted for their actions in Krucha.  
The battalion commander, Commichau, who issued the order did not survive the war.  The 
court found Nöll guilty of knowingly overseeing a minimum of sixty cases of manslaughter, 
noting that he could not have “feared for life and limb as a result of his refusal” and was 
“merely afraid that his avoidance of the order would be uncomfortably noted.”747  When Nöll 
weakly told the court that his personal intervention in the killings was “superfluous” because 
his “people were so well behaved,”  the presiding judge acidly replied, “ ‘Behaved’ is a fully 
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tasteless expression here.  As we will hear from witnesses, thank God that not all people are 
‘so well behaved.’”748 Zimber was found guilty as an accessory to the sixty cases of 
manslaughter;  the court concluded “that the achievement of the battalion commander’s 
desires would have been unthinkable without Zimber’s supporting activities.”749  If the 
court’s judgment was at least somewhat stern, its sentences were not.  Nöll and Zimber were 
initially sentenced to four and three years in prison respectively, but these were both reduced 
by a year on appeal in 1956. 
 Finally, the cases of Slonim and Novogrudok also failed to provide any substantive 
measure of judicial justice.  In the Slonim case, only a private and a sergeant were tried, and 
not for the murder of the Jews but for a hanging that took place shortly before.  These 
charges were dismissed due to a lack of evidence.750  The vast majority of soldiers who 
testified to their participation in the November killing operation in Slonim were, in fact, 
testifying against Gerhard Erren, the Gebietskommissar, and were not themselves charged 
with anything.  Erren himself was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and sentenced 
to life in prison.  Unfortunately, the conviction was overturned on appeal due to a 
technicality and Erren was then, conveniently, unable to stand trial for health reasons.751  
Johann Artmann, whose 7th Company assisted in the killings in Novogrudok was spared 
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prosecution because the court reasoned that “it could not expect a conviction on the charges;” 
it had determined that Lieutenant Martin had acted alone.752   
 For the case of the 12th Company in Szczuczyn, charges against Captain Kiefer were 
dropped due to lack of evidence.  Charges against Lieutenant Ritterbusch were dropped 
because “he appeared after investigation…not sufficiently suspect” and because “countless 
witnesses based on their knowledge of the accused found it out of the question [that he could 
have committed the acts].”753  Lieutenant Schaffitz, however, was turned over to a Polish 
court and sentenced to death in 1948 (though this was later commuted to life).754 
 Each case, of course, was different but all suffered from both a general unwillingness 
to condemn Wehrmacht veterans and from the imposition of difficult German legal 
standards.  The former is not particularly surprising given that, in some cases, the judges 
involved had also been sitting judges during the Third Reich.  In other cases, diligent young 
prosecutors often found themselves stymied by evidentiary and legal obstacles.  The statute 
of limitations on crimes with sentences of less than fifteen years meant that only the more 
difficult first degree murder charge was available.  This charge required prosecutors to 
demonstrate base motives on the part of the perpetrator (i.e. antisemitism), the use of 
subterfuge, and that the nature of the killing was particularly cruel.  With very few survivors 
available, successfully proving these elements often proved to be a serious challenge. 
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Motive but not Opportunity?  Representativeness and Wehrmacht Crimes 
 In order to better weigh the significance of this study, we must consider the issue of 
representativeness.  How characteristic were the actions of the military units described here 
as well as the actions of the individuals and leaders involved?  Indeed, how typical were 
these units themselves?  We have already seen that the security divisions such as the 286th 
were second or third rate at best.  They were under-equipped, under-manned, under-trained, 
and overage.  After the winter crisis of 1941-42, these divisions lost their best trained 
infantry regiments to front line duty; these losses, if they were made good at all, were filled 
by even more unsuitable units such as Landesschützen battalions.755  Yet in regard to its 
antisemitic orders and complicity, the 286th is certainly in line with its fellow security 
divisions in rHGM, the 221st and 403rd. However, the 707th and 339th Infantry divisions were 
not so far removed from other divisions fighting in rHGM.  Both these units ended up 
fighting at the front.  In any case, all the units investigated here are far more typical of the 
Wehrmacht as a whole than SS or police formations which are the basis of several excellent 
previous studies.756 
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 Situational factors played an important role in determining both whether and how 
units would become involved in genocide.  These can be temporal, spatial, and mental.  How 
do we sort all these in an attempt to determine how far we can apply the findings of this 
study?  In this, the legal concepts of means, motive, and opportunity provide a useful 
framework.  Assuming that most units possessed the ability to murder Jews by shooting, 
what about motive?  Did other units possess similar organizational climates and mentalities 
that would allow them to kill, given the chance? 
 A brief survey of eleven other divisions in Army Group Center (Rear) is helpful in 
answering these questions.757  These “control” divisions, all first and second line infantry 
divisions, passed through central Belarus in the same areas as the case study units.  Some 
were fighting in conventional combat and others were temporarily involved in occupation 
duties.  Between June 21 and November/December 1941, these divisions followed a roughly 
northeasterly trajectory from Warsaw through Minsk toward Smolensk before becoming 
entangled in the struggle for Moscow.  What can a look at the surviving documents from 
these units tell us about the mindsets and motives of their leadership and men? 
 Several of these divisions exhibited antisemitic climates.  The Division commander of 
the 252nd Infantry division, General der Kavallerie Diether von Böhm-Bezing, told his men at 
the end of September: “As your Division Commander and comrade for two long years, I 
know that each of you have worked through this war that was forced upon us by international 
Jewry and Free masonry toward the greatest victory our history has ever known even as this 
can only be achieved through difficult battle on Russian soil.”758 Three months later, his 
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Christmas message exuded a similar antisemitic, anti-Bolshevik message: “In these days of 
Christmas, the sacrifice of our fallen and wounded comrades finds its transfiguration.  
Entrenched in this Russian ground that we have freed from Bolshevism and the Jews, we 
want to prepare ourselves to go forward to the final victory in firm confidence in our 
strength, in unerring belief in the future of our Fatherland, and with a tenacious will.  
Comrades of the 252nd Division, not for us, but all for our homeland, our people, our 
Führer.”759  In both messages distributed to his entire command, the general clearly places 
Jews and Bolsheviks as the main enemy. 
Other units did not perhaps place their antisemitism so prominently, but at least some 
of them were already dealing with issues of Nazi racial policy.  The war diary for the 102nd 
Infantry Division stated on 13 July, regarding Lithuanian militias operating in its area: “For 
the first time, questions have surfaced whose solution, because of their half-political 
character, is particularly delicate. A decision from the Army is not forthcoming despite 
multiple requests….As they so far proved quite useful and also emphasize antisemitism and 
convey an anti-bolshevik character, the division has ordered that militias 
[Hilfspolizeitruppen] be recognized as legal, and be treated favorably,  but that all political 
discussions be refused.”760 At this time, the 102nd was stationed just east of Vilnius.  Clearly 
here the division’s leadership was willing to accept (or even encourage) a violent solution to 
certain “questions” as long as it was not directly involved in approving them. 
 Such antisemitic rhetoric found expression in more concrete policies in these 
divisions as well.  The 78th Infantry Division expressly forbid the use of Jews as interpreters 
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and in any other capacity.761  The 252nd Infantry Division (whose commander already 
demonstrated his adherence to Nazi racial beliefs) ordered on 26 July 1941 that “requests or 
complaints from the Jewish population are to be rejected by all units.  The complainant is to 
be referred to the responsible police office.”762  These referrals would had predictably 
negative results. 
 Such guidance does not always tell the whole story.  Indeed, part of the aim of this 
study has been an attempt to determine what actually happened on the ground.  Jews were 
also specifically targeted and identified as casualties by these divisions, most notably the 
252nd and 102nd.  In July, the 232nd Infantry Regiment of the 102nd Infantry Division was 
reporting Jews killed in the course of its security operations.  On 20 July, it claimed two 
communist functionaries, three Jews, and 5 Poles executed “because they were still active as 
communists after the occupation of the area…and in particular had incited the population 
against the Wehrmacht.”763  Two days later, the same regiment reported four Jews shot for 
“continuing terrorism of the local population, sabotage of Wehrmacht efforts, plundering, 
etc.”764  The 102nd Division itself supported these actions of its subordinates and later 
forwarded a directive from the XXXX Corps stating, because it was often difficult to catch 
partisans in the act, “all suspects are to be shot immediately on the order of a company (or 
other) commander.  Communist party members, members of a communist organization, or 
Jews are particularly suspicious if they are found in the vicinity of an incident and cannot 
prove themselves residents of the nearest town or become entangled in contradictions during 
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interrogation.”765  The 162nd Infantry Division ominously reproached its own troops, saying: 
“The notion that it is only the police but not the army who should shoot partisans, armed 
people, and suspicious persons is completely false.  It is completely vital that we demonstrate 
our will to take drastic measures…on the spot in a timely manner.”766 As we have seen, a 
blurring of the lines between the antipartisan effort and racial policy was also a recurring 
theme in other units.  We will return to this concept in these other divisions shortly. 
 Another way in which these divisions were complicit in the Holocaust was through 
their collaboration with the SS, Einsatzgruppen, and other Nazi organizations.  Evidence 
from these control divisions suggests that they, too, were not unaware of the actions of these 
killing units and in many cases supported them.  Organizationally, several divisions made 
their relationship with the Einsatzgruppen clear.  In a memorandum explaining its duties as 
rear security, the 102nd Division explicitly stated that under the jurisdiction of Section VII (an 
Army staff section) were: “General administrative affairs of the land and civil 
population….Collection of assets managed by Jews…Police affairs…Liaison with Order 
Police, Security Police, and SD.”767  The executive officer of the 87th Infantry Division 
returned from a meeting at rHGM headquarters and noted in the unit war diary: “Jews are to 
be collected together in ghettos…Cooperation with the police [including] Einsatzkommando 
Major Dr. Bratfisch.”768  The 252nd Division informed its soldiers on 16 July that: 
“Einsatzkommando 8 of the SD, with its headquarters in Baranovichi [sic]…and a  branch 
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office in Slonim and Novogrudok is dependent on the cooperation of the Division.  This 
command primarily handles all political issues and defensive affairs, but also advises the 
Feldkommandanturen in the selection of select trusted persons as mayors and economic 
leaders. Captured communists (civilians) are to be handed over to the SD.”769   
The next day it was clear that this cooperation was already taking place, as the 
division reported the “execution of a police roundup in Slonim in the course of the day 
during which a large number of communists and unsafe elements were arrested.”770  This was 
most likely one of the first Einsatzgruppen actions against Jews in Slonim.  Recognition of 
structural relationships led to actual collaboration in other control divisions as well.  The 
102nd Division informed its units that a ten-man advance party from Einsatzkommando 9 had 
been attached to the division with the mission of “supporting and advising the division in all 
political and police matters [and] the supervision of all political and criminal matters in the 
division area.”771  Likewise, the 87th Division reminded its men that “suspect persons and 
those who are not caught in the act are to be handed over with the proper documentation to 
Einsatzkommando 8 of the security police and the SD in Minsk.”772  The 162nd Division went 
so far as to request that elements of Einsatzgruppe B conduct an action against “former 
Communist party members” near Bialystok; seventeen individuals were arrested and 
“liquidated.”773  Four of these divisions also had working relationships with both SS infantry 
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and cavalry brigades, which as we have seen, were deeply involved in carrying out the Final 
Solution in the East.774  Being assigned control of these units did not always mean direct 
complicity in acts of genocide.  At times, these Waffen-SS units were assigned as actual 
combat units. This was likely the case for two squadrons of the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment that 
formed the so-called Vorausabteilung and were attached to the 162nd Infantry Division to 
help combat a Soviet counterattack.775  However, when the Vorausabteilung was transferred 
to the 252nd Infantry Division on 17 August, it had already been very busy murdering at least 
11,000 Jewish men, women, and children in the northern reaches of the Pripet marshes.776   
If there was one area in which there was almost complete agreement among the 
control divisions, it was in the necessity of harshness in antipartisan operations.  In 
September, the 258th Infantry Division forwarded a typical declaration from its corps 
headquarters: “Ruthlessly fight the partisan with the harshest measures.  Any charity and 
lenience is wrong and indicates weakness which ultimately costs us our own blood.”777  The 
162nd Division ordered one regiment to round up and shoot all “suspect men” in three 
towns.778  Certainly in these actions we can see the same brutal policy toward civilians as 
was suggested at the Mogilev Conference. 
It appears that many of these control divisions held similarly antisemitic beliefs and 
also exhibited similarly harsh and brutal attitudes toward civilians.  Why, then, did these 
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units not participate in the mass killings of Jews that the 707th, 339th, and 286th did?  The first 
possibility may be that some did, but that no records exist to prove participation or at least 
there were no trials involved that would bring to light the details of this involvement.  The 
second explanation is related to the concept of opportunity.  At least some of these divisions 
were mainly occupied with fighting and mopping up surrounded pockets of Red Army 
soldiers before they were thrown into the destructive battles for Smolensk and Moscow.  
Very simply, this meant that by their position on the battlefield these units were often too 
busy with combat to be involved with genocidal policy, though they could certainly were 
involved in carrying out the Commissar Order and with antipartisan related atrocities.  
An example of the importance of opportunity comes from two of the units that appear 
most prominently in conjunction with anti-Jewish actions among the control divisions, the 
102nd and the 252nd, also spent a large amount of time in rear areas, conducting security 
operations.  It is perhaps not surprising then that they became more deeply embroiled in 
carrying out genocide for this is where , by and large, it was taking place.  Rear area duty was 
not something these units looked forward to.  Neither the 102nd nor the 252nd were happy 
with their assignment.  Trying to put a positive spin on this assignment, the commander of 
the 252nd termed their duty a “quiet but not to be undervalued detail work.”779  The 102nd 
Division, however, expressed its feelings more clearly in its war diary.  After learning that 
the Division would again be relegated to rear area duty, the entry read: “That this wish [for 
frontline duty] was once again not fulfilled raises in the best of us a feeling of bitterness.”780  
The experience of these divisions before they, too, were sent to the front supports some of the 
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conclusions of this study.  The longer a unit was involved on a daily basis and at close 
proximity to genocidal policy, the deeper it became complicit and the more extreme its 
actions became. 
This is not to say that all the divisions behaved equally.  The 28th Infantry Division 
told its men that “poor treatment by our own troops drives the population into the arms of the 
partisans.”781  The 78th Division likewise instructed its soldiers that they were to “refrain 
from violent reprisals against towns where communist cells were found or in whose vicinity 
attacks on [German soldiers] have taken place when it cannot be without a doubt proven that 
the inhabitants were the perpetrators or were in contact with them.”782 The division 
commander, General der Artillerie Curt Gallenkamp, personally warned his soldiers against 
the thefts of property and livestock that were increasing in the division area. “I will leave no 
doubt that I will have every complaint investigated by the military police and will sentence 
the offenders by court-martial.”783  An understanding of the necessity of winning hearts and 
minds, while perhaps a rare insight in the German army, does not simultaneously prove any 
disagreement with racial policy.  However, it does indicate that units could have different 
interpretations of what behavior was to be accepted depending on the context. 
A survey of similar kinds of units in the same region at the same time suggests that 
they have much in common with the units in this study.  Expressions of blatant antisemitism 
were not rare, though there were varying levels of virulence among different divisions.  What 
was certainly prevalent was a proclivity to violence against civilians and a willingness to 
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knowingly collude with the SS, SD, and police battalions.  Moreover, in units such as the 
252nd and 102nd that were employed as occupation troops, we see glimpses of the same 
progression towards a normalization of complicity in genocide.  It would appear that many 
units were capable of similar genocidal behavior as the ones investigated for this study.  The 
deciding factor appears to have been, to a large extent, whether or not the unit was put into a 
situation of extended contact with Jews and occupation policy, that is, whether or not it had 
the opportunity to participate.  It is likely that more often than not those that were ended up 
becoming more and more complicit.  However, some units, but more often individuals, did 
refuse to comply, evade participation, or, more rarely, attempt to aid Jews. 
 
Between Evasion and Rescue: Wehrmacht Non-Compliance in The Holocaust 
The question of participation in anti-Jewish killing is more difficult for these control 
divisions as is the question of compliance and noncompliance.  Both these behaviors rarely 
show up in military documents, which formed the basis for the investigation of the control 
divisions. The case of Feldkommandantur 551 is a good introduction to the complexities of 
seeking noncompliance in these sources.  On 22 July, the commander of Feldkommandantur 
551 wrote a heated memorandum to the 252nd Infantry Division to which FK 551 was 
attached.  He complained that the previous day a German police battalion from Baranovichi 
had swooped down upon various factories and slave labor details, arresting Jews.  He further 
argued that this raid had deprived him of irreplaceable laborers and impeded operations 
which supported the Wehrmacht.  The police had torn up and trashed special identification 
cards that the Feldkommandantur had issued to its Jewish slave laborers.  The lieutenant 
colonel closed by angrily terming the entire operation a “great injury to my office in front of 
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the Jews, that I cannot accept.” He ended by requesting that “the police regiment be given 
orders which will prevent such behavior in the future.”784 
The 252nd acted quickly, forwarding the report to rHGM the next day.  It requested 
that the Higher SS and Police Leader ensure that identification papers issued by the 
Wehrmacht would be honored in order to both keep important operations running and to 
recognize the authority of the Feldkommandanturen.  Additionally, the division requested 
that in the future if there were “political or police” concerns about individuals under the 
authority of the Feldkommandantur that it be notified before any action would be taken. It 
was noted in the file that the matter was “satisfactorily settled;” in the future the HSSPF 
would recognize Army-issued identification.785 
This small occurrence is a good introduction to the complex phenomenon of 
Wehrmacht evasion, resistance, or rescue behavior.  In this case, it appears that the conflict 
was far more jurisdictional than moral and that it was the interests of the Army rather than 
those of the victims that predominated.  In other cases, similar objections may have been 
attempts at expressing some form of moral outrage in a manner that would be both less 
challenging and also more convincing in military terms. A more well-known, but no less 
problematic example is that of the military chaplain in the 295th Infantry Division in the 
Ukraine.  After the adults of Byelaya Tserkov had been murdered, the young children of the 
town had been locked in a house without food, water, or any kind of care.  The military 
chaplain, Dr. Reuss, who had been called to the house by Wehrmacht soldiers, filed a lengthy 
report to his superiors in which he described in detail the inhumane conditions and how the 
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soldiers were “shaken” and had “expressed their outrage.”  Reuss then alluded to the risk of 
disease and the fact that German soldiers were able to enter the house that had resulted in “a 
reaction of indignation and criticism.”786  Successive reports also remarked upon the impact 
on soldier morale of this scene.  Eventually, the children were executed.  What was the 
chaplain’s motivation in this instance?  Was he truly only concerned about morale and 
disease or was that how he chose to word his complaint in order to receive the most 
attention?  The answer is unclear; however, the length in which he describes the plight of the 
children suggests at least some concern for their welfare.  Even Josef Sibille, who refused 
outright to murder the Jews in his area, remarked after the war, that he would not “expect 
upstanding German soldiers to soil their hands with such things.”787  This may have been the 
limits of his objection or he may have simply been unwilling to openly condemn the 
immorality of the Army out of some feeling of loyalty. 
Recent scholarship has uncovered several cases of Wehrmacht soldiers refusing to 
participate in killing or even acting as rescuers.788  Some of these are quite extraordinary, 
such as the case of Sergeant Anton Schmid, a Viennese soldier who smuggled Jews out of 
the Vilna ghetto across the border with Belarus, releasing them in Lida.  When a ghetto in 
Lida was established, the Gestapo noted the presence of many Jews from Lida who, under 
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torture, revealed how they came to be there.  Schmid was arrested, tried, and executed.789  In 
his last letter to his wife and daughter, he wrote, “my dearest Steffi and Gerta, it is a terrible 
blow for us, but please, please forgive me.  I acted only as a human being and did not want to 
hurt anyone.”790  Cases such as this are made extraordinary by their rarity.  Most soldiers did 
not react this way as, indeed, most Germans did not.  However, this study has shown that 
some men, like Joachim Lochbihler, did find the courage and opportunity to aid those Jews 
they came into contact with.  Unfortunately, the vast majority did not object or, if they did, 
did not take any action on that objection. 
Even rarer still were soldiers who spoke out against the killing and sought to 
encourage others to disobey.  Such behavior, more than individual refusal, put soldiers in real 
danger of being executed.  Lieutenant Reinhold Lofy was one such individual.  In April 
1944, he was ordered to lead a raid behind the lines, capture Red Army soldiers, and then, as 
a “birthday present to the Führer,” behead them with entrenching spades.791  He refused to do 
this and also reportedly informed his men about the concentration camps and the murder of 
the Jews, leaving no doubt what he thought of them.  He was shortly thereafter denounced 
and sentenced to a punishment battalion, whose extraordinarily dangerous missions he barely 
survived.  Another young officer whose actions fall into this rarest category of attempting to 
persuade others to resist was Lieutenant Michael Kitzelmann who was assigned to the 262nd 
Infantry division in the Soviet Union.  He, too, was denounced for expressing his opposition 
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to the war and the brutal German occupation to his soldiers.  Unlike Lothy, he was sentenced 
to death and executed.792  With the exception of these last two cases, acts of Wehrmacht 
resistance or rescue tended to be both very rare and highly individual in nature.  The process 
of deepening complicity in acts of genocide and violence led instead to increased passivity 
and often to more active participation in the Holocaust for soldiers. 
 
Explaining Wehrmacht Involvement in Murder 
For Wehrmacht units, situational and institutional factors were most important in 
influencing the manner of participation in violence against civilians and in the Nazi 
genocidal project.  This is, of course, not to minimize the effects of antisemitism brought to 
the military from the larger German society or to reopen the old intentionalist-structuralist 
argument.  Beliefs and ideology were certainly a preexisting condition for many men. Indeed, 
they exist as a foundation and an important context in which all of these events took place.  
We must first recognize that the sources available, namely postwar testimony from German 
soldiers, do not often lend themselves to a judgment on the witness’ stance on antisemitism 
as these men definitely knew to avoid any such racist statement when talking to the 
authorities. However, given the ages of most of the men involved, we can at least say that 
they lived their formative years not under the racially polarizing influence of Nazi Germany 
and the Hitler Youth but during the chaotic but liberal Weimar period that probably made 
them more anti-Bolshevik rather than antisemitic.  Perhaps this is why the Jew-Bolshevik-
Partisan calculus may have had such impact.   Second, on a relative scale, these men were 
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likely less antisemitic (or at least certainly less racially indoctrinated) than the police and SS 
units which have been the focus of previous studies of this nature. 
One factor that appears vital again and again is that of leadership.  In every instance 
of complicity in the murder of the Jews of Belarus, a key leader led, encouraged, or permitted 
this behavior.  Personalities such as Captain Kiefer, Lieutenant Glück, Lieutenant Martin, 
Lieutenant Schaffitz and others actively inserted themselves (and their men) into the killing 
process.  At the opposite extreme stands Josef Sibille who refused any participation and, 
through this refusal, eliminated the participation of any of his men as well.  In the middle of 
this spectrum and likely representing the majority of leadership are men such as Major 
Waldow, Captain Nöll, and Captain Artmann, who, while not driving participation 
themselves, permitted it, enabled it, and supported it.  Artmann was too ineffectual to stop it 
and Nöll, who likely recognized the immorality of what he was doing was simply too weak 
to say no.  The role of leadership in Wehrmacht complicity places the “obedience to orders” 
defense in an entirely different light.  The arguments of Omer Bartov (and others) regarding 
the draconian discipline in the German Army and the statistics of Nazi military justice 
highlight the importance of leadership in not committing atrocities.  If the threat (real or 
perceived) of swift punishment for a refusal to obey orders drove some men to kill, certainly 
an order to the contrary (like Sibille’s) would have prevented them from doing so on their 
own. 
Yet, like many things, the decision-making process on the ground was more complex.  
The institutional culture of the German Army itself greatly complicated this.793  The older 
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artifacts of extreme brutality toward “potential” civilian resistance, expropriation of civilian 
property, and scorched earth policies flowed together with the more recent anti-Bolshevik 
fervor and polarizing Nazi racial ideology to create the conditions for a “perfect storm” of 
atrocity in the East.  Perhaps the best example of this convergence of traditions was the 
intentional instrumentation of the antipartisan war to mobilize the resources of the Army in 
the rear areas in support of the Nazi genocidal project.  The Jew-Bolshevik-Partisan calculus 
was specifically designed to play upon fears (real and imagined) of a partisan threat and to 
connect them with a racialized vision of the enemy (Jews) that would allow the military to at 
least pretend that it was accomplishing legitimate military tasks while killing women and 
children.794  Of course, there were leaders involved here, men such as Keitel, Wagner, 
Reichenau, and von Schenckendorff as well as lower level commanders such as von 
Bechtolsheim who set a command climate that drove this process and undoubtedly 
influenced the decision-making of those below them. 
The last element that influenced the level and type of participation in atrocity by 
German soldiers, not surprisingly, the situation in which they found themselves, both 
spatially and temporally.  Not every German soldier was placed in a position where he would 
come into contact with the Nazi genocidal project.  Frontline soldiers were exposed to 
different elements of Nazi violence such as POW killings, the Commissar order, plunder of 
civilian property, and murders of “suspected partisans,” but not usually anti-Jewish actions.  
For those stationed in the rear, familiarity bred greater and greater levels of complicity.  
While the Krupki and Krucha killings were somewhat ad hoc, new, and benefited from no 
                                                
794 Should this seem too stark a conclusion, we should not forget that a similar environment (though certainly 
different as well) enabled American servicemen to murder women and children under the pretext of an 
antipartisan action at My Lai in Vietnam in 1968. 
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real systematic working relationship, the actions of soldiers in Slonim, Novogrudok, and 
Szczuczyn demonstrate an increasing understanding of all the dimensions of the Final 
Solution and the various ways in which soldiers could participate and benefit.  In a few cases, 
as Joachim Lochbihler’s behavior shows, this familiarity could also allow those soldiers not 
interested in participation or seeking to assist Jews to identify modes of behavior within the 
system of persecution that would allow them to do just that. 
The archival research behind this study has also brought to light the incredibly 
complex relationships between Jews, soldiers, and civilian authorities ranging from 
friendships to sexual exploitation.  Despite postwar protestations that they had had no contact 
with Jews, these relationships demonstrate that long term exposure and proximity to anti-
Jewish policy resulted in varying forms of intimate contact between Jews and soldiers.  Of 
course, understanding these relationships has been one of the more difficult areas of research 
given the postwar reticence of both survivors and German soldiers to discuss these issues. 
Only recently have historians begun to venture into these sensitive, yet important areas.795  
Certainly, more research is necessary to better understand both the nature of these encounters 
and their effects on both Germans and Jews. 
This study has also identified other areas for further investigation.  First, as a result of 
the bitter fighting in the winter of 1941/42 both the 354th Infantry Regiment and the 691st 
Infantry Regiment were sent to the front so it is difficult to conduct a longitudinal study of 
their behavior throughout the war.  It would be important to see how previous experience in 
the Holocaust in rear areas would impact a unit’s actions later in the war.  We have some 
                                                
795 Most notable is Christopher Browning’s latest work which includes descriptions of relationships between 
Jews, Poles, and Germans and begins to paint a picture of some of these most personal situations.  Christopher 
R. Browning, Remembering Survival: Inside a Nazi Slave-Labor Camp (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2010). 
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indication of how this might occur as the 707th Infantry Division was assigned to the 
increasingly dangerous antipartisan war in the East.  The 6th Company, which had been so 
deeply involved in mass murder in Slonim, apparently continued to behave brutally in these 
operations as well.  Former Lieutenant Scherer, who had joined the 6th Company in Slonim in 
December 1941, was charged in 1964 with murdering at least twelve civilians who had been 
confined in a barn during antipartisan operations.796  This is not, perhaps, an isolated 
phenomenon as the most well-known of atrocities in France, in Oradour-sur-Glane in 1944, 
was perpetrated by an SS unit that had cut its teeth on the Eastern Front.797  However, more 
research is necessary to determine the longer paths of these kinds of units throughout the war 
and to identify more instances of Army support for genocide, as only a small minority of 
these actions is reflected in judicial records. 
Finally, in the end, why did these men choose to participate or fail to decline 
participation?  Each individual approached this moment in the context of his own beliefs and 
background and few were prepared for it (at least initially).  Some generalizations can be 
made. These men felt intense social pressure to conform, in a vast and strange enemy land 
with only their comrades around them.  The environment heightened the already powerful 
cohesive forces that military units intrinsically exert.  Of course, the all-male make-up of 
these units cannot be overlooked and likely contributed to criteria by which those who 
participated were strong and masculine; the condemnation of Josef Sibille by his commander 
                                                
796 See BA-ZS: B162/1550 and B162/1551 
797 For more on Oradour, see Sarah Bennett Farmer, Martyred Village : Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at 
Oradour-Sur-Glane (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 
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as “too soft” bears this out.798  This also explains why those who did seek to abstain often 
blamed their distaste for the physical experience of killing rather than their moral opposition 
to the killing itself.  Blaming one’s own “softness” or sentimentality for non-participation 
allowed a soldier to continue to access the masculine support network of comradeship.  
Conversely, taking a moral position, and openly identifying the actions of one’s comrades as 
wrong risked exclusion from that community and “social death.” 
The “obedience to orders” defense, while rejected by the Nuremburg Tribunal, speaks 
to a larger pressure:  that of the fear of retribution and the indoctrination of slavish discipline 
(Kadavergehorsam).  We cannot overlook the power that the military hierarchy held over 
soldiers, many of whom were draftees.  However, this research has also shown that there was 
a significant space for agency among Wehrmacht soldiers in these rear areas.  Asking to be 
released from shooting civilians was not the same as asking to be released from frontline 
duty and this request was almost always granted. 
Longterm exposure to the genocidal project was decisive in cultivating the reactions 
of the soldiers involved.  As the landscape of perpetration became more and more apparent, 
so too did the opportunities for both personal involvement (and enrichment) and for either 
disengagement or assistance to Jews.  Therefore, these men were faced with the stark choice 
of to kill or not to kill, but also with the much more complex choices of complicity at the 
edges of the Final Solution.  Most men chose not to take any outward action to remove 
themselves from the situation, though it is likely that some were deeply troubled by what 
                                                
798 For more on this concept, see Thomas Kühne, "Male Bonding and Shame Culture: Hitler's Soldiers and the 
Moral Basis of Genocidal Warfare," in Ordinary People as Mass Murderers : Perpetrators in Comparative 
Perspectives, ed. Olaf Szejnmann Claus-Christian W. Jensen (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2008). 
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they were participating in.799  Even those few who chose to help or at least evade 
participation did so in the least conspicuous ways possible.  Unfortunately, the evidence 
indicates that many soldiers chose to take advantage of the situation financially and that few 
refused to participate in tasks directly related to but not spatially near killing.  
War and genocide are inextricably linked.  All genocides in the modern era (and most 
throughout history) have occurred in the context of a war or some kind of armed conflict.  
Moreover, in each of these, militaries have played a key supporting and/or active role in the 
mass killing of civilians.  The addition of a military to a genocidal (or pre-genocidal) 
situation can often be the spark required to ignite a full-fledged genocide.  The behavior of 
the German Army during the Holocaust in the Soviet Union shows how deeply and rapidly a 
supposedly professional organization can become involved in the murder of women and 
children given extended exposure to genocidal policy. 
The importance of leadership in preventing atrocities is perhaps not an earth 
shattering finding.  However, the fact that institutional and unit cultures were decisive for the 
participation of German soldiers, even in an openly racist and violent regime such as the 
Third Reich, highlights for us the real impact of organizational structures and attitudes in 
influencing behavior.  The experiences of German soldiers in killing in the East also allows 
the rare opportunity to connect the more general elements of a dysfunctional organization 
with the very real and specific effects they have at the ground level, on the lives of real 
power. 
                                                
799 This kind of internal disagreement, though often assumed by the courts, is often difficult to find in soldier 
testimony because it required them to admit both participation and that they knew it was wrong, which for both 
reasons of legality and conscience many were reluctant to do.  In this situation, the most clear indicator of 
mindset is action. 
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In an era whose wars continue to be less clearly defined and increasingly include 
civilian populations, the lessons we can learn from these Wehrmacht units regarding the 
critical impact of leadership and unit culture are even more important.  The actions of a few 
American units in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce that this lesson has not been learned and 
that maintaining an ethical environment in a complex war is very difficult.  At least five 
members of the U.S. Army’s 5th Stryker Brigade have been accused of war crimes, including 
forming a “kill team” which targeted unarmed Afghan civilians and took body parts as 
trophies.  Investigators have focused on the command climate created by the brigade 
commander. An official who observed the unit in training noted  “When you feel violent 
intent coming down from the command and into the culture of the brigade, that’s when you 
end up with things like the rogue platoon. He established a culture that allowed that kind of 
mindset to percolate. And there are second- and third-order effects that come with that. 
Clearly, the guys who were pulling the trigger are the proximate cause of the crime, but the 
culture itself is the enabler.”800  The brigade commander had openly “sneered” at the Army’s 
counter-insurgency policy and “old shocked U.S. and NATO officials that he was 
uninterested in winning the trust of the Afghan people.”801 
No one is comparing this unit to Wehrmacht units supporting a racist and genocidal 
regime.  Indeed, it is the rarity of such crimes in the U.S. military that makes them so 
shocking.  At the same time, this case starkly demonstrates that, despite advances in 
technology and the benefits of an all-volunteer force, dysfunctional unit cultures originating 
                                                
800 Anna Mulrine, "Pentagon Had Red Flags About Command Climate in 'Kill Team' Stryker Brigade," 
Christian Science Monitor, 28 October 2010. 
801 Craig Whitlock, "Brigade's Strategy: 'Strike and Destroy'," The Washington Post, 14 October 2010. 
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from upper leadership can still result in crimes that would not seem out of place in the 
Wehrmacht.  
Finally, this project has recreated Wehrmacht behavior at the individual level in a way 
that has not yet been done.  It shows the Army participating in the Holocaust by bullets in 
different kinds of situations over time and it gives a human face to the perpetrators.  
“Complicity” is no longer a vague term that somehow indicates a compromised morality.  It 
now represents men looting corpses, marching women and children to their deaths, and 
eventually murdering them as well.   
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Appendix I: Belarus Demographic Information 
 
Figure 5. Population of Belarus, 1926 Census 
802 
                                                
802 Mordechai Altshuler, Soviet Jewry on the Eve of the Holocaust : A Social and Demographic Profile 
(Jerusalem: Centre for Research of East European Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1998), 222. 
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Figure 6. Jewish Population of Belarus by Oblast, 1939 
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803 Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus : At a Crossroads in History (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 78. 
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Appendix II: Demographic Profile of Jewish Victims of Krupki and Slonim 
 
 
Figure 7. Krupki victims by age and gender (from a sample of 157)804 
 
                                                
804 This data was gathered from the Yad Vashem Names Database.  This database consists of entries on 
individuals listing a great deal of biographical.  These entries were generally submitted by family or friends of 
victims and, as such, cannot be considered entirely accurate.  However, they do likely give us enough 
information to suggest general trends. 
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Figure 8. Krupki victims by marital status (from a sample of 157) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Slonim victims by age and gender (from a sample of 670) 
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Figure 10. Slonim victims by marital status (from a sample of 670) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Slonim victims by profession (from a sample of 670) 
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Professions of Slonim Victims (Detail) 
 All % Men % Women % 
Professionals 35 7.17 25 9.47 10 4.67 
Accountant 5 1.02 4 1.52 1 0.47 
Dentist 3 0.61 2 0.76 1 0.47 
Doctor 5 1.02 4 1.52 1 0.47 
Electrical Eng 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Engineer 2 0.41 2 0.76   0.00 
Judge 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Lawyer 3 0.61 3 1.14   0.00 
Nurse 3 0.61   0.00 3 1.40 
Opera Singer 1 0.20   0.00 1 0.47 
Pharmacist 4 0.82 3 1.14 1 0.47 
Piano Teacher 1 0.20   0.00 1 0.47 
Polish Teacher 1 0.20   0.00 1 0.47 
Rabbi 5 1.02 5 1.89   0.00 
Businesspeople 42 8.61 27 10.23 15 7.01 
Banker 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Builder 2 0.41 2 0.76   0.00 
Clerk 17 3.48 9 3.41 8 3.74 
Contractor 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Factory Owner 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Furniture Trader 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Grocer 7 1.43 5 1.89 2 0.93 
Hotel Owner 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Industrialist 2 0.41 2 0.76   0.00 
Printer 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Saleswoman 1 0.20   0.00 1 0.47 
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 All % Men % Women % 
Textile Merchant 1 0.20   0.00 1 0.47 
Wood Merchant 2 0.41 2 0.76   0.00 
Craftsman, etc 117 23.98 103 39.02 14 6.54 
Textile Merchant 1 0.20   0.00 1 0.47 
Baker 4 0.82 4 1.52   0.00 
Blacksmith 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Butcher 5 1.02 5 1.89   0.00 
Candle Maker 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Craftsman 5 1.02 5 1.89   0.00 
Furniture Trader 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Goldsmith 2 0.41 2 0.76   0.00 
Grocer 7 1.43 5 1.89 2 0.93 
Haberdasher 2 0.41 1 0.38 1 0.47 
Hairdresser 3 0.61 2 0.76 1 0.47 
Merchant 64 13.11 56 21.21 8 3.74 
Sattler/Leatherworker 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Shoemaker 4 0.82 4 1.52   0.00 
Tailor 10 2.05 10 3.79   0.00 
Tanner 2 0.41 1 0.38 1 0.47 
Watchmaker 3 0.61 3 1.14   0.00 
Weaver 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Laborers 50 10.25 32 12.12 18 8.41 
Agriculture 3 0.61 3 1.14   0.00 
Carpenter 8 1.64 8 3.03   0.00 
Electrician 2 0.41 2 0.76   0.00 
Factory Wkr 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Forrestry 2 0.41 2 0.76   0.00 
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 All % Men % Women % 
Metalworker 9 1.84 9 3.41   0.00 
Road Worker 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Seamstress 17 3.48   0.00 17 7.94 
Textile Technician 1 0.20 1 0.38   0.00 
Worker 3 0.61 2 0.76 1 0.47 
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Appendix III: Demographic Profile of German Soldiers 
 
Figure 12. Soldier age by rank and unit 
805 
                                                
805 These overall unit numbers are based on 320 separate former soldiers who testified after the war and, thus, 
had their biographical data entered into the record.  The ages by rank relate to 172 men whose rank could be 
determined from their testimony. 
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Figure 13. Soldier professions (as reported at the time of their questioning
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